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Without realising it, people unconsciously mimic each other’s postures, gestures 
and mannerisms. This ‘chameleon effect’ is thought to play an important role in creating 
affiliation, rapport and trust. Existing theories propose that mimicry is used as a social 
strategy to bond with other members of our social groups. There is strong behavioural 
and neural evidence for the strategic control of mimicry. However, evidence that mimicry 
leads to positive social outcomes is less robust. In this thesis, I aimed to rigorously test 
the prediction that mimicry leads to rapport and trust, using novel virtual reality methods 
with high experimental control. In the first study, we developed a virtual reality task for 
measuring implicit trust behaviour in a virtual maze. Across three experiments we 
demonstrated the suitability of this task over existing economic games for measuring 
trust towards specific others. In the second and third studies we tested the effects of 
mimicry from virtual characters whose other social behaviours were tightly controlled. In 
the second study, we found that virtual mimicry significantly increased rapport and this 
was not affected by the precise time delay in mimicking. In the third study we found this 
result was not replicated using a strict, pre-registered design, and the effects of virtual 
mimicry did not change depending on the ingroup or outgroup status of the mimicker. In 
the fourth study we went beyond mimicry to explore new ways of modelling coordinated 
behaviour as it naturally occurs in social interactions. We used high-resolution motion 
capture to record motion in dyadic conversations and calculated levels of coordination 
using wavelet analysis. We found a reliable pattern of decoupling as well as coordination 
in people’s head movements. I discuss how the findings of our experiments relate to 
theories about the social function of mimicry and suggest directions for future research. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
After his return from the Amazon rainforest, the naturalist William Henry Bates 
proposed one of the most important principles in evolutionary theory: mimicry. The 
butterflies he had been observing mimicked the appearance of poisonous species to 
avoid being eaten by predators. Broadly speaking, mimicry is to be like another in 
appearance or behaviour. For humans, mimicry of other people’s behaviour seems to be 
a kind of evolutionary Swiss Army knife, with a wide range of adaptive functions 
proposed. Rather than helping us avoid predators, each of these suggested functions 
resonates with the adaptive human qualities of innovation and cooperation noted by 
Darwin (1859). Adam Smith (1759) suggested that mimicry is a way of feeling what 
others are feeling, making it easier for us to understand one another and cooperate. 
Thorndike (1898) highlighted the usefulness of mimicry for learning new abilities from 
others by doing as they do. During the 20th century, mimicry was proposed to underlie 
empathy (Allport, 1968; Freud, 1921) and provide a communicative tool to signal 
togetherness (Allport, 1968; Condon & Ogston, 1966; Piaget, 1946). In light of the 
adaptive social functions attributed to mimicry, many have gone so far as to claim that 
our ability to imitate is what makes us human. Over the last two decades, mimicry 
research in social psychology has referred to this remarkable aspect of human behaviour 
as the ‘chameleon effect’. 
The chameleon effect typically refers to unconscious behavioural mimicry, which 
occurs when one person unintentionally and effortlessly copies another person’s posture 
or body movements without either one being aware (Chartrand & Lakin, 2013; Chartrand 
& van Baaren, 2009). Mimicry has also been described as ‘behaviour matching’ (Bernieri 
& Rosenthal, 1991; Chartrand & Bargh, 1999), and may extend to the contagion of facial 
expressions (Bavelas, Black, Lemery, & Mullett, 1987; Bavelas, Black, Lemery, & Mullett, 
1986; Dimberg, Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000), moods and emotions (Hsee, Hatfield, 
Carlson, & Chemtob, 1990; Neumann & Strack, 2000) and characteristics of speech 






(Giles & Powesland, 1975; Neumann & Strack, 2000). However, I will use the term 
‘mimicry’ to refer more strictly to the unconscious imitation of body posture and 
movement.  
Mimicry is one of many ways we can coordinate our behaviour with other people 
during social interactions (Table 1-1).  The umbrella term interpersonal coordination 
covers a range of coordinated actions between two people, which can be linked in both 
space and time. If the actions occur at the same time, they are described as entrained 
or synchronous (see Table 1-1, column 1). If one action occurs after a delay but is 
contingent on the other, this is termed mimicry or imitation if the actions have the same 
form, and complementary if the form is different (see column 2). We make a distinction 
between mimicry, which is unconscious and spontaneous, and imitation, which may be 
deliberate and goal-directed (Bekkering & Prinz, 2002; Bekkering, Wohlschlager, & 
Gattis, 2000; but see Whiten, McGuigan, Marshall-Pescini, & Hopper, 2009). While the 
terms above have traditionally occupied separate research literatures, different forms of 
interpersonal coordination may occur at the same time or dynamically during a real life 
social interactions. Therefore, while this PhD project specifically focuses on mimicry, I 
will also draw from literature on imitation, contingent behaviour and synchrony. 
Although mimicry between real life social partners may happen reciprocally, in 
research we typically label one person as the mimicker and one person as the mimickee. 
With the spotlight predominantly on the mimicker, recent research has built up a large 
body of evidence about the social and cognitive processes involved in mimicking another 
person. Data from many sources shows that people tend to spontaneously copy each 
other (Chartrand, Maddux, & Lakin, 2005; van Baaren, Janssen, Chartrand, & 
Dijksterhuis, 2009), and the production of mimicry may be modulated by the motivation 
to affiliate (Chartrand et al., 2005; Lakin, Jefferis, Cheng, & Chartrand, 2003). Neurally, 
we know that producing mimicry engages inferior parietal cortex and premotor cortex 
(Grèzes & Decety, 2001; Iacoboni et al., 1999; Molenberghs, Cunnington, & Mattingley, 
2009), which are commonly referred to as the mirror neuron system. Top-down control 






of mimicry in response to the social context has also been linked to neural activation in 
prefrontal cortex (Brass, Ruby, & Spengler, 2009; Spengler, von Cramon, & Brass, 2010; 
Spengler, von Cramon, & Brass, 2009; Wang & Hamilton, 2012); As a result, several 
detailed neurocognitive models of mimicry have been developed which link together 
processes of mimicry production and top-down control (Brass et al., 2009; Cross, Torrisi, 
Reynolds Losin, & Iacoboni, 2013; Spengler et al., 2009; Wang & Hamilton, 2012).  
 
Table 1-1. Definitions. 
Interpersonal coordination  
The degree to which the behaviours in an interaction are nonrandom, patterned, or 
synchronised in both timing and form (Bernieri & Rosenthal, 1991) 
 
 Synchrony in timing Delay in timing 
 Entrainment 
The behaviour of two moving 
actors A1 and A2 becomes 
coupled because they mutually 
affect each other's behaviour 
(Knoblich & Sebanz, 2008). 
 
Contingency 
The extent to which activation of 
one representation predicts 
activation of another (Cook, 
Press, Dickinson, & Heyes, 
2010). 
Same Form Perfect synchrony 
The matching of behaviour in 
both form and time (Miles, 
Griffiths, Richardson, & Macrae, 
2010), e.g. marching in parade. 
Imitation 
Copying the form of an action 
(Whiten et al., 2009). Imitation is 
volitional (Kinsbourne & Helt, 
2011) and goal-directed 
(Bekkering et al., 2000). 
 
Mimicry 
The automatic imitation of 
gestures, postures, mannerisms, 
and other motor movements 
(Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). 






The matching of different 
behaviours at the same time, e.g. 
playing of an orchestra. 
Complementary actions and 
other non-matching contingent 
behaviours, e.g. taking an object 
from someone’s hand. 
 
 
In contrast to this detailed evidence about the production of mimicry, we know less 
about how mimickees perceive and respond to being mimicked. From a theoretical point 
of view, it is widely assumed that there is a bidirectional link between mimicry and 






affiliation, such that being mimicked leads to more liking, affiliation and rapport 
(Chartrand et al., 2005; Chartrand & van Baaren, 2009; Lakin & Chartrand, 2003). This 
has led to the dominant theory that mimicry has evolved to act as ‘social glue’ 
(Dijksterhuis, 2005; Lakin et al., 2003) that helps us to bond with members of our social 
groups by creating smooth, harmonious social interactions (Lakin et al., 2003). Much of 
the support for this theory comes from evidence that people increase mimicry when they 
interact with in-group members (Bourgeois & Hess, 2008; Yabar, Johnston, Miles, & 
Peace, 2006) or otherwise have a goal to affiliate (Cheng & Chartrand, 2003; Karremans 
& Verwijmeren, 2008; Stel et al., 2010). However, if mimicry truly serves an adaptive 
social function, then we should also look to mimickees for critical evidence as to whether 
mimicry creates positive social effects or not. 
The aim of this thesis is to rigorously test the claim that being mimicked leads to 
rapport and trust towards the mimicker. In the following section, I review three different 
theoretical views about the social function of mimicry. Next, I critically review existing 
empirical evidence about how people respond to being mimicked outside of awareness. 
In particular, I will re-examine whether being mimicked consistently leads to positive 
outcomes such as liking and trust. Finally, I will discuss methodological challenges 
traditionally associated with studying mimicry effects, and alternative methods which 
may overcome these challenges. Such methods include programming avatars to mimic 
in virtual reality and motion tracking participants who have been primed to mimic each 
other. These methods form the basis for the experiments in this PhD project. 
1.1 Theories of Mimicry 
1.1.1 Mimicry is Innately Adaptive. 
One set of theories suggests that mimicry has evolved as an innate ability with 
adaptive advantages for communication and bonding. According to this view, mimicry is 
a matter of nature rather than nurture. Meltzoff and Moore (1977, 1983, 1997) claimed 
that newborn infants are born with the ability and tendency to imitate adults’ facial 






expressions. They proposed that this ability comes from a specialised cognitive 
mechanism for mapping observed actions onto actions that could be performed by the 
infant’s body, called ‘active intermodal mapping’ (Meltzoff & Moore, 1997). According to 
a nativist view, this innate mechanism would have evolved through natural selection 
because mimicry is an important survival tool that provides a basis for social learning 
and understanding (Meltzoff, 2007a; Meltzoff & Moore, 1997). Most evidence for this 
account comes from studies of newborn infants and monkeys. For example, Meltzoff and 
Moore (1977) famously reported that neonates mimicked the facial expressions of adults 
mere hours after birth. They argued that if such young infants could mimic a range of 
facial expressions, there must be an innate ability to mimic that could not be explained 
as a simple reflex. However, subsequent meta-analysis has shown that neonate imitation 
cannot be reliably replicated for most expressions (Anisfeld, 1996). One exception was 
tongue protrusion, although a subsequent review also found this effect to be unreliable 
(Jones, 2009). A recent longitudinal study following 106 infants for nine weeks found no 
evidence for neonatal imitation, and the data suggested that previous positive findings 
could be artifacts associated with small sample sizes and limited control conditions 
(Oostenbroek et al., 2016). Overall, there is little robust evidence that mimicry is an 
innate ability in newborns and therefore there is not strong support for nativist accounts 
of mimicry. 
Focusing on adult mimicry, another theory proposes that our unconscious 
tendency to mimic other people is an ‘honest signal’ (Pentland, 2010). Pentland defines 
an honest signal as behaviour that is processed unconsciously or is otherwise 
uncontrollable. As well as mimicry, Pentland suggests that other honest signals include 
imitation in speech (which he terms ‘influence’), amount of overall movement (termed 
‘activity’) and variability in movements and speech (‘consistency’). These unconscious 
patterns of behaviour are assumed to have a biological basis, and it is proposed that 
they evolved from primate social signalling. According to Pentland (Arena, Pentland, & 
Price, 2010; Pentland, 2010), honest signals have strong adaptive value because they 






unintentionally reveal our true attitudes towards people we interact with, particularly in-
group versus out-group members. Evidence in favour of the honest signal theory comes 
from the observation that people mimic unintentionally and outside of their awareness. It 
is also supported by studies showing that people tend to increase mimicry towards 
ingroup members (Bourgeois & Hess, 2008; Yabar et al., 2006). However, there is little 
evidence about how the mimicked party can unconsciously perceive mimicry and 
recognise it as a signal of liking. In addition, the honest signals theory is directly 
challenged by evidence that people adjust their levels of mimicry in a goal-directed 
manner. Following an explicit goal to affiliate, participants increased their level of mimicry 
outside their own awareness (Lakin & Chartrand, 2003). This finding implies that 
unconscious mimicry can be affected by deliberate goals, and might therefore be 
modulated in a Machiavellian way to achieve social influence (Tanner, 2008; Wang & 
Hamilton, 2012). This evidence therefore undermines the idea that mimicry evolved for 
honest social signalling.  
1.1.2 Mimicry is a Social Strategy. 
Another set of theories proposes that mimicry is a strategic communication tool. 
Lakin et al. (Lakin et al., 2003) describe mimicry as ‘social glue’ that bonds people 
together by creating liking, affiliation and rapport (see also Dijksterhuis, 2005). They 
suggest that the ability to deliberately imitate other people’s actions may originally have 
had adaptive value in helping us to communicate non-verbally. Over time, they propose 
that this ability might have become automatized and evolved into unconscious 
behavioural mimicry. According to the social glue theory, mimicry now serves a new 
adaptive function of creating more harmonious relationships with group members. Thus, 
the social glue theory makes similar claims to Pentland’s honest signals theory. 
However, the two theories make different claims about the strategic control of mimicry. 
Whereas Pentland argues that mimicry is adaptive because it is truly honest and 
uncontrolled, the social glue theory suggests that mimicry is adaptive because people 
can use it strategically when they need to create affiliation and rapport. This part of the 






social glue theory is based on two lines of evidence. Firstly, Chartrand and Bargh (1999) 
showed that people who are mimicked feel rapport towards the mimicker, suggesting 
that mimicry can be successful in generating rapport. Secondly, Lakin et al.’s (2003) 
finding that people are more likely to mimic others when they have an explicit goal to 
affiliate with them suggests that levels of mimicry can be strategically increased. Other 
studies have reported consistent data on the link from mimicry to liking (Bailenson & Yee, 
2005; Kot & Kulesza, 2016; Kouzakova, van Baaren, & van Knippenberg, 2010) and the 
modulation of mimicry towards people who are liked versus disliked (Stel et al., 2010). 
However, this literature also contains negative results (Drury & van Swol, 2005; Maddux, 
Mullen, & Galinsky, 2008; Verberne, Ham, Ponnada, & Midden, 2013). I will go on to give 
an in-depth critical review of the downstream effects of mimicry in the second section of 
this chapter. 
In line with the social glue theory, the Social Top-Down Response Modulation 
(STORM) model of mimicry outlines how mimicry can be strategically controlled 
depending on the social context (Wang & Hamilton, 2012). Rather than giving a theory 
about the purpose of mimicry, the STORM model outlines how the strategic control of 
mimicry may be neurally implemented. Specifically, it suggests mimicry is implemented 
in the mirror neuron system (MNS) and is strategically controlled by medial prefrontal 
cortex (mPFC). The model is based on evidence from a stimulus-response compatibility 
(SRC) task. In this task, the participant must close or open their hand while a model in a 
video makes a compatible or incompatible action. Typically, participants show an 
imitative effect in which they are faster to respond when the actions are compatible 
(Brass et al., 2009; Wang, Newport, & Hamilton, 2011). Wang, Newport and Hamilton 
(2011) showed that this imitative tendency was enhanced when the model in the video 
maintained direct eye contact, instead of looking away or at her hand. This suggests that 
levels of mimicry are controlled depending on the presence of direct gaze as a social 
cue. In addition, Wang, Ramsey and Hamilton (2011) showed that performing the SRC 
task activated two mirror regions, the STS and IFG, while the observation of eye contact 






engaged mPFC. The connectivity between the MNS and mPFC increased when 
participants imitated a model making eye contact, suggesting that the mPFC exerts top-
down control over mimicry. Thus, the STORM model gives a detailed account of how 
mimicry is controlled by top-down mechanisms. Recently, Stel, van Dijk and van Baaren 
(2016) have proposed a similar cognitive model called Associated Reaction to Action in 
Context (ARAC). This model also proposes that the automatic elicitation of mimicry is 
controlled depending on the social context. However, the authors add that this top-down 
control could depend on previous experiences of reward from mimicking in different 
contexts, and that it may be limited by cognitive capacity. So far these additions have 
not been directly tested. 
1.1.3 Mimicry is a By-Product of Learned Associations. 
In contrast to the theories above, an alternative account claims that mimicry does 
not have a social purpose but is instead a by-product of learned associations. The 
associative sequence learning (ASL) theory suggests that mimicry develops through 
repeated contingent experiences of performing an action and seeing someone else 
perform the same action (Heyes, 2001; Heyes & Ray, 2000). For example, when a baby 
waves her arm and sees her own arm moving, this strengthens the neural connectivity 
between the baby’s visual and motor representations of waving an arm. Similarly, when 
the baby smiles in front of a parent or a mirror and sees a smile back, this strengthens 
her connection between visual and motor representations of smiling. The ASL theory 
suggests that, over time, repeated contingent sensorimotor experiences create neural 
associations between perceiving and doing actions, such that perceiving an action leads 
to activation of motor neurons that produce the action. This may sometimes produce 
mimicry (and mirror neurons), but critically the ASL theory also predicts that other 
contingencies are learned in the same way. Therefore, according to this view, mimicry is 
simply an evolutionary by-product of associative learning mechanisms. Heyes (2010) 
argues that mimicry may still have social benefits, but it is not a specialised ability that 
was selected for a particular social function.  






Support for the ASL theory comes from SRC studies showing that automatic 
imitative behaviour can be reversed or abolished through sensorimotor training (Ray & 
Heyes, 2011). For example, Heyes, Bird, Johnson and Haggard (2005) gave participants 
a task where they had to respond with the opposite action to a hand opening or closing. 
Following relatively brief training on this task over 432 trials, participants no longer 
showed an automatic imitation response to seeing a hand opening or closing. In another 
study, participants who were trained to perform foot actions in response to hand actions 
(and vice versa) showed a similar reduction in automatic imitation following the training 
(Gillmeister, Catmur, Liepelt, Brass, & Heyes, 2008). Catmur, Walsh and Heyes (2007) 
showed that imitative tendencies can even be reversed through sensorimotor training of 
incompatible actions, demonstrating that the involuntary tendency to mimic finger 
movements can become an automatic tendency to counter-imitate. This research 
suggests that our automatic tendency to imitate others is malleable and can be changed 
through relatively brief sensorimotor training. Furthermore, neuroimaging has shown that 
the reversal of imitative behaviour is reflected in MNS activation (Catmur et al., 2008). 
Usually, the MNS shows greater activation when hand movements are observed, 
compared to foot movements. However, after participants were trained to respond with 
a foot movement when they saw a hand movement and vice versa, the MNS showed 
more activation when observing foot movements than hand movements. This strongly 
supports the ASL theory by showing that learning new sensorimotor associations is 
accompanied by a change in the MNS, suggesting that its mirror properties are formed 
and changed through learned experience.  
1.1.4 Summary and Theoretical Predictions 
Current theories about the social function of mimicry fall into three main camps. 
The first suggests that mimicry is an innate behaviour that has evolved because it is 
socially adaptive. Nativist theories suggest that mimicry may serve functions associated 
with social learning and understanding others’ minds (Meltzoff, 2007a; Meltzoff & Moore, 
1997). The ‘honest signals’ theory suggests mimicry is adaptive because it provides a 






true indicator of social attitudes (Arena et al., 2010; Pentland, 2010). Each of these 
theories has only received weak empirical support. The second theoretical camp 
suggests that mimicry is used as a social strategy. The social glue theory assumes that 
mimicry originally evolved to facilitate communication but now serves the function of 
creating affiliation and rapport (Dijksterhuis, 2005; Lakin et al., 2003). According the 
social glue theory, people can adjust levels of mimicry strategically. In line with this view, 
the STORM model provides a detailed neurocognitive account of the top-down control 
of mimicry depending on social context (Wang & Hamilton, 2012). However, while there 
is strong behavioural and neural evidence that people use mimicry strategically, it is less 
clear whether mimicry actually has strategic benefits for social interactions. This is a key 
limitation, because the third theoretical camp opposes the view that mimicry has a social 
function. Proponents of this view suggest that mimicry is an evolutionary by-product of 
learned associations (Heyes, 2001, 2010). The ASL theory proposes that domain-
general learning processes lead to visuomotor associations between perceived and 
performed actions. In some contexts these may give rise to mimicry, but the ASL theory 
suggests that mimicry itself has no special social purpose.  
For critical evidence about whether mimicry does or does not serve a social 
function, we can look at the effects of mimicry on the mimickee. If being mimicked leads 
to positive feelings towards the mimicker, this would suggest that mimicry is a useful 
social strategy and would support the social glue theory. However, if mimicry itself cannot 
generate any positive social effects then this would undermine its utility as a social 
strategy, consistent with the view that mimicry is an evolutionary by-product with no 
social purpose. It is the aim of this thesis to rigorously test whether mimicry leads to 
positive social effects, with a focus on rapport and trust. In the following sections of the 
introduction I critically examine the current literature on mimicry effects and highlight 
methodological issues associated with current approaches, as well as new methods 
which will be used in this thesis. 






1.2 How Do People Respond to Being Mimicked? 
In this section, I critically review the current literature on the downstream effects of 
being mimicked on the mimickee. First, I review the effects of being mimicked on a range 
of positive social outcomes that have been investigated, including affiliation, trust, 
prosocial behaviour, self-related feelings and changing opinions. While many studies 
show positive effects of being mimicked on these outcomes, these results may be 
tempered by other research showing that the effects of being mimicked are modulated 
by social characteristics of the mimicker and mimickee. 
1.2.1 Positive Responses to Mimicry  
Liking. There is a strong consensus that people respond positively to being 
mimicked. Initially, researchers observed that mimicry during clinical therapy sessions 
(Cappella & Planalp, 1981; Scheflen, 1964, 1972) and classroom interactions (Bernieri, 
1988; Bernieri & Rosenthal, 1991; LaFrance, 1979; LaFrance & Broadbent, 1976) was 
correlated with reported affiliation, empathy and rapport. Several early experiments 
manipulated posture congruency and found that confederates who mirrored the posture 
of participants were evaluated as more similar (Dabbs Jr., 1969; Navarre, 1982), 
empathic (Maurer & Tindall, 1983) and sociable (Navarre, 1982). Then, in a seminal 
study, Chartrand & Bargh (1999, Experiment 2) trained confederates to manipulate the 
level of mimicry in an interaction. Each participant spent fifteen minutes with a 
confederate, taking turns to describe various photographs. In the mimicry condition, the 
confederate mirrored participants’ posture, gestures and mannerisms; in the control 
condition, the confederate maintained a neutral posture. At the end of the session, 
participants who were mimicked rated the confederate as significantly more likeable and 
the overall interaction as significantly more smooth than participants in the control 
condition. Following this study, the confederate paradigm became a popular method for 
studying mimicry effects (Stel, Rispens, Leliveld, & Lokhorst, 2011; Van Baaren & 
Chartrand, 2005; van Baaren, Holland, Kawakami, & van Knippenberg, 2004), and 






researchers have worked under the assumption that one of the fundamental effects of 
mimicry is to increase liking towards the mimicker (e.g. Chartrand & Lakin, 2013; Lakin 
et al., 2003; Stel et al., 2010). 
However, this basic link from mimicry to liking has not been replicated consistently. 
Eleven studies which measured liking in response to mimicry are summarised in Table 
1-2. Five experiments have replicated Chartrand & Bargh’s (1999) result using the 
confederate paradigm (Kot & Kulesza, 2016; Kouzakova, Karremans, van Baaren, & van 
Knippenberg, 2010; Kouzakova, van Baaren, & van Knippenberg, 2010; Stel et al., 2011, 
Study 1). One experiment replicated this finding within ‘prosocial’ but not ‘proself’ 
participants (Stel et al., 2011, Study 2). Two experiments using the confederate paradigm 
failed to replicate the mimicry-liking link, despite reporting significant effects of mimicry 
on other measures (Drury & van Swol, 2005; van Swol, 2003). Similar results were 
reported by a much earlier experiment on posture congruency (Dabbs Jr., 1969). 
Bailenson and Yee (2005) found positive effects of being mimicked using a virtual 
mimicry paradigm: in their experiment, participants wore a head mounted display (HMD) 
which let them see a virtual character in an immersive virtual environment. The HMD 
tracked participants’ head movements and the virtual character either mimicked their 
movement or made head movements recorded from a previous participant, while 
delivering a persuasive speech. Participants who were mimicked rated the character as 
more effective on a composite scale which included likability (Bailenson & Yee, 2005), 
although the weighting of likeability was unclear. Another virtual mimicry study found a 
positive effect on liking for one out of two virtual characters that mimicked participants in 
the same way (Verberne et al., 2013). Finally, Maddux, Mullen and Galinsky (2008, Study 
2) instructed participants to either mimic or not mimic their partner during a business 
negotiation task, and found that mimicry did not lead the partners to rate more liking for 
each other. Overall, only six of 12 studies found a clear mimicry-liking link, and our list 
does not include studies which have not been published due to negative results. Even 






the studies which have found positive results report small effect sizes (eta squared close 
to 0.1).  
Trust. The effects of mimicry on trust towards the mimicker appear to be similarly 
inconsistent. In the same business negotiation task, Maddux et al. (2008, Study 2) found 
that the amount of time participants self-reported mimicking their partner was significantly 
correlated with the partner’s rating of trust towards the mimicker, and the partner’s trust 
mediated a positive effect of mimicry on the likelihood of negotiating a successful deal. 
In line with these findings, Verberne et al. (2013) found people rated more trust towards 
a virtual character that mimicked them, and mimicry also increased participants’ 
willingness to trust the virtual character in an economic investment game. However, they 
could not replicate these results with a second character and a different decision-making 
task. This suggests the effects of mimicry on implicit trust behaviour may be mimicker- 
or task-dependent (Hasler, Hirschberger, Shani-Sherman, & Friedman, 2014). It is worth 
noting that very few experiments have tested the effects of mimicry on trust, so the mixed 
results reported here make it hard to draw any firm conclusions. Self-report ratings (e.g. 
Maddux et al., 2008) and economic trust games where the amount of money or other 
goods exchanged provides the measure of trust (Verberne et al., 2013) are also relatively 
explicit measures that require the participant to put a number on how much they trust the 
mimicker or non-mimicker, and may not capture more implicit aspects of trust. In addition, 
the economic trust game is highly sensitive to individual differences (Ben-Ner & 
Halldorsson, 2010; Johnson & Mislin, 2011), which may reduce its sensitivity to 
differences between a mimicker and non- mimicker. Therefore, mimicry research could 
benefit from more implicit behavioural measures of trust. 
At this point it would also be helpful to discuss how trust and trustworthiness are 
defined. There is a conceptual distinction between a participant’s trust towards a target, 
and the target’s trustworthiness, although sometimes a participant’s ratings of the 
target’s trustworthiness are used to infer their trust (Lyon, Möllering, & Saunders, 2012). 
There are multiple definitions of trust: a widely-accepted definition in behavioural 






economics is that trust involves a voluntary transfer of goods or services in a situation 
where reciprocation is expected but not guaranteed (e.g. Gunnthorsdottir, McCabe, & 
Smith, 2002), such as the investment game. Under this definition, trust involves risking 
exploitation by another person, and that person is trustworthy if they do not exploit. In 
research using virtual characters, and the field of human-computer interaction more 
generally, trust and trustworthiness are often construed in terms of cooperation. 
Economic games involving a risk of exploitation have been used to measure a user’s 
cooperation with an agent and/or manipulate the agent’s cooperativeness (e.g. de Melo, 
Carnevale, & Gratch, 2011; de Melo, Gratch, Carnevale, & Read, 2012; Krumhuber et 
al., 2007). In these contexts, cooperation is interpreted as trusting the agent, and has 
been shown to correlate with ratings of perceived trustworthiness (de Melo, Carnevale, 
& Gratch, 2013; Krumhuber et al., 2007). 
However, in this thesis we adopt a looser cross-disciplinary definition, where trust 
involves putting oneself in a vulnerable position with positive expectations of another 
person’s intentions or behaviour (Lyon et al., 2012; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 
1998). Under this definition, trust does not necessarily involve a risk of exploitation, but 
could involve a risk of being disadvantaged if the other person is uncooperative, 
untruthful, unreliable or incompetent. This broad view is able to accommodate nuances 
in the lay meanings of ‘trust’ in everyday language. However, it is unclear whether this 
definition is compatible with the popular model of social cognition proposed by Fiske et 
al. (Fiske, 2008; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007; Fiske, 
Xu, Cuddy, & Glick, 1999). According to this model, our perceptions of others are 
organised along two universal dimensions of warmth and competence. Fiske et al. (2007) 
argue that warmth is closely linked to trustworthiness, although they acknowledge that 
this link is debated. In contrast, they claim it is widely accepted that competence 
comprises traits such as efficiency and intelligence. Under this view, perceived 
trustworthiness may be independent of perceived reliability or competence, although it 
is less clear where traits like cooperativeness or truthfulness might fit in.
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Negotiation Other participant 
instructed to mimic 
participant 
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negotiating with the other 
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We return to discuss the relationship between trust, warmth and competence in Chapter 
2. 
Prosocial and self-related changes. A reliable positive consequence of mimicry 
is an increase in prosocial behaviour. Following mimicry, participants are not only more 
likely to agree with an explicit request for help (Guéguen, Martin, & Meineri, 2011), they 
are also more spontaneously helpful: van Baaren et al. (2004, experiment 1) found that 
people who were mimicked by an experimenter while taking turns to describe 
advertisements were more likely to pick up some pens she dropped after the end of the 
task. In a follow-up experiment, people who were mimicked were also more likely to help 
an unrelated experimenter (van Baaren et al., 2004). Similar responses were recently 
demonstrated in infants aged 18 months using an adaptation of the same paradigm 
(Carpenter, Uebel, & Tomasello, 2013). In other contexts, being mimicked made 
participants more willing to help an unknown researcher by filling out a tedious 
questionnaire (Ashton-James, van Baaren, Chartrand, Decety, & Karremans, 2007) and 
made people passing along a street more compliant with a stranger’s request for help 
(Fischer-Lokou, Martin, Guéguen, & Lamy, 2011). As well as helping, mimicry leads 
people to donate more money to charity, regardless of whether the charity is connected 
to the mimicker (van Baaren et al., 2004). People may even be more inclined to vote for 
prosocial left-wing political parties following mimicry (Stel & Harinck, 2011). Taken 
together, these findings suggest that mimicry elicits prosocial responses which extend 
beyond the mimicry interaction (Van Baaren & Chartrand, 2005; van Baaren et al., 2004).  
Mimicry also appears to influence or affect the self-construal of the person being 
mimicked. When completing a ‘twenty statements’ measure of self-construal (Kuhn & 
McPartland, 1954), in which people may define themselves by relationships with other 
people (interdependently) or without reference to others (independently), people reliably 
provide more interdependent statements following mimicry (Redeker, Stel, & Mastop, 
2011; Stel & Harinck, 2011; Stel et al., 2011). Participants who were mimicked also felt 
closer to others when completing an ‘inclusion of other in the self’ (IOS) scale (Aron, 






Aron, & Smollan, 1992), which depicts increasingly overlapping circles representing self 
and other (Ashton-James et al., 2007, Experiment 2). As well as feeling closer to others, 
participants who have been mimicked are more likely to connect objects with their 
surrounding context and see similarities between photographs which are not 
systematically related (van Baaren, Janssen, et al., 2009). They also show less divergent 
thinking and more convergent thinking, which is thought to facilitate collaboration 
(Ashton-James & Chartrand, 2009). Together, these studies suggest that being 
mimicked leads to both an interdependent self-construal and prosocial behaviour. 
Notably, these effects have been demonstrated together (Ashton-James et al., 2007; 
Catmur & Heyes, 2013; Stel & Harinck, 2011) and Ashton-James et al. (2007, Study 4) 
found that self-construal mediated the effect of mimicry on prosocial behaviour.  
Changing opinions. Being mimicked can change people’s opinions and 
behaviour in a number of ways. Mimicry increases perceived smoothness in an 
interaction (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). In addition, people are more likely to disclose 
intimate information (Guéguen, Martin, Meineri, & Simon, 2013) or give honest answers 
(Guéguen, 2013) to a confederate who mimicks them. Mimickers are also rated as being 
more persuasive than non-mimickers (Bailenson & Yee, 2005; Drury & van Swol, 2005; 
van Swol, 2003), and may sometimes be more successful in swaying people to agree 
with their opinion (Bailenson & Yee, 2005, but see van Swol, 2003) or to consume and 
purchase goods (Herrmann, Rossberg, Huber, Landwehr, & Henkel, 2011; Jacob, 
Guéguen, Martin, & Boulbry, 2011; Tanner, Ferraro, Chartrand, Bettman, & Baaren, 
2008). Furthermore, mimicry can improve negotiation outcomes (Maddux et al., 2008): 
participants who negotiated for around 30 minutes had better personal and joint 
outcomes when one member of the dyad was instructed to mimic (Maddux et al., 2008). 
These results suggest that mimicry could indeed be a beneficial social strategy for 
inducing compliance (Lakin et al., 2003). However, it is possible that confederate 
mimickers might subtly alter other aspects of their behaviour as well as mimicry; I will 
discuss this challenge further in the next section.  






In addition, increasing conformity of opinions is not always positive. Mimicry can 
make participants conform to stereotypes consistent with group stereotypes even when 
those are negative towards the participant and the participant does not endorse them 
(Leander, Chartrand, & Wood, 2011). Together, these studies suggest that being 
mimicked may make participants more conformist or likely to agree, with both the good 
and bad consequences that can bring. 
1.2.2 Factors Modulating Positive Responses to Mimicry 
Mimicker factors. A large number of factors can alter the general picture that 
mimicry has positive and prosocial effects. This is particularly clear in situations where 
people interact with a member of their social outgroup. People typically produce less 
mimicry towards others who they initially dislike (Stel, Blascovich, et al., 2010), outgroup 
members (Bourgeois & Hess, 2008; Yabar, Johnston, Miles, & Peace, 2006), and others 
from a different race (Johnston, 2002). Being mimicked by someone from an outgroup 
does not seem to have the same prosocial consequences as ingroup mimicry. For 
example, following mimicry from an ingroup (White) or outgroup (Black) confederates, 
Dalton et al. (2010, Experiment 2) gave participants a Stroop task as a measure of 
cognitive resource depletion. The results showed a significant interaction between 
mimicry and race: participants who were mimicked by a confederate of the same race 
showed less resource depletion than people who were not mimicked; on the other hand, 
participants who were mimicked by someone of a different race showed more resource 
depletion than people who were not mimicked (Dalton et al., 2010). Mimicry by an 
outgroup member also leads participants to report a room as colder than mimicry from 
an ingroup member (Leander, Chartrand, & Bargh, 2012, Experiment 3).  
Similar effects are found when social status and affiliation is manipulated. Dalton 
et al. (2010) manipulated status by assigning participants to the role of leader or follower 
and a confederate to the other role. Participants who were mimicked by a leader showed 
more resource depletion in a later Stroop task, compared to those mimicked by a follower 
(Dalton et al., 2010, Experiment 3). Participants who were mimicked by a confederate 






expressing affiliation showed positive consequences of mimicry, whereas those 
mimicked by a task-focused confederate did not (Leander et al. 2012, Experiment 1). A 
plausible explanation for all these effects is that mimicry only has positive consequences 
in contexts where it is expected. If being mimicked is unexpected, because a partner is 
an outgroup member or of higher status or not interested in affiliating, then participants 
do not respond in the same way to being mimicked. However, to test this explanation it 
would be useful to examine the effects of mimicry from ingroup and outgroup members 
on more direct measures of liking, rapport or trust. 
Mimickee factors. The consequences of mimicry may also depend critically on 
the personality or other features of the participant being mimicked. In particular, people 
who are highly ‘proself’ rather than ‘prosocial’ may not respond positively to being 
mimicked. Stel et al. (2011) defined participants as prosocial if they consistently chose 
to benefit another player in a game, and proself if they played the game competitively or 
for individual gain. The prosocial participants reacted positively to being mimicked and 
indicated more liking towards a mimicker than a non-mimicker; however, this effect was 
absent in proself participants (Stel et al., 2011). Similarly, although mimicry usually 
causes people to feel more interdependent, people who naturally have a strong 
independent self-construal could find it uncomfortable to be mimicked. Highly 
independent people underestimated the room temperature as a result of mimicry; in 
contrast, highly interdependent people underestimated temperature when they were not 
mimicked (Leander et al., 2012, Experiment 2). Individual differences in self-construal 
can reflect differences in cultural background (Markus & Kitayama, 1991), which may 
modulate responses to mimicry in a similar way. Sanchez-Burks et al. (2009) showed 
that US Latino participants, whose culture emphasises social harmony, felt anxious when 
interviewed by a confederate that did not mimic them, whereas this was not observed in 
US Anglos. Overall, a variety of findings indicate that people who highly value personal 
gain or feel independent from others may not show the expected positive reactions to 
being mimicked.  






Social anxiety may also prevent some individuals from responding positively to 
mimicry. People with high social anxiety tend to focus on themselves and feel awkward 
during conversations (Heerey & Kring, 2007). Therefore it is not surprising that women 
with high social anxiety mimic others less than non-socially anxious women (Vrijsen, 
Lange, Becker, & Rinck, 2010). However, Vrijsen Lange, Dotsch, Wigboldus, & Rinck 
(2010) also found that women with high social anxiety do not respond positively when 
they are mimicked by someone else. In their study, women listened to two virtual 
characters give an opinionated speech; one mimicked participants’ head movements 
and the other did not mimic. Socially anxious women evaluated both characters as 
similarly likable, friendly and convincing, whereas non-socially anxious women evaluated 
the mimicking character more highly (Vrijsen, Lange, Dotsch, et al., 2010). This suggests 
that being mimicked may not have prosocial effects in individuals who focus on 
themselves due to high social anxiety. 
Finally, the prosocial effects of mimicry are expected to break down when people 
become aware they are being mimicked (Ashton-James et al., 2007; Chartrand & Bargh, 
1999; Dalton et al., 2010; Guéguen et al., 2013). This is partly because deliberate 
imitation can be intended and seen as mockery (Nadel, 2002; van Baaren, Decety, 
Dijksterhuis, van der Leij, & van Leeuwen, 2009). However, very few studies have 
directly addressed this expectation, as it is common practice to exclude participants who 
detected mimicry manipulations from analyses (e.g. Bailenson & Yee, 2005; Cheng & 
Chartrand, 2003; Drury & van Swol, 2005; van Swol, 2003). Bailenson et al. (2008, 
Experiment 2) explicitly tested how people respond when they detect they are being 
mimicked. A virtual character mimicked participants’ head movements while delivering a 
persuasive speech in an immersive virtual environment. Eighty per cent of participants 
detected they were being mimicked; these participants rated the character as 
significantly less warm and trustworthy compared participants who did not detect mimicry 
(Bailenson et al., 2008), suggesting that people may only respond positively to mimicry 
when they are unaware it is happening. Consistent results come from another study in 






which participants were told at the end of the experiment (or not) that a confederate had 
been mimicking them (Manusov, 1992). Participants who were made aware of the 
mimicry suggested negative reasons for it in a follow-up questionnaire, including 
manipulation, mockery and being annoying.  
1.2.3 Summary 
In line with previous literature reviews (Chartrand & Dalton, 2009; Chartrand & 
Lakin, 2013; Chartrand & van Baaren, 2009; van Baaren, Janssen, et al., 2009), our 
review suggests there are a variety of ways in which people respond positively to 
mimicry. A range of studies show that mimicry can change people’s perception of the 
mimicker, including judgements of likeability and trust, although these particular effects 
are not very reliable. Other studies show that mimicry can change a participant’s self-
construal, leading an increase in prosocial behaviour, and may also increase agreement 
and conformist behaviour. The positive results from these studies are generally taken as 
good evidence for the social glue theory of mimicry. However, research I have reviewed 
here also shows that positive effects of being mimicked are modulated by characteristics 
of both the mimicker and mimickee. If characteristics of the mimicker make mimicry seem 
unlikely, including outgroup membership or high status, then participants do not respond 
positively to mimicry. Participants who are naturally independent or socially anxious also 
report less positive effects of mimicry. These findings indicate that mimicry cannot always 
offer a strategic advantage in all social situations. Overall, the studies reviewed in this 
section suggest that mimicry can sometimes have positive social effects, in line with the 
social glue theory, but the evidence is not conclusive.  
1.3 Methodological Challenges and Alternative Approaches 
Limitations of the current literature may be partly attributed to methodological 
challenges in studying mimicry effects. In this section I will discuss several major 
challenges associated with existing approaches to manipulating mimicry and measuring 
people’s responses to being mimicked, as well as challenges for carrying out rigorous 






experiments. I then introduce two alternative methods for studying mimicry which exploit 
recent technological advances. The first approach is to generate mimicry from virtual 
interaction partners. The second is to extracting motion data from naïve participants 
during a mimicry interaction. Both of these methods are used and developed in the 
experimental chapters of this thesis. 
1.3.1 Methodological Challenges 
Manipulating mimicry. The first major challenge in testing the consequences of 
being mimicked is to achieve a well-controlled manipulation of mimicry. Since mimicry 
normally occurs unconsciously (Chartrand & Lakin, 2013; Chartrand et al., 2005), it is 
inherently difficult to generate or eliminate. A compromise is to instruct participants or 
confederates to mimic in one experimental condition and refrain from mimicking in a 
control condition. Although this kind of instruction can generate levels of mimicry similar 
to spontaneous levels (Stel, Dijk, & Olivier, 2009; Stel, van den Heuvel, & Smeets, 2008), 
this is not guaranteed (Kurzius & Borkenau, 2015). If untrained participants are instructed 
to mimic it is necessary to perform manipulation checks, such as video recording their 
behaviour (Stel & Vonk, 2010). Some researchers have relied on asking the participant 
to report how well they followed the instruction (Maddux et al., 2008), although this check 
could easily be distorted by demand characteristics or insufficient recall. Even with 
trained confederates, it may be hard to achieve consistent mimicry or non-mimicry 
performance (Fox, Arena, & Bailenson, 2009). 
It may also be hard to control extraneous variables. The instruction to mimic 
imposes cognitive demands which could change other aspects of the social interaction, 
such as emotional understanding (Stel et al., 2009). Furthermore, it is impossible for a 
confederate to be blind to experimental condition, and hard for them to be blind to the 
research hypothesis. It is also possible that differences in non-mimicry behaviour from 
confederates between conditions could influence the experimental results, without 
confederate or experimenter being aware of this (Doyen, Klein, Pichon, & Cleeremans, 
2012; Klein et al., 2012). For example, postural mimicry is normally intertwined with 






emotional and vocal imitation (Chartrand & Lakin, 2013; Chartrand et al., 2005), and 
other types of co-ordination like synchrony (Bernieri & Rosenthal, 1991), turn-taking 
(Pentland, 2010; Wallbott, 1995) and eye contact (Wang, Newport, et al., 2011). 
Sometimes these behaviours are deliberately included in the mimicry manipulation (e.g. 
synchrony, Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; facial and vocal imitation, Stel et al., 2011), but 
researchers wishing to control for these variables must usually video their experiment 
and code the behaviour post hoc (e.g. Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Drury & van Swol, 2005; 
Sanchez-Burks et al., 2009; van Swol, 2003). This approach has limitations because it 
is time consuming and may not be perfectly accurate. 
There are also challenges associated with achieving a good control condition. In 
some paradigms, the control condition is defined as non-mimicry, i.e. neutral movements 
(e.g. Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Kouzakova, Karremans, et al., 2010; van Baaren et al., 
2004). Although the confederate is allowed to move, this condition usually involves sitting 
relatively still in a neutral pose. This could result in less than typical amounts of 
movement, which might be perceived as unnatural compared to the level of movement 
in the mimicry condition. In other paradigms, the control condition involves anti-mimicry, 
i.e. deliberately dissimilar movements (e.g. Ashton-James et al., 2007; Hasler, 
Hirschberger, Shani-Sherman, & Friedman, 2014). This approach may lead to a better 
match between the amount of movement in mimicry and non-mimicry conditions, 
compared to non-mimicry paradigms. However, anti-mimicry may be a poor ‘baseline’ 
because it involves contingent opposite behaviours. Non-mimicry and anti-mimicry 
conditions have been shown to generate different effects; for example, people bought 
significantly more products when they were not mimicked compared to anti-mimicked 
(Kulesza, Szypowska, Jarman, & Dolinski, 2014). Therefore, researchers need to 
consider the appropriate control condition to use.   
Beyond the specific field of mimicry, researchers have criticised the use of 
confederates as conversational partners in studies of language and social interaction. 
Kuhlen and Brennan (2013) highlight four concerns: firstly, that confederates may 






introduce inadvertent bias if they are not blind to the study’s hypothesis; secondly, that 
confederates risk detection as false participants, potentially changing participants’ 
behaviour; thirdly, that confederates may fail to give natural social cues to participants, 
due to the extra knowledge they have about the interaction context; and finally, that 
confederates are often required to follow a script, which could result in unnatural 
utterances. These concerns may be reflected in evidence that conversations with 
confederates or experimenters produce different social effects compared to free 
conversations between naïve participants. A recent review of studies which examined 
how much participants gestured depending on whether or not they could see their 
conversation partner (Bavelas & Healing, 2013) found that significant differences were 
reported by seven studies where the partner was a confederate with constrained 
responses, and no significant differences were reported by seven studies of free 
conversation between naïve participants. In a direct test of referential gaze patterns, 
Brown-Schmidt and Tanenhaus (2008) found that participants also fixated differently on 
items that were mentioned by an experimenter versus another participant, even though 
participants could not see each other or the experimenter. This suggests that there may 
be core differences between conversation with a true partner compared to a confederate. 
Overall, evidence suggests there are substantial limitations to using confederates as 
interaction partners in experiments aiming to test spontaneous social phenomena such 
as the production and downstream effects of mimicry. 
Modulators of mimicry effects. Another challenge is to test how mimicry effects 
are modulated by social contexts and characteristics of the mimicker. This challenge 
particularly applies to confederate paradigms which manipulate mimicry within a live 
interaction (e.g. Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Stel et al., 2011; van Baaren et al., 2004), 
because it is necessary to (a) find the right confederate and (b) train that person to 
perform appropriately. Confederate features such as race, gender and age may all affect 
mimicry, but would be hard to control in a traditional research setting. For example, a 






researcher interested in how age moderates mimicry effects could not employ a child 
confederate for ethical and practical reasons.  
Choosing implicit or explicit measures of mimicry effects. Another major 
challenge is to find valid ways of measuring how participants respond to being mimicked. 
In particular, we can choose between explicit and implicit measures. Explicit measures 
refer to ones where the participant is aware of what is being measured, whereas implicit 
measures are ones where the participant is either unaware of what is specifically being 
assessed or is unaware of their own attitude or behaviour (Petty, Fazio, & Brinol, 2012). 
Note the distinction refers to measures, and the relationship between implicit and explicit 
attitudes at the cognitive level is a matter of debate (Fazio & Olson, 2003). In mimicry 
studies, explicit measures usually involve questionnaires or ratings about the mimicry 
interaction. The advantage of questionnaires is that they are easy to administer and 
widely used (e.g. Bailenson & Yee, 2005; Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Stel et al., 2011; 
Stel & Vonk, 2010; Vrijsen, Lange, Dotsch, et al., 2010). However, there are no 
standardised rating scales for many of the constructs of interest in mimicry research, 
such as liking and rapport (see Table 1-2). Note that explicit measures do not have to 
use standard questionnaire items, and may sometimes involve pictorial scales or 
analogies. For example, IOS scale (Aron et al., 1992) uses overlapping circles to 
illustrate interpersonal closeness, and the ‘feeling thermometer’ uses a temperature 
scale to measure feelings of warmth or liking; however, these measures have not 
consistently shown positive mimicry effects (Ashton-James et al., 2007; Hasler et al., 
2014; Hogeveen, Chartrand, & Obhi, 2014). Self-report questionnaires and ratings have 
the limitation of being open to bias in interpretation and responses (Ben-Ner & 
Halldorsson, 2010; Lyon et al., 2012), and are unsuitable for measuring implicit attitudes. 
This means that explicit responses to questionnaires may correspond poorly to actual 
behaviour (Armitage & Christian, 2003). 
Therefore, it is also useful to measure implicit behavioural responses to mimicry. 
A wide variety of implicit behavioural measures have been used in previous research, 






including Stroop task reaction times (Dalton et al., 2010), estimates of room temperature 
(Leander et al., 2012), the number of pens picked up (van Baaren et al., 2004), and seat 
choice (Ashton-James et al., 2007). These measures have the advantage of measuring 
participants’ implicit reactions to being mimicked, but are not very closely related to the 
mimicry itself and could be influenced by other factors. The variety of implicit measures 
in existing research can also be seen as an advantage and a disadvantage (Daniël 
Lakens, Schubert, & Paladino, 2016). On the one hand, replicating mimicry effects 
across different measures can demonstrate robustness and generalizability. On the 
other hand, it makes it difficult to compare outcomes and possible mechanisms across 
different studies. Mimicry research would therefore benefit from establishing implicit 
behavioural measures that can be easily shared and replicated by multiple research 
groups. Better evaluation of the relationship between implicit and explicit mimicry 
responses within the same experiment could also provide important insights for 
understanding cognitive mechanisms involved in responding to mimicry. 
Scientific rigour. As well as specific challenges for manipulating mimicry and 
measuring its effects, a major issue for psychology research is the need for greater rigour 
in designing and reporting experiments. Here I will briefly outline four interrelated issues 
affecting mimicry research. Firstly, it is increasingly recognised that traditional 
experiments in psychology may lack statistical power (Chase & Chase, 1976; Cohen, 
1962; Tressoldi, 2012). Our brief review of the mimicry-liking link suggest an approximate 
average effect size of η2 = .01 and an average sample size of 60 participants. Most studies 
have used a between-subjects design, possibly to reduce participant awareness of the 
experimental conditions, although this is not necessarily an effective precaution 
(Lambdin & Shaffer, 2009). A power-analysis (G*Power, version 3.1.7, 2013) suggests 
that detecting an effect of η2 = .1 with a between-groups design would require 120 
participants per group. Detecting a similar effect size with a within-subjects design would 
require only 22 participants (c.f. Cohen, 1992). As new factors are introduced, 
increasingly large participant samples must be recruited for between-subjects 






experiments to achieve sufficient experimental power. Between-subjects paradigms are 
also hard to adapt to fMRI to allow neuroimaging. Therefore, it may not be feasible to 
study how mimicry effects vary across different contexts and individuals using traditional 
between-subjects paradigms. 
Secondly, traditional experimental psychology approaches focus on null 
hypothesis significance testing (NHST), which recent critiques have associated with an 
over-emphasis on p-values rather than effect sizes. The problem with focusing on p-
values is that they may represent a relatively arbitrary level of ‘significance’ and do not 
provide information about the size of the effect (Lakens, 2013). In general, effect sizes 
were reported in almost all studies we reviewed (with some exceptions, e.g. see Table 
1-2), but very few authors discussed what these mean or whether their research designs 
were based on previous effect sizes (as is best practice). Another problem with NHST is 
that it is very hard to establish a null effect of being mimicked. An alternative approach 
which avoids these limitations of NHST is to carry out Bayesian statistical analysis 
(Nathoo & Masson, 2016; Wagenmakers, 2007). Bayesian analysis calculates the 
likelihood of the observed data under the null hypothesis and under the alternative 
hypothesis and the resulting Bayes factor can be interpreted as a measure of how much 
evidence the data provides in favour of either hypothesis.  
Thirdly, because of the traditional emphasis on p-values in psychology research 
and the publication bias in reporting significant results (Ferguson & Heene, 2012; 
Francis, 2012), it can be very tempting for researchers to present exploratory analyses 
as though they were confirmatory. This is particularly a problem if (a) the researcher 
carried out many statistical tests they do not report and do not correct for before finding 
one that was significant (‘p-hacking’) or (b) the researcher continued recruiting more 
participants until they obtained a significant result. In both cases, this can lead to the 
reporting of false-positives. In order to counter this kind of practice, there is growing 
support for pre-registration of experimental methods (Jonas & Cesario, 2015; van ’t Veer 
& Giner-Sorolla, 2016). In the most strict form, this involves writing a full specification of 






the sample, data collection method and planned analyses prior to data collection, and 
submitting a registered report. Some journals will agree to publish the final results based 
on the merit of a registered report (e.g. Cortex, Elsevier, 2014). However, it is also 
possible to specify analyses on an existing dataset, or pre-register other aspects of the 
research design using platforms such as the Open Science Framework.  
Finally, another issue in psychological research is a lack of replication (Francis, 
2012; Maxwell, Lau, & Howard, 2015). This has particularly caused controversy over 
social priming effects, in which subtle social cues are thought to unconsciously influence 
cognition or behaviour. For example, studies have reported that participants felt more or 
less close to family members after plotting points that were close or further apart 
(Williams & Bargh, 2008), walked more slowly after reading words related to the elderly 
(Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996), and donated less money after reading money-related 
words (Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2006). However, this area of research recently received 
strong criticism in an open letter from Daniel Kahneman (Yong, 2012) that highlighted 
widespread doubt about the validity of classic social priming results. Kahneman argued 
that wider problems with replication in psychology (including the file drawer problem) 
could especially affect social priming research because this field has traditionally 
favoured conceptual replications rather than exact repetitions of the same method. 
Several direct replications of classic experiments have failed to find significant results 
(e.g. Doyen et al., 2012; C. R. Harris, Coburn, Rohrer, & Pashler, 2013; Pashler, Coburn, 
& Harris, 2012; Shanks et al., 2013), contributing to concerns about the original effects. 
However, John Bargh responded to criticisms (Bargh, 2012) by pointing out that some 
social priming effects such ‘elderly walking’ have been independently replicated 
(Cesario, Plaks, & Tory, 2006; Hull, Slone, Meteyer, & Matthews, 2002). Others have 
pointed out that single replications can lack the power needed to replicate classic effects 
(Maxwell et al., 2015). 
In the mimicry literature that we have reviewed it is often accepted that there are 
consistent effects across studies. However, as we mentioned above, the wide variety of 






dependent measures (and manipulations) used across separate experiments can make 
it difficult to establish the reliability of particular effects (Lakens et al., 2016). In the case 
of liking, we found that the effect has not been consistently replicated across studies, but 
these employed different measures (Table 1-2). It is a matter of debate how closely 
methods should match in order to be considered a replication (Maxwell et al., 2015; 
Stroebe & Strack, 2014), with some arguing that direct replication is essential for 
establishing reliability and others arguing that looser replications demonstrate the 
generalizability of an effect. We would consider both types of replication to be useful, 
and therefore researchers could contribute to the field by both seeking to replicate the 
results of other research groups using novel methods and establishing that their own 
methods give replicable results over multiple experiments. 
1.3.2 Alternative Approaches 
Virtual mimicry. Generating mimicry in a virtual reality (VR) setting is an 
alternative method that overcomes many traditional challenges associated with 
achieving a controlled mimicry manipulation and investigating modulating factors such 
as the mimicker’s appearance. VR involves the computer simulation of a seemingly real 
environment, and first had applications in flight simulation and medical training 
(Rheingold, 1991) following the development of 3D computer graphics in the 1960s 
(Loomis, Blascovich, & Beall, 1999). Two main hardware systems have been designed 
to display virtual environments to a user (Loomis et al., 1999); head-mounted displays 
(HMDs) are perhaps the most widely used. HMDs display stereo images via head-
mounted eyepieces and track the user’s head movements in order to update the view 
and simulate looking around a 3D space. Until the 1990s, visual realism was limited by 
slow computer graphics processing, but this has vastly improved so that now even 
mobile phones can deliver high-resolution HMD displays (e.g. Samsung GearVR and 
Google Cardboard systems). The other main system is the CAVE (cave automatic virtual 
environment) which is a room-sized structure made from projector screens with 
incorporated motion sensors. A user wearing 3D glasses can walk around the CAVE and 






experience a virtual environment that updates when they move. VR displays are often 
combined with headphones to provide audio feedback and haptic devices which deliver 
vibrations or force feedback to the hands or body in order to add to the sensory realism 
of the virtual environment. However, as well as sensory realism, the virtual environment 
also needs to seem physically interactive in order to make someone feel like it is reality, 
which is termed ‘presence’ by computer scientists. Physical interaction can be simulated 
by sensing a participant’s movement and updating the environment accordingly. For 
example, a basic form of interactivity is updating the visual display according to head 
motion sensors; a more sophisticated form involves applying body-worn sensors to the 
user so that their movement can drive the actions of a virtual avatar which they embody 
in the virtual space.  
Similarly, in order to generate socially realistic virtual humans (termed ‘virtual 
characters’ or ‘agents’), they need to seem socially interactive. The term ‘co-presence’ 
is used to describe the feeling of being with another person in a virtual environment and 
this is typically assessed with questionnaires (Sanchez-Vives & Slater, 2005). Whereas 
physical interactivity can be simulated by sensing the user’s physical movements, social 
interactivity is simulated by sensing social cues from the user and triggering socially 
appropriate responses from a virtual human. Social sensing is more complicated than 
physical sensing, because we have an incomplete understanding of physiological, 
bodily, facial and speech cues and what they mean in real life social interactions. 
Nevertheless, even very basic forms of social interactivity can be enough to generate 
feelings of social realism. For example, behavioural and fMRI data show that a very basic 
virtual human head with an expressionless face can be perceived as socially interactive 
and neurally rewarding if it makes eye movements that are contingent on where the 
participant is looking (Schilbach et al., 2010, 2011; Wilms et al., 2010). 
Virtual reality is a therefore a useful tool for studying social interactions, as it has 
been shown in a range of settings that people usually react to virtual characters similarly 
to how they would with real people (Bailenson, Blascovich, Beall, & Loomis, 2001; 






Donath, 2007; Garau, Slater, Pertaub, & Razzaque, 2005; Reeves & Nass, 1996). For 
example, people maintain appropriate social distance from virtual characters (Bailenson 
et al., 2001; Bailenson, Blascovich, Beall, & Loomis, 2003; McCall & Singer, 2015), 
imitate their behaviours (Vrijsen, Lange, Becker, et al., 2010) and show distress when 
they are harmed (Pan, Banakou, & Slater, 2011; Pan & Slater, 2011). In a public 
speaking context, people reacted anxiously to an audience of visibly bored virtual 
characters (Slater, Pertaub, & Steed, 1999), and in a replication of the classic Milgram 
obedience experiment, some participants were unwilling to ‘shock’ a virtual human 
(Slater, Antley, et al., 2006). Given these reactions, social psychologists have used 
virtual characters to study a range of social phenomena, including prosociality (Gillath, 
McCall, Shaver, & Blascovich, 2008), trust (McCall & Singer, 2015; Verberne, Ham, & 
Midden, 2015), persuasion (Bailenson & Yee, 2005; Guadagno, Blascovich, Bailenson, 
& Mccall, 2007; McCall & Blascovich, 2009; Zanbaka, Goolkasian, & Hodges, 2006), 
embodiment of other people (Banakou, Groten, & Slater, 2013; Peck, Seinfeld, Aglioti, & 
Slater, 2013; Slater et al., 2009), social biases (Hasler et al., 2014; McCall, Blascovich, 
Young, & Persky, 2009; Peck et al., 2013; Zanbaka et al., 2006) and social anxiety (Pan, 
Gillies, Barker, Clark, & Slater, 2012; Vrijsen, Lange, Becker, et al., 2010; Vrijsen, Lange, 
Dotsch, et al., 2010).  
Virtual reality has also been used to study mimicry effects. Bailenson & Yee (2005) 
first developed a method for virtual mimicry. They fitted participants with an HMD which 
displayed a virtual character in immersive 3D and a head-mounted sensor which could 
also track the participant’s head rotation. Bailenson & Yee (2005) then programmed the 
virtual character to deliver a persuasive speech and mirror the participant’s head 
movements like a reflection, with a delay of four seconds between the participant’s 
movement and the character’s movement. They suggest that delay was optimal for 
maximising mimicry responses while minimising detection, based on a previous pilot 
study with 41 participants (Bailenson, Beall, Loomis, Blascovich, & Turk, 2004). To 
achieve a control condition where the character did not mimic the participant, head 






movements recorded from the previous participant while being mimicked were applied 
to the character instead. So far, this and other virtual mimicry studies have only tracked 
head movements (Bailenson et al., 2008; Verberne et al., 2013, 2015; Vrijsen, Lange, 
Dotsch, et al., 2010), but tracking could be extended to the whole body using current 
sensor technologies. 
Virtual mimicry has the advantage of high control over the mimicry manipulation, 
because virtual characters are ‘reverse engineered’ to only perform necessary 
behaviours (Fox et al., 2009), such as speaking, blinking and mimicking or not mimicking 
(Bailenson & Yee, 2005). The mimicry and control conditions are also well-matched, 
because the motion of the non-mimicking character is yoked to the movements the 
previous participant made while they were being mimicked. Furthermore, the mimicry 
interaction can be perfectly replicated using the same computer code (Verberne et al., 
2013), while characteristics of the character and the virtual environment can be endlessly 
tailored. For example, the researcher who wanted to investigate age could program a 
child character to mimic participants (Banakou, Groten, & Slater, 2013). Finally, it may 
be more feasible to measure real-time responses to mimicry using virtual reality. Motion 
tracking devices and physiological sensors for heart rate, skin conductance and 
breathing rate have been used to measure how people physically respond during a VR 
scenario (e.g. Bailenson et al., 2008; McCall, Hildebrandt, Hartmann, Baczkowski, & 
Singer, 2016). Alternatively, researchers can play back recorded segments of the 
participant’s virtual experience when they make ratings afterwards (McCall, Hildebrandt, 
Bornemann, & Singer, 2015), or even allow them to rate their experiences in real time 
using a virtual interface.  
However, there are some disadvantages to virtual mimicry. First, virtual mimicry is 
designed to be an all-or-none behaviour, which cannot easily be ramped up or down 
within a single interaction in the same way as natural human mimicry. Second, the virtual 
characters must also be programmed with other aspects of natural social interaction (e.g. 
joint gaze) to make them socially realistic. This can be technically difficult to implement. 






On the other hand, the precise control of every individual social behaviour in virtual reality 
can be described as an advantage because it allows us to test the impact of each 
behaviour separately. Even when virtual characters are very limited in their other social 
behaviours, existing VR studies demonstrate they can achieve mimicry effects similar to 
human confederates (e.g. Bailenson & Yee, 2005; Verberne et al., 2013; Vrijsen, Lange, 
Dotsch, et al., 2010). 
Motion tracking naïve participants. Another way to avoid problems associated 
with instructed mimicry is to record mimicry as it spontaneously occurs during 
interactions between two participants in a laboratory, while neither of them knows that 
mimicry is under investigation (e.g. Hess & Bourgeois, 2010). In this context, levels of 
mimicry can been monitored through detailed video scoring by trained coders (Condon 
& Ogston, 1966; Heerey & Crossley, 2013; Heerey & Kring, 2007; Kendon, 1970; Kurzius 
& Borkenau, 2015). Typically, this involves multiple coders rating the videotape frame-
by-frame for a set of pre-specified behaviours, such as posture shifts or specific facial 
expressions (Condon & Ogston, 1966; Heerey & Crossley, 2013; Messinger, Fogel, & 
Laurie, 1999, 2001). Scoring videos in this level of detail has the advantage of generating 
very rich data about the social interaction without the need for intrusive equipment such 
as motion tracking sensors. It is also possible for trained coders to rate aspects of 
behaviour that would be hard to automatically capture with current motion tracking 
technologies. For example, Messinger et al. (1999) and Heerey et al. (Heerey & 
Crossley, 2013; Heerey & Kring, 2007) have used trained coders to rate the presence of 
genuine versus polite smiles, which current facial tracking algorithms would not be able 
to distinguish. Given that mimicry may involve variable timing and degree of matching, 
and that people may switch between mimicker and mimickee roles in natural interactions, 
trained coders might also be more accurate at assessing mimicry compared to automatic 
software algorithms. 
However, detailed video scoring by specially trained coders can be prohibitively 
time-consuming. The ‘thin slice’ method is an alternative approach that drastically 






reduces the time taken to score a videotaped interaction and does not require trained 
coders. A ‘thin slice’ is a short video clip, defined as ‘a brief excerpt of expressive 
behaviour sampled from the behavioural stream’ (Ambady, Bernieri, & Richeson, 2000, 
p. 203). For example, this could be a 10-second video clip of a conversation between 
two people. When participants are asked to rate a thin slice depicting a social interaction, 
their first impressions are highly predictive of the actual outcomes of the interaction, such 
as levels of rapport (Ambady & Rosenthal, 1992), jury decisions (Parrott, Brodsky, & 
Wilson, 2015) and job interview success (Nguyen & Gatica-Perez, 2015). Interestingly, 
the duration of the clip has little impact on the predictive power of thin slices, which can 
be demonstrated for clips as short as 6 seconds (Ambady et al., 2000; Ambady & 
Rosenthal, 1993). Several research groups have therefore used thin slice ratings to 
assess synchrony and interpersonal coordination in videotapes of dyadic interactions 
(e.g. Bernieri, 1988; Bernieri, Steven, & Rosenthal, 1988; Ramseyer & Tschacher, 2011). 
However, the accuracy of thin slices ratings also depends on the level of expressivity of 
people in the videotape (Ambady et al., 2000) and raters may take into account many 
different social signals when rating the interaction, even if they are instructed to focus 
only on one aspect such as synchrony (Cappella, 1981; Lumsden, Miles, & Macrae, 
2012).  
Motion tracking methods. As an alternative to manual video coding, automatic 
recording and analysis techniques are now available to assess levels of spontaneous 
mimicry or interpersonal coordination between two (or more) participants. One option is 
to video record the participants as they interact, and then use automatic image 
processing algorithms to extract data about how each participant moved. For example, 
a participant’s total body movement can be tracked with frame-differencing methods, 
which look at the change in video pixels from one frame to the next (Paxton & Dale, 
2013). As long as the video background is stable, a change in pixels can be attributed to 
a participant moving. A recent study using this method showed that true interaction 
partners synchronise with each other more than randomly paired videos of different 






partners (Fujiwara & Daibo, 2016), replicating findings from two earlier studies which 
relied on video ratings of synchrony from untrained observers (Bernieri, 1988; Bernieri 
et al., 1988). Frame-differencing methods have the advantage specialist equipment is 
not needed, and have been used in several clinical studies of bodily synchrony (Kupper, 
Ramseyer, Hoffmann, Kalbermatten, & Tschacher, 2010; Nagaoka & Komori, 2008; 
Ramseyer & Tschacher, 2008, 2011). However, they are poorly suited to studying 
mimicry of specific actions. Currently there are few established methods for automatically 
detecting particular body movements from video footage, although this is an area of rapid 
development (Michelet, Karp, Delaherche, Achard, & Chetouani, 2012; Sun, Nijholt, 
Truong, & Pantic, 2011; Sun, Truong, Pantic, & Nijholt, 2011).  
Another option is to use a motion tracker to directly record the movements of each 
participant. There is now a very wide range of motion tracking systems available, 
although three types are commonly used in social interaction research. First, optical 
systems triangulate the position of a marker on the participant’s body using two or more 
cameras which can ‘see’ the marker either because it is reflective (passive marker) or 
because it emits light intermittently (active marker). Optical systems have the 
disadvantage that markers can easily become obscured from the cameras’ view (Poppe, 
Zee, Heylen, & Taylor, 2013). Second, magnetic systems also use markers on the 
participant’s body, but they detect the position and rotation of the markers within a weak 
magnetic field (e.g. see Feese, Arnrich, Tröster, Meyer, & Jonas, 2011, 2012). Magnetic 
systems tend to be more precise than optical systems, require less calibration, and the 
markers cannot become obscured. Third, 3D-camera systems such as Kinect (Microsoft) 
use a camera with an infrared depth sensor to capture a 3D image of a participant’s body 
without the need for markers, and additional software is used to interpret the image (e.g. 
see Won, Bailenson, Stathatos, & Dai, 2014). This type of system is ideal for facial 
capture (e.g. Li, Mian, Liu, & Krishna, 2013) as it does not require markers to be attached 
to the face. However, it also requires lengthy calibration to achieve precise readings. 






Analysis of motion tracking data. If the motion of two participants is directly recorded 
in two time series, there are several options to automatically analyse the level of mimicry 
or interpersonal coordination in their movements. The two time series can be analysed 
according to the timing, frequency or both timing and frequency of motion (Fujiwara & 
Daibo, 2016; Grinsted, Moore, & Jevrejeva, 2004; Issartel, Marin, Gaillot, Bardainne, & 
Cadopi, 2006). The timing can be analysed by performing a cross-correlation and seeing 
at what time lag the two time series are most highly correlated. This peak correlation 
would indicate the timing at which the two participants tended to match each other’s 
motion, and is therefore suitable for studying mimicry or behaviour matching (Fujiwara & 
Daibo, 2016). The frequency of each person’s movements can be examined using 
spectrum analysis. Spectrum analysis decomposes the data from a time series into 
different constituent frequencies in order to see how much movement there was at each 
frequency. Fourier analysis is a well-known method of spectrum analysis. It assumes 
that the time series follows repetitive patterns and stable frequencies over time, and is 
therefore suitable for studying how much synchrony or entrainment there is between two 
participants making repetitive movements (Fujiwara & Daibo, 2016; Issartel et al., 2006), 
such as walking in step or rocking in a rocking chair. Finally, wavelet analysis can be 
used to examine both the timing and frequency of motion (Grinsted et al., 2004; Issartel 
et al., 2006). A wavelet is a localised oscillation or ‘blip’ in time, and can be used to 
characterise the frequency (oscillation) and timing (localised blip in time) of the 
movements in a time series. Wavelet analysis therefore expands a time series into time-
frequency space, with the advantage that it can be used to track how the frequency 
spectrum of the original signal changes over time. This makes wavelet analysis a more 
suitable tool than spectrum analysis for studying coordination in spontaneous and non-
repetitive social interactions such as having a natural conversation (Fujiwara & Daibo, 
2016; Issartel et al., 2006). Therefore, studies have wavelet analysis to evaluate 
interpersonal coordination  during free conversation (Fujiwara & Daibo, 2016), musical 






improvisation (Walton, Richardson, Langland-Hassan, & Chemero, 2015), and telling 
knock-knock jokes (Schmidt, Nie, Franco, & Richardson, 2014). 
Priming naïve mimicry. A remaining challenge for studying mimicry in naturalistic 
conversations is how to manipulate the level of mimicry. If two participants are not 
instructed about how to behave, then there is no guarantee that they will mimic one 
another. If there is little or no mimicry, this would make it very difficult to test the 
downstream effects of natural mimicry on the people interacting. One way to overcome 
this problem could be to increase or decrease levels of mimicry through subliminal 
priming. Priming involves the unconscious or unintentional facilitation of a particular 
behaviour, such as mimicry, through exposure to a particular type of stimulus or event 
(Molden, 2014).   
The possibility of priming mimicry has been demonstrated across several studies 
using a scrambled-sentences priming task. In one study, participants were given 18 
sentences with five words in the incorrect order, and were asked to make a grammatically 
correct four-word sentence (van Baaren, Maddux, Chartrand, de Bouter, & van 
Knippenberg, 2003). In one condition, the sentences contained words related to an 
interdependent self (e.g. ‘cooperate’) and in the other condition, words related to an 
independent self (e.g. ‘unique’). Participants in the interdependent condition later spent 
more time mimicking a target behaviour (pen-playing) displayed by a confederate in a 
separate task. Other studies have tested the effect of scrambled sentence priming on 
the automatic imitation of finger tapping movements in SRC paradigms. Two studies 
compared prosocial words with antisocial words and found that the prosocial priming led 
to greater imitation than antisocial priming (Cook & Bird, 2011; Leighton, Bird, Orsini, & 
Heyes, 2010), ,consistent with other research that has reported increased mimicry of 
target behaviours from a confederate following unsuccessful affiliation (Lakin & 
Chartrand, 2003) or third party ostracism (Lakin, Chartrand, & Arkin, 2008; Over & 
Carpenter, 2009). Subsequent research showed that the effect of prosocial and 
antisocial scrambled sentences seems to be reliable but depends on whether the 






sentences describe first person or third person events (Wang & Hamilton, 2013). Taken 
together, these studies provide converging evidence from multiple paradigms to suggest 
that mimicry may be reliably increased by first-person prosocial stimuli or third-person 
antisocial scrambled sentences.  
Whereas some social priming effects have failed to replicate (e.g. Doyen et al., 
2012; C. R. Harris et al., 2013; Pashler et al., 2012; Shanks et al., 2013), the effects of 
prosocial and antisocial primes (specifically, scrambled sentences) appear to be 
relatively robust. The fact they have been replicated across different research groups 
measuring different mimicked actions (e.g. foot versus finger movements) suggests the 
scrambled sentence task could be a reliable and flexible way of manipulating mimicry 
within participants, with the major advantage that it could allow us to study mimicry as it 
spontaneously occurs. This is important, because the majority of empirical evidence we 
have about how people respond to mimicry comes from studies where mimicry was 
artificially instructed, which may lead to behaviour that diverges from spontaneous 
mimicry interactions. Priming is also suitable for within-participants designs, as 
participants can be subtly primed with different conditions that induce different levels of 
mimicry over the course of one experiment (e.g. Wang & Hamilton, 2013). However, the 
few initial studies that have demonstrated priming of mimicry all showed effects on 
specific actions such as foot tapping or finger tapping that were performed by a 
confederate or stimulus figure (Lakin & Chartrand, 2003; van Baaren et al., 2003). It 
remains to be tested whether the same results can be conceptually replicated within 
more naturalistic contexts such as free conversations.  
1.3.3 Summary 
To make progress in understanding how people respond to mimicry, new research 
will need to overcome the major traditional challenge of manipulating mimicry in a 
naturalistic way under controlled lab conditions, as well as other issues highlighted 
above. Virtual mimicry and motion tracking naïve participants are two modern 
approaches that show promise in overcoming some of these challenges, with the 






respective advantages of strong experimental control and high ecological validity. 
Existing proof-of-principle studies demonstrate the validity of these approaches. 
Therefore I use and develop them in this thesis to rigorously test the claims put forward 
in the social glue theory of mimicry, and to investigate new factors which could tell us 
about the cognitive processes behind people’s responses to being mimicked.  
1.4 Overview of Experimental Chapters 
In this chapter I have reviewed competing theories about the social function of 
mimicry. On the one hand, the social glue theory of mimicry suggests that mimicry is an 
adaptive social strategy for creating rapport. On the other hand, the ASL theory suggests 
that mimicry is simply an evolutionary by-product that has no special social purpose. 
Although behavioural and neural evidence suggests people produce mimicry 
strategically, in line with their social goals, to accept the claim that mimicry is an adaptive 
social strategy we would also need to show that being mimicked creates positive feelings 
towards the mimicker. The current literature on effects of being mimicked, which I have 
reviewed in this chapter, provides some support for the social glue theory. However, 
existing research in this area has methodological limitations. In particular, most studies 
have used confederate paradigms, in which it is difficult to isolate the effects of mimicry 
and avoid all other social confounds. Therefore, we have proposed two alternative 
approaches to studying mimicry which overcome some of the challenges associated with 
confederate paradigms: (1) programming virtual characters to mimic participants, and (2) 
motion tracking naïve participants. 
The aim of this thesis is to rigorously test the claim that being mimicked leads to 
rapport and trust towards the mimicker. It is central to the social glue theory that being 
mimicked should lead to feelings of rapport, and this outcome has been tested in many 
previous studies. We aim to see if previous effects can be replicated using a strict 
approach. In contrast, relatively few studies have tested whether mimicry leads to trust, 
although several have noted the advantages of mimicry for persuasion and compliance. 






One challenge for investigating trust outcomes is that we lack behavioural methods for 
measuring trust towards specific individuals. We aim to address this problem in Chapter 
2, by developing a new behavioural task for measuring trust. While Chapter 2 focuses 
on measuring trust, Chapters 3 and 4 move on to the main focus of this thesis and use 
a novel virtual mimicry paradigm to test the effects of mimicry on rapport and trust. 
Finally, in Chapter 5 we widen our scope to investigate the parameters of interpersonal 
coordination in natural conversations by motion tracking naïve participants. A central 
theme throughout the thesis is the use and development of novel methods for 
investigating mimicry.  
Specifically, the studies in this thesis address the following questions:  
1. How can we measure trust behaviour towards specific targets? 
Chapter 2 develops a new behavioural task for measuring trust towards specific 
targets. In this task, the participant is immersed in a 3D virtual maze. They must find the 
way out of the maze and can choose whether to ask for and follow advice from different 
virtual characters. Across two experiments we show that the virtual maze task provides 
a more sensitive measure of trust towards specific targets than existing questionnaires 
or economic games. In a third experiment we demonstrate how the VR task could be 
adapted for traditional displays. We go on to use the maze task in Chapter 4 to test the 
effects of mimicry on trust. 
2. Does being mimicked by a virtual character lead to rapport and trust? 
Chapters 3 and 4 use virtual mimicry to strictly test the claim that mimicry leads to 
rapport and trust. In both studies we programmed virtual characters to mimic the head 
and torso movements of a participant with a specified time delay. In Chapter 3, we 
explored a range of outcomes reported in the previous literature and found that mimicry 
had a significantly positive effect on rapport. In Chapter 4, we carried out a more rigorous 
experiment in order to see if this effect could be replicated following a pre-registered 
design. 






3. Are the effects of being mimicked modulated by the timing of mimicry? 
Chapter 3 also exploits the advantages of virtual mimicry to test the role of timing. 
We showed that the timing of mimicry had a significant impact on conscious detection, 
but did not affect the strength of participants’ positive responses to being mimicked. 
4. Does mimicry lead to rapport and trust across group boundaries? 
Chapter 4 investigates the effects of virtual mimicry within in-group and out-group 
pairs. The group membership of the mimicker did not significantly change levels of 
rapport or trust in response to being mimicked.  
5. What are the parameters of mimicry in natural conversations?  
After finding weak effects in the virtual mimicry studies, we depart from strict tests 
with virtual mimickers to investigate mimicry as it naturally occurs. Chapter 5 investigates 
the natural parameters of interpersonal coordination in face-to-face conversations 
between naïve participants. We used wavelet analysis to examine the dyadic 
coordination of head movements across a range of motion frequencies. Across two 
datasets, participants showed significantly less coordination than chance at head motion 
frequencies between 1.5 and 5 Hz, as well as greater than chance coordination at lower 










Chapter 2. The virtual maze: A behavioural tool 
for measuring trust 
2.1 Abstract 
Trusting another person may depend on our level of generalised trust in others, as 
well as perceptions of that specific person’s trustworthiness. However, many studies 
measuring trust outcomes have not discussed generalised versus specific trust. To 
measure specific trust in others, we developed a novel behavioural task. Participants 
navigate a virtual maze and make a series of decisions about how to proceed. Before 
each decision, they may ask for advice from two virtual characters they have briefly 
interviewed earlier. We manipulated the virtual characters’ trustworthiness during the 
interview phase and measured how often participants approached and followed advice 
from each character. We also measured trust through ratings and an investment game. 
Across three studies we found participants followed advice from a trustworthy character 
significantly more than an untrustworthy character, demonstrating the validity of the 
maze task. Behaviour in the virtual maze reflected specific trust rather than generalised 
trust, whereas the investment game picked up on generalised trust as well as specific 
trust. Our data suggests the virtual maze task may provide an alternative behavioural 
approach to measuring specific trust in future research, and we demonstrate how the 
task may be used in traditional laboratories. 
2.2 Introduction 
In this chapter, we aimed to develop a novel task for measuring trust towards 
specific people. In everyday life, we often have to weigh up how much we trust strangers 
or people we have only briefly met. Can I trust that passer-by to direct me to the station? 
If I lend the new intern my stapler, will I get it back? In some situations, such as criminal 
investigations, there are high stakes attached to the decision whether or not to trust 
someone. A wide body of literature suggests that nonverbal cues influence how 






trustworthy we perceive someone to be (Anderson, DePaulo, Ansfield, Tickle, & Green, 
1999; DePaulo et al., 2003; Hosman & Wright, 1987). In the field of mimicry, it has been 
found that being mimicked can lead to persuasion and conformity (Leander et al., 2011; 
Tanner, 2008), although existing measures of trust have yielded mixed findings about 
the effect of being mimicked (Maddux et al., 2008; Verberne et al., 2013). In this chapter 
we consider how to measure the level of trust one person feels towards a specific 
stranger and develop a new behavioural task which may be used to test social factors 
such as mimicry that may influence levels of trust.  
The measurement of trust is a vast and complicated topic, spanning domains in 
psychology, neuroscience, sociology, behavioural economics and organisation science 
(Ashraf, Bohnet, & Piankov, 2006; Bachmann & Zaheer, 2006; Blomqvist, 1997). Across 
these fields there are many different definitions of trust (Ashraf et al., 2006; Bachmann 
& Zaheer, 2006; Ben-Ner & Halldorsson, 2010), but very broadly speaking there are two 
main ways we can think about an individual’s level of trust towards someone else. On 
one hand, we can treat their level of trust as a stable personal characteristic, a reflection 
of how much they trust others in general. This is often termed ‘generalised trust’ (Couch 
& Jones, 1997; Freitag & Traunmüller, 2009). On the other hand, we can treat their level 
of trust as a specific reaction to the other person, perhaps based on having a close 
relationship with them, or other social cues if the person is a stranger. The term 
‘interpersonal trust’ is often used to refer to this kind of trust between people in a close 
relationship (Johnson-George & Swap, 1982; Rotter, 1967, 1971); we will use the term 
‘specific trust’ to cover strangers as well. 
In this chapter, we are interested in how to measure specific trust towards one 
particular person. We will begin by reviewing three major methods for trust measurement 
available to social psychologists and social neuroscientists, considering the suitability of 
each method. The first and oldest method is to administer questionnaires that ask people 
to self-report how much they trust others (Johnson-George & Swap, 1982; Rempel, 
Holmes, & Zanna, 1985; Rosenberg, 1957; Rotter, 1967). A more recent behavioural 






approach is to measure how much money an individual will entrust to another player in 
an economic game (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995; Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, 
& Soutter, 2000; Tzieropoulos, 2013). Finally, an alternative behavioural approach is to 
measure trust in terms of willingness to ask for and endorse information from an 
informant (Clément, Koenig, & Harris, 2004; P. L. Harris & Corriveau, 2011). The first 
two approaches are the most widely used across psychology and other social sciences, 
but we argue the ‘ask and endorse’ approach is most suitable for measuring trust towards 
specific strangers. We then introduce our novel method for measuring trust using a virtual 
maze task, which builds on some of the advantages of ask-endorse paradigms. 
2.2.1 Self-Report Questionnaires 
For many decades, researchers have used self-report questionnaires to gauge 
levels of trust. Most of these have been designed to measure generalised trust (Couch 
& Jones, 1997; Freitag & Traunmüller, 2009; Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, & Soutter, 
1999) or interpersonal trust towards a close interaction partner such as a spouse or 
family member (Couch & Jones, 1997; Johnson-George & Swap, 1982; Rotter, 1967, 
1971; Sorrentino, Holmes, Hanna, & Sharp, 1995). In comparison, there are very few 
validated scales that capture specific trust towards a stranger during an experiment. One 
exception is McCroskey & Teven’s (1999) trustworthiness scale in which participants rate 
six dimensions of trustworthiness, in line with research highlighting the multidimensional 
nature of trustworthiness judgments and other social impressions (e.g. Ben-Ner & 
Halldorsson, 2010; Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007). Other researchers have often used just 
one or two items to measure the perceived trustworthiness of a target person (e.g. 
Maddux, Mullen, & Galinsky, 2008; Todorov, Pakrashi, & Oosterhof, 2009; Willis & 
Todorov, 2006). For example, participants might rate the target from ‘not at all’ to 
‘extremely’ trustworthy (Willis & Todorov, 2006), or make a yes/no judgement about the 
target’s trustworthiness and back this up with a confidence rating (Todorov et al., 2009). 
Approaches like these have the advantage that they are straightforward to administer 
and therefore may translate well to settings outside of the laboratory, particularly to 






clinical contexts in which behavioural measures may be impractical and time-consuming. 
However, one or two items may not fully capture the nature of trustworthiness (Ben-Ner 
& Halldorsson, 2010) and perceiving someone as trustworthy may not always equate to 
trusting them. It is also difficult to interpret and compare questionnaire results across 
studies, since the items used vary and are often specific to the experimental setting, e.g. 
‘how much did you trust the other party during the negotiation?’ (Maddux et al., 2008). 
This can be an advantage for investigating context-specific trust towards different 
sources (e.g. political leaders vs. scientists on the topic of stem cell research; Liu & 
Priest, 2009) but is less suitable for social cognitive research into what makes people 
trust or not trust a specific stranger.  
The lack of validated scales for measuring trust towards strangers may be due to 
concerns over the validity of self-report methods. Questionnaire items are open to 
interpretation, which may undermine the validity of responses. Trust questionnaires can 
be particularly susceptible to ambiguity due to the multiple meanings and interpretations 
of trust (Ben-Ner & Halldorsson, 2010; Lyon et al., 2012), especially across cultures 
(Hooghe, Reeskens, Stolle, & Trappers, 2009; Miller & Mitamura, 2003). Assuming the 
interpretation of items were unambiguous, participants still may not have accurate 
access to their internal feelings (Chan, 2009); even if they do, their self-reports may be 
biased by social norms or demand characteristics (McCambridge, de Bruin, & Witton, 
2012). Finally, even if people report accurate internal feelings, these may be poor 
predictors of external behaviour (Armitage & Christian, 2003); for example, survey 
measures of generalised trust actually predict trustworthy behaviour better than trusting 
behaviour (Glaeser et al., 1999). For these reasons, implicit behavioural measures are 
often preferred over explicit self-report ratings. 
2.2.2 The Investment Game  
A major behavioural method for investigating trust emerged from behavioural 
economics. This method is aligned with the view that trust involves a ‘voluntary transfer 
of a good or favour to someone else, with future reciprocation expected but not 






guaranteed’ (Gunnthorsdottir et al., 2002, p. 50). The method was developed by Berg, 
Dickhaut and McCabe (1995), who designed a simple investment game played between 
two people: an investor and a trustee. The investor was given $10 (different amounts 
have been used in subsequent studies; Johnson & Mislin, 2011) and had to decide how 
much of that $10 to send to the trustee, knowing that the amount they sent would be 
tripled before it was given to the trustee. Then the trustee had to decide how much of the 
tripled amount to return to the investor. The game measures trust behaviour in terms of 
the percentage of money the investor is willing to send to the trustee. Earlier trust games, 
such as the prisoners’ dilemma, typically required an all-or-nothing decision to trust or 
distrust the other player, which did not provide such a sensitive measure (Schniter, 
Sheremeta, & Shields, 2013). Thus, the investment game has come to dominate the field 
(Johnson & Mislin, 2011). 
It is unclear to what extent the investment game taps into generalised trust versus 
specific trust. Although the investment game was originally designed to answer questions 
about generalised trust (Berg et al., 1995; Glaeser et al., 2000; McEvily, Radzevick, & 
Weber, 2012), several studies have found that people’s investments correlate poorly with 
generalised trust questionnaires (Ashraf et al., 2006; Glaeser et al., 1999) and relate 
instead to perceptions of the other player’s trustworthiness (McEvily et al., 2012). In 
psychology and neuroscience, the investment game has been used to test factors that 
may affect specific trust towards known and unknown trustees. For example, studies 
have found that participants make significantly higher investments when the trustee is 
happy (Tortosa, Lupiáñez, & Ruz, 2013; Tortosa, Strizhko, Capizzi, & Ruz, 2013), 
belongs to a racial in-group (Stanley et al., 2012) or coordinates their nonverbal 
behaviour with the investor (Launay, Dean, & Bailes, 2013; Verberne et al., 2013, 2015). 
On the other hand, investment behaviour is also found to correlate with traits such as 
altruism (Ashraf et al., 2006; Ben-Ner & Halldorsson, 2010; Cox, 2004) and risk-seeking 
(Karlan, 2005; McEvily et al., 2012; Schechter, 2007), and to vary according to cultural 
norms (Johnson & Mislin, 2011; Willinger, Keser, Lohmann, & Usunier, 2003). This 






suggests that even if the investment game is not correlated with self-reported levels of 
generalised trust, it is sensitive to stable individual characteristics which may be proxies 
of generalised trust. Overall, the amount someone invests is likely to reflect a mixture of 
generalised trust and specific trust towards the other player, but it is unclear how levels 
of these are weighted in different people and different versions of the investment game.  
The investment game also has some practical limitations. Firstly, it is hard to know 
how far people’s investment behaviour in this abstract game may be used to infer how 
they would trust someone in the real world. In the investment game, participants have to 
make an explicit decision about the amount of money to send the trustee, but in real life 
people’s trust decisions may be more implicit. Secondly, the rules of the investment 
game are somewhat complicated to explain, causing differences in how participants 
perceive and interpret the game (Macko, Malawski, & Tyszka, 2014). The task 
complexity means that the investment game may not be suitable for young children, or 
participant groups whose understanding is otherwise impaired. Furthermore, healthy 
adult participants may ‘overthink’ their response; for example, participants make more 
cautious investments when they have less time to make a decision (Tzieropoulos, Grave 
De Peralta, Bossaerts, & Gonzalez Andino, 2011) or know they will be paid randomly at 
the end of the study (Johnson & Mislin, 2011). Finally, the investment game is dyadic 
and over successive rounds players learn about each other’s trust or trustworthiness 
(King-Casas et al., 2005). This means there is a one-shot opportunity on the first round 
to measure the investor’s initial trust towards the trustee. It is unclear whether an 
averaged measure may be derived across multiple trials of the ‘first round’ where the 
investor does not find out the trustee’s decision. 
Economic trust games in virtual reality. In the context of investigating specific  
trust towards virtual characters, previous research has often construed trust in terms of 
cooperative behaviour (de Melo et al., 2011, 2013, 2012; de Melo, Zheng, & Gratch, 
2009; Kulms, Kopp, & Krämer, 2014; Kulms, Mattar, & Kopp, 2015). In particular, several 
studies have investigated trust towards a virtual character in terms of willingness to 






cooperate rather than defect over the course of an iterated prisoners’ dilemma game. 
For example, de Melo, Zheng & Gratch (2009) found that participants cooperated 
significantly more with a virtual character that expressed facial emotions after each round 
of the game (e.g. gratitude or reproach) compared to a virtual character with a neutral 
expression. In a more recent study (de Melo, Carnevale & Gratch, 2013) they found that 
participants cooperated more with an agent or avatar that made emotional expressions 
signalling cooperativeness (e.g. smiling after cooperation) compared to an agent or 
avatar that signalled competitiveness (e.g. smiling after exploiting the participant). 
Participants also rated cooperative agents or avatars as more trustworthy than 
competitive agent or avatars, suggesting that their behaviour in the prisoners’ dilemma 
may be interpreted as trusting the other player (or not), in line with the use of this task in 
the economic literature. Very similar findings have been reported by this group (de Melo, 
Carnevale & Gratch, 2011; de Melo, Carnevale, Gratch & Read, 2012) and others (e.g. 
Kulms, Kopp & Krämer, 2014) when they recast the prisoners’ dilemma game as an 
investment game, in which the choice to cooperate or defect was reframed as a choice 
to invest in a particular project, e.g. ‘Project Green’ vs. ‘Project Blue’. Overall, this body 
of research suggests that the prisoners’ dilemma (or variations thereof) can be a 
sensitive behavioural tool for measuring cooperation towards specific virtual characters 
presented sequentially in the same experiment.  
On the other hand, Antos, de Melo, Gratch and Grosz (2011) found more mixed 
results using a version of the investment game (note that they refer to this as a variation 
of the public goods game, but their task actually follows the format of the investment 
game developed by Berg, Dickhaut & McCabe, 1995). In their study, participants 
completed a negotiation task with successive virtual characters that varied in their 
emotional expressions (five different conditions) and negotiation strategies (four different 
conditions) and accrued coins from successful negotiating. After every three 
negotiations, participants played a version of the investment game involving two steps: 
in the first step they had to choose which character from the preceding neogtiations they 






wanted to play with; in the second step they exchanged chose how many coins to invest 
with the chosen character following the typical investment game procedure. The results 
showed that the expression of the character and its strategy during the negotiation phase 
had significant interactive effects on which character the participant chose to play with. 
However, there were no significant effects on the amount of resources that participants 
trusted to the virtual character. This suggests that perhaps the binary selection part of 
the task provides a more sensitive measure than the transfer of resources. In the next 
section we elaborate on the potential advantages of tasks that use a binary selection to 
assess trust towards specific people.  
In our own pilot experiments, we had little success using the investment game to 
test specific trust towards mimicking virtual characters. Across three pilot studies with a 
total of 78 participants we have consistently found that how much people invest with a 
particular virtual character does not correlate with their rating of that character’s 
trustworthiness. Instead, we find that their investments towards two different virtual 
characters are highly correlated, suggesting that the investment game was picking up on 
a stable level of generalised trust. This motivated us to develop an alternative 
behavioural approach that would be more sensitive to levels of specific trust and less 
affected by generalised trust or other individual traits.   
2.2.3 The Ask-Endorse Paradigm  
An alternative behavioural approach to measuring trust comes from developmental 
psychology. In order to investigate the extent to which children will trust information from 
a teacher or informant, Koenig et al. (Koenig, Clément, & Harris, 2004; Koenig & Echols, 
2003; Koenig & Harris, 2005, 2007; Pasquini, Corriveau, Koenig, & Harris, 2007) 
developed a paradigm in which children implicitly had to consider the trustworthiness of 
two puppets or video characters. Having seen one puppet or video character give 
accurate information, and the other give inaccurate information, each child had to make 
two choices. Firstly, they had to choose which one they would ask in order to learn 
something new. Each puppet or character would give conflicting testimony. Then the 






child would have to choose which testimony they believed. This procedure was repeated 
over multiple trials. Thus the paradigm provides two measures of trust: firstly, whether 
the child would ask for information, and secondly whether they would endorse that 
information. These may be called ‘selective’ trust measures since trust is inferred from 
which informant the child selects. Other selective trust research by Mills et al. (Johnston, 
Mills, & Landrum, 2015; Landrum, Mills, & Johnston, 2013; Mills, Legare, Bills, & Mejias, 
2010) has also measured how often children would ask questions to different puppet 
informants to help them figure out a puzzle. Studies using selective trust paradigms have 
shown that children tend to trust informants who are nice, smart and honest (Landrum, 
Eaves Jr, & Shafto, 2015; Lane, Wellman, & Gelman, 2013), as well as people who are 
attractive (Bascandziev & Harris, 2014) or belong to their in-group (Kinzler, Corriveau, & 
Harris, 2011; VanderBorght & Jaswal, 2009). Several of the effects found with children 
have been replicated in adults using the same approach (Landrum et al., 2015; Lane et 
al., 2013). 
There are several advantages to this approach for measuring trust towards a 
specific stranger. Firstly, it represents an ecologically valid scenario, i.e. based on limited 
experience of this person, will you ask them for advice and trust what they say? We might 
consider the same questions when asking a passer-by for directions, or conducting an 
investigative interview. Therefore, the ask-endorse scenario might be more 
representative of everyday trust decisions than the investment game scenario. Secondly, 
the decision to ask or endorse taps into implicit trust behaviour, which may provide a 
‘purer’ estimate of trust levels than explicit measures. Thirdly, by framing each decision 
in terms of selecting one informant versus the other, participants have to use their 
perceptions of each informant’s trustworthiness and therefore the task should be more 
sensitive to specific trust than generalised trust.  
2.2.4 The Virtual Maze  
We aimed to design a novel behavioural task for measuring trust towards specific 
strangers, and decided to implement the task in virtual reality. As virtual reality 






technology becomes increasingly sophisticated and more widely available, it is becoming 
an increasingly popular tool in social psychology and social neuroscience (Chapter 1; 
Blascovich et al., 2002; McCall & Blascovich, 2009). This is because virtual characters 
and virtual spaces can be manipulated in systematic ways that would be hard to achieve 
with confederates in a physical laboratory (Fox et al., 2009). For example, it is easy to 
program a virtual character that subtly blinks or nods at a certain rate (Bailenson & Yee, 
2005; Gratch et al., 2006), or a virtual space which is much larger than the average 
laboratory. Many studies have shown that participants react to virtual scenarios as they 
would in real life (Durlach & Slater, 2000; Fox et al., 2009; Garau et al., 2005), so virtual 
reality also offers an opportunity to closely replicate everyday situations under controlled 
conditions. As well as affording high ecological validity, there are also novel opportunities 
to measure implicit behavioural responses such as where participants direct their gaze 
in the 3D space, or how closely they will approach a virtual character (Khooshabeh et 
al., 2011; McCall et al., 2009). 
Exploiting some of the strengths of virtual reality, we designed a task where 
participants navigate through a virtual maze and may choose to trust virtual characters 
about which way to proceed. Participants find themselves in a virtual maze made up of 
a series of identical rooms connected by corridors. Each time they enter a new room, 
they face two doors and must make a decision about which door to proceed through. To 
help them decide, they may approach two virtual characters for advice, although they do 
not have to. When approached, each virtual character will indicate which door they think 
is the one to take. The participant keeps making decisions until they are told that they 
have found the way out of the maze. In fact, there are no right or wrong choices about 
which way to go. Instead, we are able to randomly generate endless rooms and corridors 
until the participant has gone through a specified number of rooms (trials) and we tell 
them they have found the way out. At the end, we can measure how often the participant 
approached each character for advice, and how often they followed advice they received 
from each character. The virtual maze therefore follows a similar approach to the ask-






endorse paradigm, although the virtual maze task is more implicit in that participants are 
not prompted on every trial which character they want to ask for advice, but are instead 
left to make an implicit choice to approach neither, one or both characters. 
In this chapter, we present three studies in which we piloted the virtual maze task 
and explored how it compares to other trust measures. Firstly, we aimed to test whether 
people’s decisions in the virtual maze are sensitive to differences in trustworthiness 
between two virtual characters. Therefore, in the first two studies participants got to know 
two different virtual characters through a short interview where the participant asked 
each character some prepared questions. During the interview, we manipulated the 
trustworthiness of each character through their verbal answers and nonverbal and vocal 
behaviour. The manipulation was designed to achieve a large effect size, since we did 
not know the sensitivity of the virtual maze task. We predicted that participants would 
decide to approach and follow the advice of a trustworthy character significantly more 
often than an untrustworthy character in the virtual maze. In order to compare our task 
with major alternative methods, in Studies 1 and 2 we also included ratings of each 
character’s trustworthiness and an investment game. We further aimed to explore the 
extent to which each measure showed a correlation between the two virtual characters. 
If trust in one character is correlated with trust in the other character, that would indicate 
the level of trust towards each one is being driven by stable individual differences among 
participants, i.e. generalised trust. On the other hand, if a measure shows no correlation 
between two characters that suggests it is sensitive to specific trust rather than 
generalised trust. In the third study, we implemented a purer manipulation of 
trustworthiness by using the investment game as a manipulation instead of a dependent 
measure, following two studies by Franzen et al. (Franzen et al., 2011; Lis et al., 2013). 
In Study 3, we also programmed a low-tech version of the virtual maze task on a standard 
computer screen to demonstrate how the task could be used in standard laboratories 
without VR equipment or software.  






2.3 Study 1 
2.3.1 Methods 
Participants. Twenty participants (13 female) were recruited through email 
advertisements to the Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience (ICN) departmental participant 
pool. A power calculation using G*Power (version 3.1.7, 2013) showed that 20 
participants would be sufficient to detect a large effect size (dz = 1.1) with power of 0.98 
or a medium effect size (dz = 0.71) with power of 0.91. All participants gave written 
informed consent and received payment of £7, plus a bonus of up to £3 depending on 
how they played the investment game. The study was granted ethical approval by the 
MoD Research Ethics Committee (Reference Number 564/MODREC/14) and the ICN 
Ethics Chair (Project ID Number ICN-AH-PWB-3-3-14a).  
Virtual reality system. Participants sat at a desk in front of a 90 x 160cm projector 
screen. We used Vizard virtual reality software (Worldviz, 2014) to display a virtual 
environment on the screen (Figure 2-1A). During the interview phase of the experiment, 
the virtual environment looked like an extension of the physical desk and walls of the 
laboratory. We programmed life-sized virtual characters to appear seated on the other 
side of the desk, facing the participant. We programmed a virtual barrier to occlude the 
virtual character at the end of the interview phase. Instructions and stimuli for the 
following tasks were displayed on the virtual barrier. The virtual maze task was also 
completed on the projector screen, but the maze environment was not designed to look 
like an extension of the laboratory. Instead, the participant saw virtual corridors and 
rooms similar to playing a video game. 
Virtual characters. We prepared two male virtual characters for the experiment, 
named Mike and Ryan. The characters’ appearances (Figure 2-1B) were selected from 
a collection of characters (‘Complete Characters HD’) supplied by Rocketbox Libraries 
for Vizard. We scripted everything the characters said during the experiment, which we 
pre-recorded from two male volunteers with native British accents. The pre-recorded 
speech was triggered by the experimenter or the computer program. The characters 






were programmed to move their jaw according to the amplitude of the pre-recorded 
speech, so that it looked like they were speaking. Audio speakers were hidden behind 
the projector screen so that the sound of the character’s voice came from their virtual 
location. 
Trustworthiness manipulation. We manipulated the trustworthiness of the two 
virtual characters during the initial interview phase of the experiment. Mike was designed 
to seem trustworthy, whereas Ryan was designed to seem untrustworthy. We achieved 
the manipulation through verbal, non-verbal and vocal signals. 
Verbal signals. Mike and Ryan gave different scripted responses to three 
interview questions: (1) What is your occupation? (2) What did you do last weekend? (3) 
What are your plans for the summer? Mike made statements demonstrating reliability, 
e.g. ‘I promised to raise £800 in sponsorship and I managed to smash the target’, 
whereas Ryan indicated irresponsibility, e.g. ‘things didn’t go so well at my last job and I 
basically ended up getting fired after missing too many deadlines’. For full scripts see 
Appendix.   
 
Figure 2-1. Overview of the virtual display (Study 1). Participants interacted with 
virtual characters displayed on a projector screen (panel A). Panel B shows the 
appearance of Mike (left) and Ryan (right). Panel C shows a plan and screenshot of 
each room in the virtual maze. The dashed green line illustrates a possible path 
through the room. 
 






Non-verbal signals. We programmed Mike and Ryan to make different amounts 
of eye contact, which people often use as a nonverbal signal to trustworthiness (even if 
it is not a reliable signal; DePaulo et al., 2003). Mike averted his gaze at random intervals 
of 6-9s, whereas Ryan averted gaze at random intervals of 3-6s and consequently made 
less eye contact. Both characters looked away at a random location for 0.75-1.75s before 
returning to make eye contact.  
Facial appearance is also used as a nonverbal cue to trustworthiness (Todorov, 
2008; Todorov & Duchaine, 2008). We obtained pilot ratings of trustworthiness on a 1 to 
6 scale for six different virtual characters by 52 participants in an online questionnaire. 
The appearance rated the most trustworthy (M = 3.89, SD = 1.15) was assigned to Mike 
and the appearance rated as least trustworthy (M = 2.79, SD = 1.16) was assigned to 
Ryan (c.f. Ewing, Caulfield, Read, & Rhodes, 2014). There was a significant difference 
in trustworthiness ratings between the two characters (t(51) = 5.37, p < .001).  
All other nonverbal behaviour (e.g. posture, head tilting) was controlled using the 
same idle animation for both characters. 
Vocal signals. Vocal hesitations and disfluencies are sometimes seen as a signal 
of untrustworthiness (Anderson et al., 1999; Hosman & Wright, 1987). Therefore, for the 
interview phase (but not the virtual maze task), the volunteer voicing Mike was instructed 
to speak clearly without many hesitations, whereas the volunteer voicing Ryan was 
instructed to mumble and make regular hesitations (e.g. ‘umm’). 
Virtual maze task.  
Virtual maze environment. The virtual maze was generated from a series of 
identical rooms (Figure 2-1C). The rooms were connected by twisting sections of corridor 
designed to enhance the illusion of being in a maze. The participant entered each room 
through a brown door; at the far end of the room, there was a red door and a blue door. 
In each room there were also two semi-transparent ‘hologram chambers’, where the 
virtual characters appeared as holograms from outside the maze. Mike always appeared 
on the left and Ryan always appeared on the right, but participants did not show any 






preference for approaching the left versus right hologram chamber (see Appendix). 
Whenever the participant got close to a hologram chamber, there was a sound effect 
and the chamber became more transparent. At the same time, the character inside the 
chamber would spin to face the participant and deliver some verbal advice. Participants 
were able to navigate the virtual environment by using a keypad to turn the viewpoint 
and move forwards or backwards. 
Trial procedure. Going through one room corresponded to completing one trial. 
Each participant completed twelve trials in total. In each trial, they had to make a choice 
about whether to proceed through the blue door or the red door. The participant was able 
to approach neither, one or both characters to receive advice about which door to 
choose, although this was not explicitly instructed. If approached, the characters 
randomly delivered uncertain advice about which door the participant should choose 
(e.g. ‘It’s blue this time, I think’). There was no ‘correct’ door on each trial. Instead, the 
maze was completed after twelve trials in which the participant approached at least one 
character. If a participant asked neither character, that trial was recorded but did not 
count towards the requisite twelve trials. This ensured we had twelve trials in which the 
participant received some advice about which way to go, thus providing data about how 
much they trusted that advice.  
Character advice. Mike and Ryan were programmed to advise the red door in half 
the trials and the blue door in the other half. They were also programmed to advise the 
same door as each other in half the trials and different doors in the other half. In order to 
generate the verbal advice stimuli, we pre-recorded twelve scripted phrases. Then we 
paired the phrases in order to create twelve combinations of advice stimuli (Table 2-1). 
The order of the stimulus combinations was randomised for each participant. Note that 
the participant would only receive an advice stimulus if they approached a character for 
advice. Therefore, some participants may not have received both parts of every stimulus 
combination. 






Dependent measures. We measured three dependent variables on each trial of 
the maze task. Firstly, we recorded whether each character was approached for advice. 
Secondly, we recorded which character the participant approached first (if the participant 
only approached one character, then that character was treated as being approached 
first). Thirdly, we recorded whether the participant followed the advice of each character. 
We averaged each of these variables over the total number of trials completed, giving 
us (1) the proportion of trials on which each character was approached for advice; (2) 
the proportion of trials on which each character was the first (or only) character 
approached for advice; and (3) the proportion of trials on which the participant followed 
each character’s advice. 
Table 2-1. Advice stimuli. 
Trial Advice from Mike  Advice from Ryan 
1 I think you should try the blue door. I think you should go through the 
red door. 
2 I think you go through the blue door 
this time. 
I think it’s the red door this time. 
3 It’s the blue door, I think. It’s red this time, I think. 
4 I think you should try the red door. I think you should go through the 
blue door. 
5 I think you go through the red door 
this time. 
I think it’s the blue door this time. 
6 It’s the red door, I think. It’s blue this time, I think. 
7 It’s blue this time, I think. It’s the blue door, I think. 
8 I think it’s the blue door this time. I think you go through the blue door 
this time. 
9 I think you should go through the 
blue door. 
I think you should try the blue door. 
10 It’s red this time, I think. It’s the red door, I think. 
11 I think it’s the red door this time. I think you go through the red door 
this time. 
12 I think you should go through the 
red door. 
I think you should try the red door. 
 
Procedure. Kathryn Taylor carried out the data collection, supervised by Joanna 
Hale. 
Interview. Participants were instructed that they were going to interview an 
individual virtual character called Mike (or Ryan) in order to get to know him. The 
participant was given a sheet with three prepared questions, and instructed to ask each 






question one at a time during the interview. At the start of the interview, Mike introduced 
himself and prompted the participant to begin asking questions. When the participant 
asked a question, the researcher triggered a pre-recorded scripted answer. The interview 
lasted around 5 minutes. At the end of the interview a virtual barrier appeared to occlude 
Mike and present the next tasks. 
Character ratings. Participants rated their agreement with 10 statements about 
Mike by clicking on a continuous scale from 0 (strongly disagree) to 1 (strongly agree). 
Each statement began ‘I think Mike is...’ followed by five items measuring rapport 
(likable/engaging/kind/unfriendly/unpleasant) and five items measuring trustworthiness 
(trustworthy/honest/responsible/unreliable/insincere). The statements were presented in 
a randomised order. We reversed the scores for negatively valenced items and averaged 
the responses to provide one score for rapport (α =.86) and one score for trustworthiness 
(α = .76). 
Investment game. Participants completed five trials of the Investment Game with 
Mike, based on Berg et al.’s (1995) paradigm. At the start of each trial the participant had 
£1 to play with (this did not accumulate over trials). They could invest any proportion of 
the £1 with Mike. Mike would always triple their investment. Then he would choose a 
proportion of the tripled amount and return it to the participant, but his decision was not 
revealed. The participant would end the trial with any money they chose not to invest, 
plus any money that Mike chose to return them. Unknown to the participant, we 
programmed the task so that 50% of the tripled money was always returned (i.e. a 
maximum of £1.50 from Mike or Ryan). We told participants at the start of the game that 
one trial would be selected at random and they would find out the outcome of that trial, 
which would be paid as a cash bonus. To measure how much the participant trusted 
Mike, we measured the proportion of £1 that the participant chose to invest as an average 
across the five trials. 






Once the participant had completed the interview, character ratings and investment 
game with Mike, then they completed the same three steps with Ryan. The order in which 
participants met Mike and Ryan was counterbalanced.  
Virtual maze. After interacting separately with Mike and Ryan, the participant 
completed the virtual maze task. First the participant practiced using a keypad to 
navigate around a virtual space and approach hologram chambers in order to receive a 
greeting message from Mike or Ryan. After the practice, the participant was instructed 
that their task was to find the way out of the virtual maze as quickly as possible. They 
were also told ‘There are some rooms in the maze where you will have to make a choice 
about which way to go. To help you decide, Mike and Ryan will be able to give you 
remote advice from outside the maze. They will appear as holograms in the room and 
you can go up to them to get advice’. Then participants began the task. After completing 
twelve trials, they were told they had successfully completed the maze.  
Finally, participants completed a questionnaire unrelated to the current study, and 
then received payment. The experiment took approximately 40 minutes. 
2.3.2 Contributions 
Joanna Hale wrote the interview scripts and programmed the virtual characters’ 
behaviour. Antonia Hamilton and Joanna Hale devised the maze task, which was 
programmed by Joanna Hale. Kathryn Taylor carried out participant recruitment and data 
collection, under the supervision of Joanna Hale. Joanna Hale carried out the analyses 
that follow.  
2.3.3 Results and Discussion 
Missing data. One participant completed only five trials of the virtual maze due to 
motion sickness, but their data was included in the analyses. Three other participants 
briefly paused during the virtual maze task due to feeling motion sick, but this was not 
enough to cause concern that the task was too unpleasant. 






Trust towards Mike and Ryan. We carried out paired-samples t-tests to determine 
whether there was a significant difference between Mike and Ryan on each of our six 
dependent measures: rapport rating, trustworthiness rating, percentage investment, 
approaching for maze advice, approaching first, and following maze advice. We applied 
a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. Mike scored higher than Ryan on every 
measure, indicating participants liked and trusted Mike more than Ryan (Table 2-2). In 
the virtual maze participants approached Mike significantly more often than Ryan, 
although they did not approach Mike first significantly more often than they approached 
Ryan first. Furthermore, participants followed advice from Mike significantly more than 
Ryan. These results show that the maze task was sensitive to our manipulation, although 
it is possible that the effects were due to differences in the likeability of each character, 
rather than their trustworthiness. 




Ryan M (SD) 
Difference  
t(19) p d 
Rapport rating .88 (.12) .39 (.24) 8.28 < .001 2.58 
Trustworthiness rating .85 (.11) .31 (.22) 8.59 < .001 3.10 
Investment .76 (.24) .46 (.36) 6.29 < .001 0.98 
Approach for advice .90 (.18) .62 (.35) 3.27 .004 1.01 
Approach first .62 (.27) .38 (.27) 1.94 .07 0.89 
Follow advice .79 (.20) .42 (.25) 4.32 <.001 1.63 
 
 
Correlations between Mike and Ryan. For each measure, we examined the 
correlations between scores for Mike and Ryan (Table 2-3). Investment was the only 
measure which showed a significant correlation between the two characters, which was 
strongly positive. This means that participants were fairly consistent in their investments 
towards the two characters, suggesting investment behaviour might have been driven 
by generalised rather than their perception of the specific characters’ trustworthiness. 






However, we cannot tell whether this evidence for generalised trust may be explained 
by variability in traits such as risk aversion and altruism (McEvily et al., 2012), or whether 
different participants simply interpreted the task instructions differently (Macko et al., 
2014). 
 Summary. We found that the maze task was sensitive to our trustworthiness 
manipulation, showing a significant difference in how often people would approach and 
follow the advice of the trustworthy virtual character (Mike) versus the untrustworthy 
character (Ryan). Our manipulation led to large effect sizes on the measures we took 
from the virtual maze, as well as our other dependent measures. The investment game 
was the only measure for which people’s responses towards Mike and Ryan were 
significantly correlated. This suggests that people’s investments may reflect a 
generalised level of trust, or other stable individual characteristics.  




Rapport rating .02 .93 
Trustworthiness rating -.38 .10 
Investment .82 < .001 
Approach for advice .10 .67 
Approach first -1.0* 0 
Follow advice -.23 .20 
*Note that participants could only approach one character first on each trial and therefore the 
‘approach first’ measure is perfectly negatively correlated across characters. 
 
2.4 Study 2 
In Study 2, we aimed to replicate Study 1 using a more controlled manipulation of 
trustworthiness, where each character would be matched in likeability. We also aimed to 
adapt the maze task for use with a head-mounted display (HMD), and included an extra 






questionnaire to measure how real the virtual experience seemed to participants and 
record any feelings of motion sickness associated with the HMD. 
2.4.1 Methods 
Participants. Twenty-four participants (17 female, Mage = 25.9, SDage = 10) were 
recruited through email advertisements to the ICN departmental participant pool. The 
sample size was based on Study 1, which found large effects with a sample of 20. All 
participants gave written informed consent and received payment of £7 per hour, plus a 
bonus of up to £3 depending on how they played the investment game. The study was 
granted ethical approval by the MoD Research Ethics Committee (Reference Number 
564/MODREC/14) and the ICN Ethics Chair (Project ID Number ICN-AH-PWB-3-3-14a). 
Virtual reality system. We used Vizard virtual reality software (Worldviz, 2014) to 
display virtual environments in an Oculus Rift DK2 head-mounted display (HMD). This 
device allows people to look around a virtual 3D space as if they are really there. 
Participants wore the HMD while seated at a physical desk in our lab. During the 
interview phase of the experiment, participants saw a virtual desk in place of the physical 
desk, inside a virtual room that looked like a typical psychology laboratory. We 
programmed a virtual screen to occlude the virtual character at the end of the interview 
phase and display the next tasks to the participant. The virtual maze task was also 
displayed via the HMD. Participants wore stereo headphones throughout the experiment 
to hear the characters speaking and other sound effects. They were provided with a 
joystick to make responses during the tasks and navigate through the virtual maze.  
Trustworthiness manipulation. The Mike and Ryan characters from Study 1 
were slightly modified for Study 2. In this study, Mike was designed to seem reliable and 
Ryan was designed to seem unreliable but we aimed to make both characters equally 
likeable. Therefore, we scripted new questions and responses for the characters to 
deliver in the interview phase. We altered verbal, non-verbal and vocal signals of 
trustworthiness from each character as follows: 






Verbal. Mike and Ryan delivered new scripted responses to seven interview 
questions. Mike made statements demonstrating reliability, e.g. ‘I ended up graduating 
with the highest grade’, whereas Ryan indicated unreliability, e.g. ‘I only had a few 
lectures a week and I used to miss them all the time’. Both characters showed their 
likeability, e.g.  ‘I met so many people that I’m still really close with’ (Mike); ‘I also get 
along with everyone’ (Ryan). For full scripts see Appendix. To validate the new scripts, 
a separate pilot sample provided online ratings of rapport and trust towards the speakers. 
We presented the scripts from Study 1 and Study 2 as if they were transcripts from real 
interviews (in the scripts from Study 1 we changed the characters’ names to David and 
Ben). Pilot participants rated significantly more trust (t(14) = 8.14, p < .001, d = 3.73) and 
rapport (t(14) = 8.46, p < .001, d = 2.16) towards Mike than Ryan in the Study 1 scripts 
(Table 2-4). In the new scripts for Study 2 (Table 4), pilot participants rated significantly 
greater trust towards Mike (t(14) = 3.56, p = .003, d = 1.48) but there was no significant 
difference in rapport towards Mike and Ryan (t(14) = .67, p = .514, d = 0.24), supporting 
the validity of our manipulation. However, it should be noted these pilot ratings were 
based on a small sample size. 
Table 2-4. Descriptive statistics for each script (Study 2). 
Study Character name 










1 Mike (David) High High 4.37 (.85) 4.83 (.77) 
Ryan (Ben) Low Low 2.23 (1.11) 1.67 (.92) 
2 Mike (Mike) High High 4.93 (1.04) 4.71 (1.03) 
Ryan (Ryan) Low High 4.70 (.91) 3.29 (.88) 
 
Non-verbal. As in Study 1, Mike and Ryan were programmed to make different 
amounts of eye contact. In this study, we also manipulated the characters’ promptness 
as a signal of reliability. At the start of the interview phase, the participant was asked to 
wait while the current virtual character got ready. Mike was ready after a short delay of 






4 seconds, saying ‘Ok, yep, I’m ready to start!’, whereas Ryan took 14 seconds to get 
ready before saying ‘Sorry I’m late. Yeah, OK, I’m ready now’. All other nonverbal 
behaviour was controlled using the same idle animation for both characters. 
Vocal. As in Study 1, the volunteer voicing Mike was instructed to speak without 
many hesitations, whereas the volunteer voicing Ryan was instructed to make more 
hesitations. However, both volunteers spoke clearly and engagingly so as to avoid 
differences in friendliness or likeability. 
Virtual maze task. We slightly adapted the virtual maze task from Study 1 for use 
with the HMD. Instead of using a keypad to navigate the virtual maze, participants used 
a joystick. We triggered extra sound effects when the participant went through doors in 
the virtual maze, in order to increase realism. We also rendered a plainer texture on the 
virtual walls and simplified the sections of corridor joining each room in order to reduce 
motion sickness associated with navigating narrow and twisty sections of corridor. All 
other aspects of the virtual maze task remained the same. 
VR Questionnaire. We included a short questionnaire about the participant’s 
experience in immersive virtual reality. Participants indicated their agreement with 
statements on scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Four statements 
assessed how much the virtual world was real (‘presence’), e.g. ‘During the experience, 
the interview felt like the real world for me’. Four statements assessed how much the 
virtual characters seemed real (‘co-presence’), e.g. ‘My feelings and emotions in relation 
to Mike/Ryan were as if they were real’. Items were based on presence and co-presence 
items used in other virtual reality studies (Friedman et al., 2014; Pan et al., 2012). The 
questionnaire also asked participants to indicate whether they felt any motion sickness, 
queasiness, headache or eye strain whilst wearing the HMD.  
Procedure. Madeleine Payne carried out the data collection, supervised by J.H. 
Each participant was seated at a desk and given verbal instructions from the 
experimenter. Then they were fitted with the HMD and saw themselves in a virtual 
laboratory. They could see a laptop on a desk in front of them, but a large screen 






displaying instructions blocked the participant’s view of the room on the other side of the 
desk (Figure 2-2A). The participant was given a few minutes to become accustomed to 
the virtual environment. They also practiced using the joystick to trigger instructions and 
log responses. When the participant had completed the practice, they were instructed 
they were going to interview a character called Mike and were asked to press a button 
on the joystick when they were ready to start the interview. Then the participant was 
instructed to wait while Mike got ready. After a specified delay, the participant heard a 
door opening and a chair moving somewhere on the other side of the large screen, and 
then Mike said he was ready. At that point, the screen moved up to the ceiling so that 
the participant could see Mike (Figure 2-2B). Interview questions were displayed to the 
participant one at a time on the laptop. When the participant asked each question, the 
researcher triggered a pre-recorded scripted answer from Mike. The interview lasted 
around five minutes. At the end of the interview, the large screen was lowered again to 
occlude Mike and present the next tasks. 
 
 
Figure 2-2. Virtual laboratory space (Study 2). The room is shown from the 
participant’s side of the desk. Instructions and stimuli were displayed on large screen 
which occluded the virtual character (Panel A). During the interview phase, the 
participant saw the virtual character sitting opposite them and interview questions were 
displayed on the laptop screen (Panel B). 
 
Character ratings. Immediately following the interview, participants rated their 
feelings of rapport and trust towards Mike, as in Study 1. 






Investment Game. Next, participants completed the investment game as in Study 
1. Data from Study 1 indicated that participants made highly consistent choices over five 
trials of the investment game. Therefore in Study 2 we decided to reduce the number of 
trials to one, consistent with the traditional paradigm (Berg et al., 1995). Reducing the 
number of trials also reduced the time participants spent wearing the HMD.  
Once participants had completed these steps with Mike, they took a break from 
wearing the HMD and completed the VR questionnaire on paper. Then the same 
procedure was repeated with Ryan. The order of characters was counterbalanced across 
participants.  
Virtual Maze. Then the participant completed the virtual maze task in the HMD. 
First, they practiced using the joystick to navigate around the virtual space and approach 
Mike and Ryan. They were instructed their task was to find the way out of the virtual 
maze through as few rooms as possible. They were also instructed ‘in each room in the 
maze, you must choose which way to go. To help you decide, Mike and Ryan can give 
you advice.’ Then participants began the task. After completing twelve trials, they were 
told they had successfully completed the maze.  
Finally, participants received payment. The experiment took approximately 50 
minutes. 
2.4.2 Contributions 
Joanna Hale programmed the virtual characters’ behaviour and the virtual maze 
task. Madeleine Payne wrote the interview scripts, recruited participants and carried out 
data collection, under the supervision of Joanna Hale. Joanna Hale carried out the 
analyses that follow.  
2.4.3 Results and Discussion 
Missing data. Three participants terminated the virtual maze due to discomfort 
before completing 12 trials. One participant reported making a mistake on two ratings; 






these responses were recorded as missing. No participants were excluded from the 
analyses. 
VR Questionnaire. The median rating of how real the virtual environment seemed 
to participants was 4.75 out of 7 (M = 4.58, SD = 0.73, Range = [2.75, 6]), and the median 
rating of how real the virtual characters seemed was 5 out of 7 (M = 4.72, SD = 1.25, 
Range = [1.5, 6.5]) which is very similar to levels found in other immersive VR 
experiments using a comparable rating scale (e.g. Friedman et al., 2014; Pan et al., 
2012). One participant reported eye strain due to not wearing their glasses, but no other 
symptoms of motion sickness, queasiness, headache or eye strain were reported, 
despite three participants terminating the maze task early.  
Trust towards Mike and Ryan. We carried out paired-samples t-tests to 
determine whether there was a significant difference between Mike and Ryan on each 
of our measures. We applied a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. 
Replicating the results from Study 1, Mike scored significantly higher than Ryan on every 
measure (Table 2-5), indicating that participants liked and trusted Mike more than Ryan. 
In the virtual maze, participants approached Mike significantly more than Ryan overall, 
and Mike was also approached first significantly more than Ryan. Participants also 
followed advice from Mike significantly more than advice from Ryan. Therefore in Study 
2 we replicated the results from Study 1 using a different trustworthiness manipulation 
and a more immersive virtual reality system.  
The significant difference in rapport was inconsistent with our pilot ratings of Mike 
and Ryan’s scripted responses, raising the possibility that our results were affected by 
other aspects of the experiment. In particular, the extra nonverbal cues which were 
present in the experiment (such as eye contact) could have affected feelings of rapport 
towards each character. Other factors such as the immersive environment could also 
have affected the experimental results. While we could not test all of these factors, we 
were able to test whether the order of interviewing Mike and Ryan (which was 
counterbalanced) affected our results. Because our experiment had a within-participants 






design, it is possible that participants’ impressions of each character would differ 
depending on whether they already had a ‘baseline’ impression about the other 
character, or no baseline information to go on. Therefore we carried out ANOVAs to test 
the interaction between character (within-subjects) and interview order (between-
subjects) on each of our dependent measures.  




Ryan M (SD) 
Difference  
t(23) p d 
Rapport rating .82 (.12) .60 (.16) 5.26 <.001 1.56 
Trust rating .74 (.17) .42 (.13) 6.45 <.001 2.11 
Investment .77 (.25) .48 (.36) 4.93 <.001 0.94 
Approach for 
advice 
.98 (.05) .76 (.31) 3.67 .004 
0.99 
Approach first .64 (.29) .36 (.29) 2.38 .03 0.97 
Follow advice .87 (.15) .47 (.23) 5.60 <.001 2.06 
 
 
There was a significant interaction between character and interview order on 
rapport ratings (F(1, 22) = 4.55, p = .04, np2 = .17) and investments (F(1,22) = 5.47, p = 
.03, ƞp2 = .20). To further decompose these effects, we conducted post-hoc pairwise 
comparisons with Bonferroni correction. For rapport, Mike was rated significantly higher 
than Ryan by both groups, but the difference was greater in the group who interviewed 
Mike first (MMike  = .83, MRyan = .53, t(10) = 4.76, p = .004) compared to the group who 
interviewed Ryan first (MMike = .81 MRyan = .67, t(12) = 3.11, p = .037). For investments, 
only the group who interviewed Mike first invested significantly more money with Mike 
than Ryan (MMike = .67 MRyan = .25, t(10) = 5.62, p < .001); the same effect was not 
significant for participants who interviewed Ryan first  (MMike = .85 MRyan = 0.68 t(12) = 
2.30, p = .16). A graph of these results highlights the presence of an order effect (Figure 
2-3). Participants invested almost identical amounts of money in the first character they 






interviewed, but when we look at the second character interviewed there is a large 
difference between Mike and Ryan. This suggests that participants’ investment in the 
first character simply reflected their level of generalised trust, but once they had a 
baseline impression about the first character their investment with the second character 
was more informed by perceptions of trustworthiness, i.e. specific trust. 
Correlations between Mike and Ryan. For each measure, we examined the 
correlations between scores for Mike and Ryan (Table 2-6). Replicating our results from 
Study 1, investment was the only measure which showed a significant positive 
correlation between the two characters. We interpret this as evidence that the investment 
game is sensitive to generalised trust or other stable individual characteristics, since 
people showed strong consistency in their investments towards different virtual 
characters. We also found a significant negative correlation between following Mike’s 
advice and following Ryan’s advice in the maze. This reflects the fact that on half of the 
trials in the virtual maze task, Mike and Ryan gave opposing advice.  
 
 
Figure 2-3. Investments towards Mike and Ryan by interview order (Study 2). 
 










Rapport rating -.05 .80 
Trust rating -.23 .28 
Investment .63 .001 
Approach for advice .18 .40 
Approach first -1.0* 0 
Follow advice -.64 .001 
*Note that participants could only approach one character first on each trial and therefore the 
‘approach first’ measure is perfectly negatively correlated across characters. 
 
Summary. We found that the virtual maze task was sensitive to our more 
controlled manipulation of trustworthiness, replicating the results from Study 1. 
Participants were significantly more likely to approach and follow the advice of the 
trustworthy virtual character (Mike) versus the untrustworthy character (Ryan). We also 
found a significant effect of our manipulation on the other measures of trust as well as 
on rapport ratings, despite the pilot ratings of our new scripts suggesting that Mike and 
Ryan were similarly likeable. Therefore, we explored the possibility of an order effect in 
our data and found that the order in which the virtual characters were interviewed 
affected how much participants invested in Mike versus Ryan. Those who interacted with 
Mike first invested much less money with Ryan compared to Mike, but those who met 
Ryan first invested similar amounts with Ryan and Mike. In fact, participants invested 
very similar amounts in whichever character they met first, but when investing with the 
second character they showed greater trust towards Mike than Ryan. This suggests that 
people’s initial investments may have been driven by generalised trust, but their 
investment with the second character may have been more informed by perceptions of 
trustworthiness, i.e. specific trust. This interpretation is consistent with our finding that 
investment was the only measure showing a significant positive correlation between the 






two characters, which replicated Study 1 and indicates that the investment game at least 
partly reflects stable individual differences.   
2.5 Study 3 
In the first two studies we demonstrated that the virtual maze task is sensitive to 
differences between two characters and appears to tap into specific trust rather than 
generalised trust. However, we manipulated a variety of factors to make one character 
seem trustworthy and the other untrustworthy, and some of our manipulations might have 
indicated competence or efficiency (e.g. being on time vs. late, or seeming reliable vs. 
unreliable) rather than trustworthiness per se. Therefore in the third study we aimed to 
manipulate trustworthiness in a purer way, using the investment game. Participants 
played the investment game with a fair character who usually returned a profit, and an 
unfair character who usually returned a loss, then completed the virtual maze task. In 
this study, we adapted the virtual maze task for use on a standard desktop computer to 
demonstrate how it may be used in traditional laboratories without the need for virtual 
reality software or equipment.  
2.5.1 Methods 
Participants. Twenty-four participants (14 female, Mage = 21.4, SDage = 11.8) were 
recruited through email advertisements to the ICN departmental participant pool. The 
sample size was based on Study 2, which had sufficient power with a sample of 24. All 
participants gave written informed consent and received payment of £5 for half an hour, 
plus a bonus of up to £3.50 depending on how they played the investment game. The 
study was granted ethical approval by the MoD Research Ethics Committee (Reference 
Number 564/MODREC/14) and the ICN Ethics Chair (Project ID Number ICN-AH-PWB-
3-3-14a). 
Investment game manipulation. In this study we used the investment game to 
manipulate the trustworthiness of two characters called Anne and Beth. We based our 
manipulation on the procedure used by Franzen et al. (2011). The participant completes 






18 trials with one character who plays fairly (usually returns a profit) and 18 trials with 
one character who plays unfairly (usually returns a loss). Participants played the fair and 
unfair characters in a counterbalanced order, and the names of the characters were 
counterbalanced.  
 At the start of each trial the participant had £1 to play with (this did not accumulate 
over trials). They could invest any proportion of the £1 with the character (e.g. Anne), 
who would always triple their investment. Then Anne would choose a proportion of the 
tripled amount and return it to the participant. Her decision was displayed on the screen. 
If Anne returned less than 1/3 of the tripled amount, the participant would end the trial 
with less than their initial £1, thus making a loss. If Anne returned more than 1/3 then the 
participant would make a profit. At the end of the trial, the participant saw the amount of 
money Anne returned and the amount of profit or loss made on that trial. The participant 
was told that at the end of the experiment we would select one of the 18 trials at random 
and pay them the outcome of that trial. We clarified that the participant could not lose 
any of their study payment on this game. 
Following Franzen et al. (2011), the fair character returned 41.3% of the tripled 
investment on average. Their returns ranged in nine steps from a maximum return of 
66% to a minimum return of 17% (two thirds of trials led to a profit). The unfair character 
returned 25% of the tripled investment on average. Their returns ranged in nine steps 
from a maximum return of 50% to a minimum return of 0% (two thirds of trials led to a 
loss). The trial order for each character was presented in a pseudorandom sequence, 
which was the same for all participants.  
Virtual maze task. We adapted the virtual maze task for use with a standard 
desktop computer. The participant viewed the task on a standard monitor and made 
responses using the keyboard. They also wore headphones to hear the advice from each 
character. 
Virtual maze environment. The maze was generated from the same virtual rooms 
and corridors as in Study 2. However, in Study 3 there were no hologram chambers and 






the participant could not move around the virtual space. We also changed the blue and 
red doors to brown so that they would have equal visual value. 
Trial procedure. The participant completed 12 trials as in the previous studies. 
The trial sequence is summarised in Figure 2-4. Each trial began with a video clip where 
the camera view moved through a corridor and a room until it ended up facing two doors 
at the far end of the room. At the end of the video clip the view of the doors stayed on 
the screen. Then a black panel and fixation cross were superimposed in the centre of 
the screen. After 1.5s, the panel displayed silhouettes and names of each virtual 
character, along with phone icons. One character (e.g. Anne) always appeared on the 
left and the other (e.g. Beth) always appeared on the right, in a counterbalanced fashion. 
The participant had an unlimited amount of time to make a response using the keyboard. 
If they chose to call a character for advice, that character’s phone icon would turn green 
and her verbal advice was played via headphones, e.g. ‘I think it’s the left door this time’. 
The participant could then call the other character for advice if they chose. The trial ended 
when the participant chose which door to go through, which triggered a short video clip 
of the door opening and the camera view moving forward through the door. If the 
participant chose a door without asking for advice, that trial was recorded but did not 
count towards the requisite twelve trials. 
Anne and Beth were programmed to advise the left door in half the trials and the 
right door in the other half. They were also programmed to advise the same door as each 
other in half the trials and different doors in the other half. In order to generate the verbal 
advice stimuli, we pre-recorded twelve scripted phrases the same as the previous 
studies.  
 







Figure 2-4. Example trial sequence in the maze task adapted for desktop 
computer (Study 3). The participant sees a video clip where the camera moves 
through the maze. A black panel with fixation cross is superimposed on the last frame 
of the video. The participant makes untimed choices to hear advice from Anne or Beth, 
or choose the left or right door. After choosing a door, the participant sees a video clip 
where the camera goes through the door. 
 
Procedure. Davide Paoletti carried out the data collection. 
Investment game manipulation. First, the experimenter gave a verbal 
introduction to the investment game and then the participant received instructions on the 
computer screen. The participant practiced the investment game and was instructed that 
they were not playing for real money in the practice. They completed four practice trials 
of the investment game with a character called Kate, who always returned 40% of the 
tripled investment on each trial (a small profit of up to 20p). When they had completed 
the practice, the participant was reminded that the rest of the game would be played for 
real money. Then they completed 18 trials of the investment game with one character 
(e.g. Anne), followed by 18 trials with the other character (e.g. Beth).  
Virtual maze task. After completing the investment game with both characters, 
the experimenter gave a verbal introduction to the maze game and asked the participant 






to put on headphones. Then the participant received instructions on the computer 
screen. First they completed four practice trials of the maze game, in which the four 
possible advice combinations from Anne and Beth (both say left; both say right; Anne 
says left but Beth says right; Anne says right but Beth says left) were included in a 
randomised order. When they had completed the practice, the participant was told that 
they would start the maze again from a new position in the main task. Then the participant 
played the maze game until they had completed 12 trials where they asked for advice 
from at least one character. 
Post-study questionnaire. Finally, the participant completed a questionnaire 
about the study on the computer. First, they were asked about the purpose of the study. 
Second, they were asked to rate two items about the fairness and trustworthiness of 
each character as a manipulation check. Fairness was rated was rated on a 7-point scale 
from ‘extremely unfair’ to ‘extremely fair’. Trustworthiness was rated on a 7-point scale 
from ‘I did not trust [Name] at all’ to ‘I trusted [Name] completely’.  Lastly, the participant 
was asked describe any strategy they used in the investment game.  
At the very end of the study, participants received payment. The experiment took 
approximately 30 minutes. 
2.5.2 Contributions 
Joanna Hale programmed the investment game and the virtual maze task. Audio 
Stimuli were recorded by Alexandra Georgescu. Davide Paoletti recruited participants 
and carried out data collection. Joanna Hale carried out the analyses that follow.  
2.5.3 Results and Discussion 
Manipulation checks. As a manipulation check, we carried out paired sampled t-
tests to see whether participants’ ratings of fairness and trustworthiness differed for the 
fair and unfair characters. Participants rated the fair character as significantly more fair 
during the investment game (M = 4.38, SD = 1.58) than the unfair character (M = 3.08, 
SD = 1.47; t(1,23) = 2.23, p = .04, d = 0.17). They also rated the fair character as 






significantly more trustworthy (M = 4.91, SD = 1.59) than the unfair character (M = 3.25, 
SD = 1.48; t(1,23) = 2.96, p = . 007, d = 0.60). In addition, participants invested 
significantly more money with the fair character (M = £0.67, SD = £0.21) than the unfair 
character (M = £0.38, SD = £0.19) (t(1,23) = 6.31, p < .001, d = 1.29). Therefore, the 
manipulation was successful in making one character seem more trustworthy than the 
other. 
Trust in the Virtual Maze. To test whether participants trusted the fair and unfair 
characters differently in the virtual maze, we carried out paired-samples t-tests on each 
of our dependent variables from the maze task. Participants followed advice from the fair 
character more than the unfair character, although this result was marginally significant 
(t(1,23) = 2.03, p = .055, d = 0.41). The Bayes Factor for this test (BF10 = 1.21) indicates 
anecdotal support for the hypothesis that people follow the advice of the fair character 
more than the unfair character. There were no significant differences in how often 
participants called each character overall (t(1,23) = 1.51, p = 0.15, d = 0.31, BF10 = 0.58), 
or called each character first (t(1,23) = 0.83, p = 0.42, d = 0.17, BF10 = 0.29).  
When we examined participants’ responses about any strategy they used in the 
virtual maze, 10 participants (42%) said that they based their maze decisions on how the 
characters played the investment game. Ten participants (42%) based their maze 
decisions on how the characters sounded when giving advice. Three participants (13%) 
indicated that they used a mixture of these strategies. One participant (4%) reported they 
had no strategy. Participants who used a strategy based on the investment game 
followed the advice of the fair character significantly more than the unfair character when 
they played the virtual maze game (t(1,9) = 2.75, p = 0.02, d = 0.87, BF10 = 3.26). The 
Bayes Factor for this test indicates moderate evidence in favour of the effect, despite the 
reduced sample size. 
Overall, these results suggest that the investment game manipulation was 
successful but did not lead to strong effects on behaviour in the virtual maze because a 
large proportion of participants (42%) used audible voice cues to inform their maze 






decisions instead. If participants had not been distracted by these cues, we would expect 
to see a stronger effect of fairness on behaviour in the virtual maze. It is important to 
note that the spoken delivery of the advice stimuli was well-matched for the fair and unfair 
characters, and stimuli were presented in a randomised order. This means that the 
participants who relied on any subjective audible cues present in the advice stimuli would 
have provided very noisy data. However, even with this limitation we were able to detect 
a marginal difference in how much participants followed the advice of each character in 
the virtual maze task. We did not see effects on how often each character was called for 
advice (either called first or called at all), which could be because pressing a button to 
‘telephone’ a character is much less socially salient than approaching an embodied 
virtual character in an immersive 3D environment. Our findings suggest that the 
simplified format of the task in this study could be less suitable than the full VR version 
for measuring implicit trust in terms of approach behaviour.  
2.6 General Discussion 
Across three experiments, we aimed to test whether our novel virtual maze task 
was sensitive to differences in trustworthiness between two virtual characters. In the first 
two studies, participants briefly interviewed a trustworthy character (Mike) and an 
untrustworthy character (Ryan) before completing the virtual maze task, which was either 
presented on a projector screen (Study 1) or in immersive virtual reality using an HMD 
(Study 2). In the third study we manipulated the trustworthiness of two characters called 
Anne and Beth using an investment game and participants completed a low-tech version 
of the virtual maze task on a standard computer. We measured three outcomes in the 
virtual maze: (1) the proportion of trials on which each character was approached for 
advice; (2) the proportion of trials on which each character was the first (or only) 
character approached for advice; and (3) the proportion of trials on which the participant 
followed each character’s advice. 






In the two VR studies, we found that people approached the trustworthy character 
significantly more than the untrustworthy character. The trustworthy character was also 
significantly more likely to be the first or only character they approached on a given trial 
(Study 2). Furthermore, we found that people followed advice obtained from the 
trustworthy character significantly more often than advice from the untrustworthy 
character. This suggested that all three measures we took from the virtual maze were 
sensitive to our manipulations of trustworthiness, supporting the effectiveness of our 
paradigm for measuring specific trust. However, in both of the VR studies we 
manipulated multiple aspects of verbal and nonverbal behaviour to achieve a large effect 
of trustworthiness, and therefore detected a large effect on each of the virtual maze 
measures (Table 2-7). In Study 3, we manipulated trustworthiness in a more subtle way 
by making characters play fairly or unfairly in an investment game (Franzen et al., 2011; 
Lis et al., 2013) and we implemented a low-tech version of the maze task without VR. 
Perhaps due to a combination of these design factors, the virtual maze task was not able 
to detect such strong effects in the third study (Table 2-7). 
Table 2-7. Effect sizes. 
Measure 
Effect size (d) 
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
Trust rating 3.10 2.11 - 
Investment game 0.98 0.94 - 
Maze: Approach for advice 1.01 0.99 0.58 
Maze: Approach first 0.89 0.97 0.29 
Maze: Follow advice 1.63 2.06 0.41 
 
As well as our virtual maze task, in our two VR experiments we also included two 
of the major existing methods for measuring trust: self-report ratings and the investment 
game. We found a large significant effect of our trustworthiness manipulation on these 
measures. In the next sections we discuss what trustworthiness ratings, the investment 






game and the virtual maze task are actually measuring. In particular, we evaluate the 
effectiveness of each approach for measuring levels of specific trust towards a stranger. 
2.6.1 What do Trustworthiness Ratings Measure? 
One of the most straightforward and direct methods to measure trust is through 
self-report ratings, although they are often criticised for being open to ambiguity (Ben-
Ner & Halldorsson, 2010; Hooghe et al., 2009) and social biases (McCambridge et al., 
2012), and having a poor correspondence with behaviour (Armitage & Christian, 2003). 
In this study we asked participants to rate their perceptions of trustworthiness and rapport 
towards the virtual characters, by indicating their agreement with statements like ‘I think 
Mike is very reliable’. The scales we used to measure trust and rapport have been used 
in other VR research in our lab and are similar to other validated questionnaires 
(McCroskey & Teven, 1999). However, in the present study we did not carry out a formal 
validation of our scales, which limits the conclusions we can draw about their 
effectiveness. When we tested for the presence of order effects in Study 2, we found that 
rapport ratings were affected by the order in which participants met the trustworthy and 
untrustworthy characters. Although this finding does not have a direct bearing on 
trustworthiness ratings, it highlights a general limitation of this method for repeated 
measures designs.   
2.6.2 What Does the Investment Game Measure? 
We suggested in the introduction that how much people invest in the investment 
game may reflect a mixture of their level of generalised trust and their specific trust 
towards the other player (trustee). Our data supports this suggestion. We found that 
participants’ investments with Mike and Ryan were highly correlated, which is consistent 
with previous pilot studies we have conducted. This means that participants who invested 
a lot with Mike were also likely to invest a lot with Ryan, reflecting a stable individual 
characteristic. The correlation did not merely reflect similar perceptions of each 
character’s trustworthiness, since trustworthiness ratings were (non-significantly) 






negatively correlated across characters. Therefore, participants perceived a difference 
in the characters’ trustworthiness, but nevertheless invested similar amounts with each 
one. We interpret this as evidence of generalised trust, although previous research 
indicated that other stable individual traits such as risk-aversion or altruism might 
possibly have determined this outcome (Ashraf et al., 2006; Ben-Ner & Halldorsson, 
2010; Cox, 2004; Karlan, 2005; McEvily et al., 2012; Schechter, 2007).  
Our data from Study 2 reveal further how generalised trust and specific trust may 
each play a role in the investment game. We found a significant order effect showing that 
the ratio of participants’ investments towards the two characters depended on whether 
they interacted with the trustworthy character first, or the untrustworthy character. From 
decomposing this effect it was clear that participants invested similar amounts of money 
with the first character they met, regardless of whether it was the trustworthy or the 
untrustworthy character. In other words, when they had no ‘baseline’ comparison from 
interacting previously with a virtual character, we assume that participants invested 
money based on their level of generalised trust. In contrast, people invested much more 
with the trustworthy character than the untrustworthy character once they had already 
completed one interaction. The first interaction may have provided a reference point so 
that when they played the investment game for a second time, participants made 
decisions based on specific trust towards the other player. This may be a limitation in 
studies using repeated investment games to measure trust towards different individuals.  
2.6.3 What Does the Virtual Maze Measure? 
Our aim in designing the virtual maze task was to develop a new way of measuring 
specific trust towards a stranger. Our results indicate that the virtual maze task was 
successful in capturing specific trust rather than generalised trust. In Studies 1 and 2, we 
did not find a significant relationship between how often participants approached one 
character and how often they approached the other character, which suggests that 
people did not simply act according to their own level of generalised trust in others. If the 
task were mainly measuring generalised trust, we would expect participants to approach 






both characters a similar amount overall. The other two measures we took from the 
virtual maze are actually anti-correlated across characters due to the nature of the task: 
e.g. if someone approached Mike first they could not also approach Ryan first, and on 
50% of trials if they followed Mike’s advice they could not also follow Ryan’s (on the other 
50% of trials the advice was the same).  
These forced-choice aspects of the virtual maze task may make it particularly 
sensitive to specific trust rather than generalised trust, because the participant is 
implicitly forced to assess the trustworthiness of one character versus the other, much 
like in the ask-endorse paradigm when the participant has to select one informant versus 
the other. We would expect this forced-choice approach to be much more sensitive than 
asking the participant to make a choice about one character alone. Indeed, when 
participants had to choose which character’s advice to follow in the VR maze (studies 1 
and 2) we found a larger difference between Mike and Ryan compared to when 
participants had to choose how much money they would invest with each character 
individually (Table 2-7).  However, our results from Study 3 suggest that outside of VR 
the virtual maze task may be less sensitive to these effects, particularly if other cues are 
present which might affect participants’ decisions, such as tone of voice.  
In Study 3, we addressed the possibility that our manipulations of Mike and Ryan 
might have included elements of competency or effectiveness rather than 
trustworthiness. According to Fiske et al.’s model of social cognition (Fiske et al., 2002, 
1999), warmth (which includes perceived trustworthiness) is evaluated independently of 
competence. In addition, economic definitions suggest that trusting involves risking 
exploitation, which was not possible in our virtual maze task (i.e. the virtual characters 
could not exploit the participant for gain). Therefore, it could be argued that our results 
from Studies 1 and 2 reflected perceptions of Mike and Ryan’s competence or reliability 
and that this does represent trust per se. Therefore, in Study 3 we manipulated 
trustworthiness of two female characters (Anne and Beth) using the investment game 
instead. We also measured trust towards each character using a low-tech version of the 






maze task. In this version, participants could ask Anne and Beth for advice in a ‘phone 
a friend’ fashion by pressing a call button. Although we found weaker effects using this 
simplified version of the task, 42% of participants explicitly reported that they made 
decisions in the maze task based on how the characters behaved in the investment game 
and these participants followed the advice of the fair character significantly more than 
the unfair character. Therefore, Study 3 demonstrates that the maze task is able to detect 
differences in trust that are based on previous economic exchange rather than 
impressions of competency. We did not directly compare trustworthiness and 
competency manipulations in any of our studies, so it is hard to say to what extent each 
factor might determine behaviour in the virtual maze; however, previous research using 
selective trust paradigms with children has shown that benevolence is favoured more 
than competence or expertise when selecting an informant to trust (Johnston et al., 2015; 
Landrum et al., 2013). We should also note that 42% of participants made decisions in 
the maze based on how confident each character sounded when delivering verbal 
advice. This was an unintended outcome that added noise to our data, but it also 
highlights a possibility for future research. By manipulating social cues within the virtual 
maze it could be possible to investigate the interaction of these cues with pre-formed 
impressions of trustworthiness.  
Finally, although we designed the virtual maze task to measure specific trust in one 
person, it would also be possible to derive a measure of generalised trust from the task. 
This could be calculated as the number of trials where the participant asks anyone for 
advice, rather than simply choosing an option on their own (in our studies such trials 
were not counted). A next step would then be to see how the virtual maze task compares 
to other existing measures of generalised trust. Unfortunately, the initial studies we 
present here did not include large enough samples to robustly test the relationship 
between the virtual maze task and existing questionnaire or economic measures of trust. 
To see how the virtual maze task correlates with other measures, it will be necessary to 
conduct a larger correlational study with sufficient power.  






2.6.4 Methodological Advantages of the Virtual Maze 
The virtual maze has several methodological advantages that may make it a 
valuable tool for future studies. Firstly, the task offers high ecological validity in the form 
of a fairly realistic scenario. While we may not find ourselves in mazes during everyday 
life, we often have to make choices about whether to ask a stranger for advice and follow 
what they say. In such situations our trust is implicit, and this is reflected in the virtual 
maze task. Unlike ask-endorse paradigms used with children (Clément et al., 2004; 
Koenig & Harris, 2005), we did not have to explicitly ask participants who they wanted to 
approach in the maze and whether they would follow that person’s advice. These 
possibilities were obvious from people’s everyday experiences of navigating an 
unfamiliar place. Similar to the ask-endorse paradigm, the maze task is also designed 
for making comparisons across multiple targets and allows us to average trust behaviour 
over multiple trials. Finally, the virtual maze task offers many opportunities to measure 
other implicit aspects of trust behaviour, such as the speed at which people approach 
different virtual characters, the time they spend looking at each character, or how direct 
a pathway they take through the rooms in the virtual maze. 
We have demonstrated that the virtual maze task can also be adapted for a 
traditional computer display, avoiding the need for virtual reality software. Future studies 
that use this version of the task should consider replacing the verbal advice stimuli with 
simpler stimuli (e.g. an arrow or word ‘left’) so as to avoid confounding effects of 
confidence perceptions based on the verbal cues. In addition, to get strong effects it 
could be important to increase the social saliency and effort involved in calling one 
character or the other. Despite these limitations, adapting the task for a traditional 
computer display had the advantage over the VR versions that it avoided nausea 
associated with navigating through a virtual space (Davis, Nesbitt, & Nalivaiko, 2014; 
LaViola, 2000). Although we attempted to reduce these effects by incorporating 
smoother movement and fewer twisting routes when we adapted the VR task for HMD 
(Study 2), several participants were still unable to complete the task. A virtual reality 






platform where participants can see their physical body moving, such as the CAVE 
(Cruz-Neira, Sandin, & DeFanti, 1993), may provide a more suitable way to administer 
the maze task in virtual reality. 
2.7 Conclusions 
In this chapter we have described a novel task for measuring specific trust towards 
a stranger. We showed that our virtual maze task is able to detect differences in specific 
trust towards different target individuals. Importantly, we found that behaviour in the 
virtual maze task appears to reflect specific levels of trust towards each target rather 
than a generalised level of trust, which was our aim in designing the task. In contrast, we 
found that behaviour in the investment game reflected generalised trust as well as 
specific trust. The virtual maze task also has several practical advantages over self-
report ratings and existing behavioural measures. In particular, it involves more implicit 
trust decisions than the investment game. Administering the task in virtual reality may 
provide opportunities to measure other implicit behaviour, such as proximity to the target 
individuals. However, the virtual maze task can also be administered on traditional 
desktop displays, although this may yield weaker effects. Overall, the virtual maze task 
could provide an alternative behavioural method for researchers interested in factors that 
affect specific trust towards unknown or familiar individuals. Future steps will be to 
establish how behaviour in the virtual maze correlates with other measures of trust, and 
use this new tool to explore other factors, such as mimicry, which may affect people’s 
specific trust towards others.  
In Chapter 4, we go on to use the maze task to test the effect of mimicry on trust. 
We did not use the maze task in our first mimicry study (Chapter 3) because that study 
was completed before we developed the maze task.   
  







Study 1 Scripts 
Interviewer Mike Ryan 
 Hi, my name’s Mike. Nice to meet 
you! I’m really looking forward to 
doing this experiment with you! But I 
think you’ve got some questions for 
me first, right? 
Hey, I’m Ryan. Umm... so,  yeah... I have 
to answer some questions or something. 
So, shall we get on with it?  
 
What is your 
occupation? 
 
Well, I’m an engineering student at 
UCL. I’m in third year of my PhD 
now, and it’s all about developing 
safety features for aircrafts. Before I 
started, I was working for a specialist 
aircraft manufacturer as a quality 
engineer, and that got me really 
interested into, umm, new safety 
features. Part of my project involves 
collaborating with my old colleagues 
to test out new prototypes – it’s been 
really good to work with them. When 
I finish my PhD I’m hoping to carry on 
working with the same company. 
Er... it’s kind of complicated to explain. I’m 
a junior associate consultant with my 
Uncle’s finance firm. Um... basically I deal 
with acquisitions and I assess the NAV of 
the company clients and review audits. 
It’s, er... it’s probably a bit technical for you 
to understand. I was a bit surprised I got 
hired, actually, because, er... things didn’t 
go so well at my last job and I basically 
ended up getting fired after missing too 
many deadlines. But I’ve skipped a couple 
of meetings at this company, and no-one 
said anything about it, so I guess they’re a 
bit more laid back. 
How did you 
spend last 
weekend? 
Oh, I was pretty busy last weekend 
actually. On Saturday I did this 
charity bike ride from London to 
Brighton – it took most of the day, but 
it was really worth it: I promised to 
raise £800 in sponsorship and I 
managed to smash the target. I was 
pretty knackered on Sunday, but I 
didn’t get much rest because I had to 
spend the rest of the day cleaning 
the flat. Then in the evening one of 
my friends came round and, umm, 
we cooked dinner. Luckily I managed 
to get an early night though, because 
I had to be at a meeting at 9am on 
Monday. 
Umm, so, last weekend was pretty epic. 
On Friday night, I took some clients to the 
Shard and we spent, like, £800 on dinner. 
And, umm, then we went to this club in 
Mayfair - I was supposed to help my 
housemate move his stuff the next day, 
but there was no way I was getting up in 
the morning. I, er, feel pretty bad about 
that actually... but, err... what can you do? 
So, umm... oh yeah, on Sunday I forgot I 
was meant to be preparing this client 
presentation for work - my friend had got 
us tickets to the rugby and I really didn’t 
want to miss the match, so I called up one 
of my colleagues and he agreed to do the 
presentation for me this week. So, er... 





My plans for the summer? I’ve got a 
couple of different things, really. In 
July I’m going to Peru with an old 
school friend. We like to get stuck in 
to the local culture, so we don’t really 
go to all the touristy places. I can’t 
wait to get on the plane to be honest! 
I’ve also got an internship starting at 
an aeronautics lab – so that’s when I 
get back from South America. I 
guess I’ve got a pretty busy summer, 
so I’m working quite hard at the 
moment to try and get all my work 
finished before then. 
Umm... I guess I’ll probably head off 
somewhere exotic for a few weeks– 
maybe, like, a cruise or something. You 
know, lie in the sun and drink cocktails... 
that’s pretty much all I want to do. Maybe 
Dubai – our company has some big clients 
there, so, err, I might be able to get them 
to pay for my flights out there and then 
just, like, have a bit of a holiday. Or it 
would be cool to go to Vegas or something 
and play all the big casinos.  I think here’s 
some company teamwork retreat 
happening as well, but I’m going to try and 
get out of that. So, err, yeah, that’s pretty 
much it. 
 






Study 2 Scripts 
Interviewer Mike Ryan 
 Ok, yep, I’m ready to start! Hey I’m 
Michael, but everyone calls me Mike! 
I’m going to be doing this study with 
you today, I’m looking forwards to it - 
shall we get started?  
Ahh sorry I’m late yeah ok I’m ready now! 
Hey, I’m Ryan and I’m going to be doing 
this study with you today. I’m looking 
forwards to it - shall we get started?  
What do 
you do for a 
living? 
 
Well, I’m a biomedical student in the 
third year of my PhD now. It’s all 
about developing interventions in 
surgery to reduce disease. Before I 
started, I was working as a 
haematologist at St Thomas’ Hospital 
and that got me really interested in 
how infections can be controlled in 
hospitals. I’m really enjoying it, mainly 
because it involves collaborating 
across disciplines to test out various 
antibiotics- it’s been really good 
working with such a range of people. 
Well, at the moment I’m working with my 
Uncle at his restaurant – I’m a waiter. Yeah 
it’s good because the food is really tasty 
and my uncle is super laid back so he lets 
me off when I’m late sometimes. I’ve been 
doing that for a few years now. I also get 
along with everyone who works there 
pretty well, it’s kind of like they’ve become 
family too, is that really cheesy? Anyway, I 
really enjoy the teamwork aspect of the 
job.  
What did 
you do at 
university? 
 
I studied biomedical sciences in 
Sheffield. I really enjoyed my time 
there, I met so many people that I’m 
still really close with now. I was 
definitely the nerd of the group 
though, I ended up graduating with 
the highest grade in our year.  
I studied history, down at Exeter university. 
Uhh… I didn’t think much of the course but 
the people I met there I know I’ll be friends 
with for a long time. Unis just so relaxed 
isn’t it? I only had a few lectures a week 
and I used to miss them all the time from 
being hungover and stuff but no one says 






Yes I was actually, I was a member of 
the hockey soc all through uni and in 
the final year I was voted as chair of 
the society. So I was involved in 
organising all the matches and 
training sessions and all of that stuff 
for a year. Yeah I really enjoyed it, I 
think it’s always a nice feeling to be a 
member of a team.   
Societies? Uhh… Oh yeah, I was part of 
the film soc. But basically just because 
they had the best parties. They used to do 
these big pub-crawls down this one road, 
and everyone has to have a pint at each 
one. Fancy dress obligatory of course! 





I still play hockey just with a local 
team now. We’re a bit better than the 
uni team was, in fact, we might be 
competing in a small tournament 
soon. I think we have a pretty good 
chance but I don’t want to be too 
confident, we’ll have to see on the 
day.  
Umm.. Err… I really just enjoy socialising 
with friends, maybe playing a couple of 
video games with some pizza, you know, 
that kinda thing.  
What do 
you do to 
relax? 
 
Umm… Well… I like running, I think 
it’s really therapeutic and I like to 
keep fit and healthy. I’m going to 
attempt the London half marathon this 
year and I’m hoping I can maybe 
raise some money for a nearby 
homesless shelter. I set up a 
justgiving page last week and I’ve 
already got a few generous 
donations; now, I just need to make 
sure I stick to the training schedule 
I’ve set up for myself.  
Umm… Well… I enjoy cooking, well 
sometimes I like cooking, me and my 
flatmates take it in turns to cook meals 
each day a week, but I kind of messed it up 
this week, I made this huge pasta bake 
and forgot all about it, by the time I’d gotten 
to it it was just a big black mush – totally 
inedible! It was so annoying! But anyway, I 
bought everyone a takeaway to make up 
for it, which is probably nicer than a pasta 
bake anyway I guess! 











Last weekend? Umm… oh yeah, it 
was my mum’s birthday on Saturday, 
she turned 50 so I arranged for some 
family and friends to surprise her at 
her local pub, yeah, it was great! I told 
her it was just me and her going and 
she didn’t suspect a thing. Everyone 
was hiding behind the chairs and 
tables in the pub. You should have 
seen her face when they all jumped 
out! Priceless!  
Last weekend? Umm… oh yeah, god, that 
was my girlfriend’s birthday. I can’t believe 
I forgot about it. I felt awful, it just totally 
slipped my mind and she definitely clocked 
on to it. Yeah, she was quite angry. I went 
over later that day with a huge bunch of 
flowers to make it up to her, her favourite 
ones. She forgave me in the end so it’s all 







Ah I can’t wait for the Summer! I’ll be 
finishing my PhD then, and I’m going 
to take a little holiday and go away 
travelling with an old friend of mine. 
We just booked our flights the other 
day actually, we’re flying into 
Bangkok and then out of Hanoi, in 
Vietnam a month later. So we’re 
going to travel between the two. I’m 
really excited, it’ll be great to really 
get into the culture and try something 
completely different. 
Umm… Well I haven’t really made that 
many plans yet, I should probably get 
started on that now you mention it… I think 
it’d be good to do an internship or 
something, maybe related to teaching if I 
could find one, I’m sure they have like 
websites for that kinda thing though, right? 
If I can’t find anything I’ll just go on holiday 
with my family. That way my mum can do 
all the organising and I can just tag on at 
the end. But yeah, other than that I should 











Chapter 3. Using virtual reality to test whether 
mimicry leads to trust and rapport 
3.1 Abstract 
People mimic each other’s actions and postures during everyday interactions. It is 
widely believed this mimicry acts as ‘social glue’, leading to positive social outcomes 
such as increased rapport towards the mimicker. In this study we develop a new mimicry 
paradigm using virtual reality to provide a stricter test of this claim and to explore whether 
the precise timing of mimicry affects how people respond to being mimicked. Fifty 
participants interacted with two virtual characters who either mimicked their head and 
torso movements at a 1 or 3 second time delay, or did not mimic. Participants rated the 
smoothness of the interaction and their feelings of similarity, rapport and trust toward 
each virtual character. Rapport was higher towards the virtual character that mimicked, 
in line with the social glue theory, and this was not affected by the timing. There were no 
other significant effects of mimicry or mimicry-timing interactions, although the paradigm 
achieved a high level of social realism. These findings suggest that virtual mimicry is 
sufficiently realistic to generate positive social effects, but controlling for all other social 
signals may lead to smaller mimicry effects than traditionally expected.  
3.2 Introduction 
As we outlined in Chapter 1, it is widely believed that mimicking another person 
has positive consequences for the social interaction (Chartrand & Lakin, 2013; Lakin & 
Chartrand, 2003; van Baaren, Decety, et al., 2009; van Baaren et al., 2004). Based on 
this belief, the prominent ‘social glue’ theory of mimicry proposes that mimicry is an 
adaptive social strategy that helps people to bond together by inducing feelings of 
connectedness and liking (Lakin et al., 2003). In line with the prevailing view that mimicry 
leads to liking, affiliation and rapport, mimicking others has been advocated as a strategy 
for business and personal interactions, as well as teaching and therapy (Bernieri, 1988; 






LaFrance & Broadbent, 1976; Scheflen, 1964). However, while there is strong evidence 
that wanting to affiliate with someone makes you more likely to unconsciously mimic 
them, the evidence that people actually like mimickers is less robust (see Chapter 1; 
Hale & Hamilton, 2016a). In addition, the cognitive processes involved in responding to 
being mimicked are currently unclear. In particular, we do not know how mimicry is 
unconcsciously ‘detected’ by the mimickee, and it is unclear whether positive feelings 
towards the mimicker depend on detecting general contingency (Catmur & Heyes, 2013) 
or predictability (Friston, Mattout, & Kilner, 2011; Kilner, Friston, & Frith, 2007) in their 
behaviour, or whether we have a cognitive mechanism that responds specifically to 
mimicry (Hale & Hamilton, 2016a). 
For all of these reasons, it is important to probe how people respond to being 
mimicked in detail and with precise experimental control. Many previous studies of this 
topic have used naturalistic situations in which a confederate is trained to subtly mirror 
the movements and posture of a naïve participant during a social interaction task such 
as describing photos to each other (Refer to Chapter 1; Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Stel 
et al., 2011; van Baaren et al., 2004). Headline results from these paradigms suggest 
that mimicry increases prosocial behaviour (Ashton-James et al., 2007; Fischer-Lokou 
et al., 2011; van Baaren et al., 2004) and may lead to a greater feeling of closeness (Van 
Baaren & Chartrand, 2005), liking (Kouzakova, van Baaren, et al., 2010; Stel et al., 2011) 
and trust towards the mimicker (Maddux et al., 2008), although these results may be 
modulated by the social context and individual characteristics (Dalton et al., 2010; 
Leander et al., 2012; Stel et al., 2011). However, there are several reasons to be cautious 
of accepting these naturalistic studies of mimicry at face value. First, both effect sizes 
and experimental power have been small in many previous studies, and there may be 
false-positives present in this literature (Chapter 1). Second, it is not always clear 
whether a confederate can accurately change her mimicry behaviour without also 
changing other behaviours which may naturally vary alongside mimicry, such as eye 
contact, smiling, or the level of contingency between the mimicker and mimickee. Third, 






confederate behaviour may be implicitly affected by knowledge of the experimental 
condition they have to perform, or the cognitive demand of the instruction to mimic or 
avoid mimicking (Stel et al., 2009). Finally, even well trained confederates lack control 
over the exact timing and matching precision of their movements, making it hard to draw 
conclusions about what it is that makes people unconsciously detect when they are being 
mimicked and change their evaluation of the mimicker. 
A strong test of the claim that mimicry itself leads to positive social consequences 
can come from virtual mimicry paradigms in which every parameter of the mimicry 
interaction is precisely controlled. Given that people react towards virtual characters 
similarly to real people (Bailenson et al., 2001; Garau et al., 2005), virtual reality is 
becoming an increasingly popular tool in social psychology and neuroscience. Bailenson 
and Yee (2005) generated mimicry in virtual reality by tracking participant’s head 
movement and applying the same movement to a virtual character after a delay. In the 
control condition, movements from the previous participant were applied to the virtual 
character instead. Bailenson & Yee (2005) found that, after listening to a persuasive 
speech from the virtual character, participants evaluated it more positively if they had 
experienced mimicry rather than pre-recorded motion. Other virtual mimicry studies also 
suggest virtual characters can generate similar mimicry effects to human confederates 
(Hasler et al., 2014; Verberne et al., 2015; Vrijsen, Lange, Dotsch, et al., 2010). However, 
this approach is still relatively new and results have not always been replicated, even 
within the same research groups repeating the same computer code (Verberne et al., 
2013).  Therefore, establishing if being mimicked by virtual characters does lead to 
increased rapport and trust would provide a strong test of the social glue hypothesis and 
an important tool for studying the cognitive mechanisms which detect when someone is 
being mimicked. 
 One aim of the present study was to build a new virtual mimicry paradigm and 
test whether this would replicate the positive consequences of mimicry found in studies 
using human confederates. Our virtual mimicry paradigm builds on Bailenson & Yee’s 






(2005) algorithm for mirroring motion-tracked movements. However, we incorporated 
this into a more socially interactive task in which the participant and virtual character take 
turns to describe photos to each other, which has commonly been used in confederate 
studies (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999) and may provide a closer comparison with this body 
of work. In this initial study we aimed to explore a range of possible mimicry outcomes, 
and therefore we tested several previously reported outcomes, including self-other 
overlap (Van Baaren & Chartrand, 2005), interactions smoothness (Chartrand & Bargh, 
1999) and feelings of similarity, rapport (Bailenson & Yee, 2005; Chartrand & Bargh, 
1999; Kot & Kulesza, 2016; Lakin & Chartrand, 2003) and trust (Maddux et al., 2008; 
Verberne et al., 2013, 2015). A second aim of this initial exploratory study was to provide 
a proof-of-concept that virtual reality can be used to systematically test mimicry 
parameters that have previously been difficult or impossible for human confederates to 
control reliably. One such parameter which was flagged in a recent review (Chartrand & 
Lakin, 2013) is the precise timing of the mimicked movements. 
3.2.1 The Timing of Mimicry 
If there is a cognitive mechanism which responds when another person is 
mimicking me, we would expect it to have some window tuned to the timing of mimicry, 
whereby mimicry at short delays is easier to detect or has stronger consequences than 
mimicry at longer delays. Such a window might also be tuned to the natural timing of 
mimicry found in social interactions. However, there is little data about the role of this 
factor or the natural timing of spontaneous mimicry  (Chartrand & Lakin, 2013). Some 
claim that mimicry naturally occurs within a 2-5s time window (Leander et al., 2012; van 
Baaren, Decety, et al., 2009), and this timescale has sometimes been used when training 
confederates (Leander et al., 2012). However, others have implicitly adopted different 
timescales, such as 1-2s (Kot & Kulesza, 2016; Tanner, 2008), with the most extreme 
ranging from zero (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999) to ten seconds (Stel et al., 2009), and many 
studies do not report a timescale for mimicry. Therefore, it is unclear whether the timing 
may impact people’s responses to being mimicked. Preliminary evidence suggests 






people find it easier to deliberately detect virtual mimicry at a one-second time delay, 
compared to two, four or eight seconds (Bailenson et al., 2004). However, no studies 
have systematically tested whether the timing of mimicry affects downstream 
consequences such as rapport and trust.  
We can begin to generate predictions about the role of timing by drawing from 
literature on contingency in social interactions. When one person mimics another, the 
mimicker’s actions are both similar to and contingent upon what the mimickee just did. 
The shorter the time delay, the easier it is to recognise the contingent nature of the 
mimicker’s actions (Bailenson et al., 2004). Recognising contingency between our own 
actions and those of others is intrinsically rewarding and motivating. From infancy, 
contingent caregiver behaviour increases positive affect, self-efficacy and social 
motivation towards the caregiver (Dunham, Dunham, Hurshman, & Alexander, 1989; 
Millar, 1988; Watson & Ramey, 1972). Therefore it has been suggested that contingency, 
rather than similarity, may be the ‘active ingredient’ in mimicry that produces positive 
responses (Catmur & Heyes, 2013). This suggestion was supported by the finding that 
people respond positively to contingent movements regardless of how similar the 
movements are to their own (Catmur & Heyes, 2013). Other research shows that being 
in synchrony has similar positive effects to being mimicked, including liking (Hove & 
Risen, 2009; Miles, Nind, & Macrae, 2009) and prosocial behaviour (Reddish, Fischer, 
& Bulbulia, 2013; Piercarlo Valdesolo, Ouyang, & DeSteno, 2010; Wiltermuth & Heath, 
2009), and that synchrony and mimicry activate similar reward regions in the brain 
(Cacioppo et al., 2014; Kokal, Engel, Kirschner, & Keysers, 2011). Since synchronised 
movements are characterised by temporal contingency rather than similarity, this 
evidence is also consistent with the idea that positive mimicry effects may depend on 
contingency. Based on these observations, we would tentatively predict that people will 
have more strongly positive responses to mimicry with shorter time delays, when the 
contingency in the mimicker’s actions might be more salient. 






3.2.2 The Present Study 
 Virtual mimicry is an ideal method for exploring the question of timing, since 
virtual characters can be programmed to repeat the participant’s actions after a precise, 
constant time delay. Building on Bailenson and Yee’s (2005) approach, we implemented 
a virtual reality version of an interactive photo description task commonly used in 
confederate studies (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; van Baaren, Decety, et al., 2009). In this 
task, the participant and an virtual character take turns to describe photographs to each 
other, giving the feeling of interaction without a full conversation (Figure 3-1). We used 
two virtual characters: one mirrored the head and torso movements of the participants 
after a specific delay (1 second or 3 seconds); the other virtual character showed pre-
recorded natural head and torso movements without mimicry. Participants interacted 
with the mimicking and non-mimicking virtual characters one after the other, in a within 
subjects design. The time-delay of mimicry was a between-subjects factor. After 
interacting with each virtual character, participants completed a number of ratings to 
evaluate their feelings about that virtual character, including rapport, trust, similarity, the 
smoothness of the interaction and self-other overlap (Aron et al., 1992), i.e. feelings of 
closeness towards others. A co-presence questionnaire was used to evaluate the realism 
of the VR (Friedman et al., 2014; Pan et al., 2012). At the end of the study, participants 
were carefully debriefed to determine if they consciously detected mimicry. 
3.3 Methods 
3.3.1 Participants 
A power calculation using G*Power (version 3.1.7, 2013) showed that 46 
participants would be sufficient to detect an effect size of ηp2 = .07 (a conservative 
estimate based on previous studies) with power of 0.95. Therefore recruitment continued 
until we obtained 50 participants who did not consciously detect the mimicry 
manipulation. Altogether, sixty three participants (44 female, Mage = 26) were recruited 
through email advertisements. All participants gave written informed consent and 






received £7.50 payment for 1 hour. There were a total of 26 participants in the 3s group 
and 37 participants in the 1s group. Ethical approval was obtained from the UCL Institute 
of Cognitive Neuroscience Ethics Chair (Project ID Number ICN-AH-PWB-3-3-14a) and 
the Ministry of Defence Research Ethics Committee (501/MODREC/13). The methods 
were carried out in accordance with the approved guidelines and the Declaration of 
Helsinki (2013). All participants gave written informed consent to take part.  
 
 
Figure 3-1. Virtual mimicry system. The participant was fitted with two motion 
tracking sensors which recorded their head and torso movements. The movement was 
mirrored by a virtual character after a specified time delay. The virtual character was 
displayed on a projector screen. 
 
3.3.2 Equipment 
Participants sat at a desk facing a 90 x 160cm projector screen at approximately 
1m distance (Figure 3-1). All parts of the experiment were presented on the projector 
screen. The participant used a mouse to make responses. 
We used a Polhemus magnetic motion tracking device (Polhemus Inc., Vermont) 
to record participants’ movements. This device detects the position and rotation of 
sensors within a low-intensity electromagnetic field, with a specified frequency (we used 






120 Hz). Participants were fitted with two sensors. One sensor was fixed on the 
participant’s forehead using a Velcro cloth band. Another sensor was attached to the 
participant’s upper back using microporous tape. 
3.3.3 Virtual Reality Environment 
We used Vizard virtual reality software (Worldviz, 2014) to display virtual 
characters in a virtual environment that looked like an extension of the physical 
laboratory. The physical walls and the participant’s desk appeared to extend into the 
virtual space, and the virtual characters appeared as life-sized people seated on the 
other side of the desk, facing the participant (Figure 3-1). 
3.3.4 Virtual Mimicry Algorithm 
To achieve the mimicry condition, we used two separate computers networked 
together (Figure 3-1). One computer received data from the Polhemus motion tracker. 
The data was applied onto a digital mannequin in MotionBuilder (Autodesk, 2014). 
Inverse kinematics were applied so that the whole body of the mannequin would move 
in a biologically realistic way based on limited data points (i.e. two motion sensors). While 
MotionBuilder was running on one computer, we used a software plugin called Live 
Characters (Worldviz, 2014) to stream the mannequin’s movement over to another 
computer running Vizard (WorldViz, 2014). In Vizard, we programmed a virtual character 
to mirror the movement of the mannequin after a delay of 3s or 1s, depending on the 
experimental condition. In addition, a restriction was imposed so the pitch (up/down tilt) 
of the participant’s head would only be mimicked within a range of 0 to -10 degrees from 
neutral. This restriction was designed to avoid mimicry of upward head tilts, which 
appeared unnatural in a pilot experiment. The virtual character from Vizard was 
displayed to the participant on the projector screen. Thus, the participant saw a virtual 
character which mirrored their movements in a biologically realistic way after a short 
delay. 






For the non-mimicry condition, we animated a virtual character using pre-recorded 
movement from a pilot participant who was experiencing the mimicry condition. The pilot 
participant moved a moderate amount while being mimicked and did not detect mimicry. 
We used this pre-recording for all participants, instead of ‘yoking’ each participant to the 
previous one (Bailenson & Yee, 2005; Vrijsen, Lange, Dotsch, et al., 2010), so that the 
non-mimicry condition would be the same for all participants. 
3.3.5 Virtual Characters 
We prepared three virtual characters for the experiment. The first virtual character 
(a male named Mike) was only used for practising the experimental tasks. The main two 
virtual characters in the experiment were females named Anna and Becky. The virtual 
characters were selected from the ‘Complete Characters’ set provided with Vizard 
software. Anna and Becky’s appearances were selected according to two criteria: firstly, 
that they appear similar to the average age of our recruitment population (university 
students aged 18-30 years, with mean sample age of 26 years); and secondly, that they 
appear similar to each other, e.g. both having blonde hair and casual clothing. This was 
because piloting with a different Becky character, who had brown hair, showed that 
participants significantly preferred the blonde-haired Anna to brown-haired Becky, and 
we wanted to avoid any such differences that might obscure mimicry effects. 
Apart from mimicry behaviour, we also programmed each virtual character to 
perform some other social behaviours when they interacted with participants. Each 
virtual character was animated to smile and greet the participant, e.g. ‘Hi, I’m Anna – 
nice to meet you’. Whenever the character spoke, they moved their jaw according to the 
amplitude of a pre-recorded audio file. If the character was describing a photo, they 
alternated between tipping their head to look down at the photo they were describing (for 
5-8s), and looking up at the participant with direct gaze (for 1-3s) throughout their turn. 
If it was the participant’s turn speaking, the virtual character smiled once and then 
alternated between direct gaze (for 4-7s) and averted gaze (for 0.75-1.5s) throughout 
the participant’s turn. The virtual character was programmed to blink every 2-5s. 






3.3.6 Photo Stimuli and Virtual Character Descriptions 
Ten photo stimuli were taken from the National Geographic website, under a 
category called ‘People and Culture’, in line with previous mimicry studies (e.g. Chartrand 
& Bargh, 1999; Cheng & Chartrand, 2003). We pre-recorded Anna and Becky’s 
descriptions of the photographs. Two volunteers with native British accents came to the 
lab and their voices were recorded using headset microphones. The volunteers were 
asked to take turns describing the set of 10 photos to each other. They were told to speak 
for at least 30s per photo (timed by a researcher on a stopwatch) to ensure we obtained 
at least 30s of recorded description. We later edited each recording to exactly 30s in 
duration, so that each virtual character would speak for their full turn in the experiment. 
First, the volunteers practiced describing the photos to each other. Then we recorded 
them while they described the same set of stimuli to each other (i.e. each volunteer 
described all 10 photos). During the experiment, the stimuli were randomly divided 
between Anna and Becky, so that each participant heard a random set of five 
descriptions from each character. 
3.3.7 Experiment Procedure 
On arriving in the lab, participants were told they were taking part in a virtual 
communication study and completed a consent form. They sat at a desk in front of a 
projector screen and Polhemus motion tracking sensors were fixed to their head and 
back. A short calibration was performed to allow the VR software to map the participant’s 
motion onto one of the virtual characters. Prior to the study and during the calibration, 
the participant was simply told that the motion tracker would allow us to record their 
motion during the experiment. After calibration, the study began. 
The participant practiced the task sequence detailed below. Then they completed 
the task sequence with Anna and then Becky. Either Anna or Becky mimicked the 
participant (mimicry condition), while the other virtual character did not mimic (non-
mimicry condition), in a counterbalanced fashion. 






Photo description task (mimicry manipulation). First, the participant completed 
the photo description task. During the task, the virtual character and participant would 
take 5 turns each at describing a photo to the other for 30 seconds. The virtual character 
greeted the participant and smiled at the start, then began the task by describing a photo 
the participant could not see. At the end of their description, the character smiled again 
and then it was the participant’s turn to describe a photo, which was displayed on a virtual 
barrier between the participant and virtual character (Figure 3-1). A timer on the virtual 
barrier counted down from 30s and an audible beep signalled the end of each turn. At 
the end of the task, the virtual barrier was raised up to occlude the character.  
Questionnaires and ratings.  
Self-other overlap. Following the photo description task, the participant rated their 
feelings of overlap towards other people, using a scale based on the Inclusion of Other 
in the Self scale (IOS; Aron et al., 1992). The participant saw two circles and were 
instructed to slide the circles further apart or closer together (Verberne et al., 2015). The 
circles were equally sized and could be moved from 1 diameter apart to completely 
overlapping. The participant rated their overlap with their best friend (used as a reference 
point), the virtual character from the photo task, virtual characters in general, and other 
people in general.  
Virtual character ratings. Next, the participant rated the smoothness of the 
interaction and their feelings of rapport, trust and similarity on a sliding scale from 
‘strongly disagree’ (scored 0) to ‘strongly agree’ (scored 1). The items are given in Table 











Table 3-1. Items for virtual character ratings. 
Construct Items 
Smoothness I think the interaction with [Character] was smooth. 
*I think the interaction with [Character] was awkward. 
Rapport I think [Character] is very likeable.  
I think [Character] is very engaging.  
I think [Character] is very kind.  
*I think [Character] is very unfriendly. 
*I think [Character] is very unpleasant. 
Trust I think [Character] is very trustworthy.  
I think [Character] is very honest.  
I think [Character] is very responsible.  
*I think [Character] is very unreliable.  
*I think [Character] is very insincere. 
Similarity I think [Character] is very similar to me. 
*I think [Character is very different from me. 
Note. Items marked * were reverse scored. 
 
 
Co-presence questionnaire. At the end of the experiment, the participant 
completed a short questionnaire about the level of co-presence they experienced, which 
refers to the feeling that the virtual characters were really present in the same place as 
the participant (Garau et al., 2005; Pan et al., 2012). The questionnaire contained four 
items, structured ‘How much did you find yourself reacting to the virtual characters as 
real people, concerning your...’ (1) thoughts; (2) feelings and emotions; (3) physical 
responses (4) physiological responses. Participants rated their responses on a 7-point 
scale from ‘not at all’ to ‘very much so’. 
Debriefing. The participant provided written and verbal answers to four questions 
to determine whether they had noticed the mimicry manipulation or guessed the purpose 
of the experiment: (1) ‘What did you think was the purpose of this study?’ (2) ‘Why do 
you think you were asked to wear the motion tracker?’ (3) ‘Did you notice anything 
unusual about how the virtual characters moved?’ (4) ‘Did you notice any differences in 
how the virtual characters moved?’ 
3.3.8 Contributions 
Joanna Hale implemented the virtual mimicry algorithm in Vizard (this does not 
include inverse kinematic modelling which was done automatically in MotionBuilder), 






recorded all audio stimuli and programmed the photo description task. Joanna Hale 
carried out all participant recruitment, data collection and analyses.  
3.4 Results 
Data were excluded from one participant in the 1s group due to technical failure of 
the motion tracker.  
3.4.1 Mimicry Detection 
In the 3s mimicry group, one participant out of 26 (3.8%) detected the mimicry 
manipulation. In the 1s group, 11 out of 36 (30.5%) detected mimicry. The detection rate 
was significantly greater in the 1s group than the 3s group (χ2(1) = 6.9, p < 0.01). All 
detectors were excluded from the analyses. Thus, the remaining sample was N = 25 in 
each group. 
3.4.2 Co-Presence 
We averaged the four items from the co-presence questionnaire into one co-
presence score (Cronbach’s alpha = .72). The median social presence score was 4.45 
(M=4.43, SD =1.15, Range = [1.75, 6.75]) on a scale from 1 to 7, which is very similar to 
levels found in more immersive virtual reality experiments using a comparable rating 
scale (Friedman et al., 2014; Pan et al., 2012).  
3.4.3 Virtual Character Ratings and Self-Other Overlap 
Participants rated their feelings of rapport, trust and similarity towards each virtual 
character, as well as the smoothness of the interaction. They also rated feelings of self-
other overlap towards the specific virtual character, virtual characters in general, their 
best friend and other people in general.  
For each dependent variable, we conducted a two-way mixed-design ANOVA to 
test the within-participants effect of mimicry condition (mimicry vs. non-mimicry) and the 
between-participants effect of time delay (3s vs. 1s). The results are reported in Table 
3-2. We found a significant main effect of mimicry on rapport in the expected direction (p 






=.02). However, there were no other significant effects of mimicry or time delay, and no 
significant interactions.  
To further explore the relationship between rapport and mimicry time delay, we 
calculated the effects of mimicry on rapport for the 1s and the 3s groups separately. We 
found that there was a significant effect of rapport in the 3s condition (mimicry M = .71, 
SD = .13; non-mimicry M = .64, SD = .13; t(24) = 2.15, p =.04, d =.49) but not in the 1s 
condition (mimicry M = .68, SD = .17; non-mimicry M = .62, SD =.16; t(24) = 1.39, p =.18, 
d =.36).  
3.4.4 Bayesian Analyses 
In order to further examine the evidence for mimicry effects, we carried out a series 
of Bayesian ANOVAs using JASP software, version 0.7.5.6 (JASP Team, 2016). Each 
Bayes factor (BF01) indicates how much more likely the data were to occur under a null 
model, compared to the model described. The results (Table 3-3) show that participants’ 
rapport ratings were more likely to occur under a model where mimicry has a main effect 
on rapport, compared to a null model. This could be considered weak or anecdotal 
evidence for the effect of mimicry on rapport (Jarosz & Wiley, 2014). There was 
ambiguous evidence for the main effect of mimicry on self-other overlap towards other 
people in general. There was weak evidence in favour of the null hypothesis for the main 
effects of mimicry on trust and similarity ratings. For all other main effects of mimicry and 
interactions between mimicry and time delay, the Bayes factors indicate substantial to 
strong evidence in favour of the null hypothesis. 






Table 3-2. Effects of mimicry and time delay on dependent variables. 





Main effect of mimicry Main effect of time Mimicry x time interaction 
Measure F(1, 48) p ηp2 F(1, 48) p ηp2 F(1, 48) p ηp2 
Rapport 
 
.69 (.15) .63 (.15) 5.54 .02 .10 .63 .43 .01 .002 .97 >.001 
Trust 
 
.65 (.14) .62 (.15) 1.90 .17 .04 1.65 .21 .03 .31 .58 .01 
Similarity 
 
.55 (.17) .51 (.20) 1.52 .22 .03 1.22 .28 .03 .04 .85 .001 
Smoothness 
 
.67 (.20) .66 (.20) .006 .94 >.001 .63 .43 .01 .03 .86 .001 
Overlap: specific virtual 
character 
 
.42 (.21) .41(.19) .28 .60 .01 3.60 .06 .07 .31 .58 .01 
Overlap: virtual characters 
in general 
 
.39 (.23) .40 (.20) .50 .50 .01 2.50 .12 .05 .12 .73 .002 
Overlap: best friend 
 
.60 (.26) .60 (.26) .21 .65 .004 .005 .94 >.001 .09 .77 .002 












Table 3-3. Bayes factors for the effects of mimicry and time delay on ratings. 







Mimicry main effect + time main 
effect 
Mimicry main effect + 
time main effect + 
mimicry x time interaction 
Rapport 0.34 2.94 1.01 3.76 
Trust 2.01 1.45 3.01 9.01 
Similarity 2.34 1.99 4.69 16.85 
Smoothness 4.79 2.02 9.85 34.74 
Overlap: specific virtual character 4.26 0.72 3.21 9.14 
Overlap: virtual characters in general 3.83 1.02 3.79 14.16 
Overlap: best friend 4.41 1.44 6.66 22.47 
Overlap: others in general 0.89 1.66 1.52 5.21 







In this study, we developed a new virtual mimicry paradigm and investigated 
whether the timing of mimicry affects how people respond to being mimicked. We 
programmed virtual characters to mimic participants’ head and torso movements at a 
delay of three seconds or one second, or to move according to pre-recorded motion in a 
non-mimicry condition. We measured how many participants consciously noticed being 
mimicked, and the remaining participants rated their feelings of smoothness, similarity, 
rapport and trust towards the virtual characters. These data allow us to consider if being 
mimicked by a virtual character can act as social glue, and if the timing of the mimicry 
matters. 
3.5.1 Can Virtual Mimicry act as Social Glue? 
Our data give a reasonably positive response to the question of whether being 
mimicked leads to a more positive social evaluation of the mimicker. Participants rated 
a level of co-presence (feeling the virtual characters were really present with them) 
comparable to virtual reality experiments using more immersive technology (Friedman 
et al., 2014; Pan et al., 2012), suggesting our system achieved a strong degree of 
realism. Participants also gave higher rapport ratings to characters who mimicked 
compared to those who did not. This is consistent with previous research using virtual 
and human mimickers (Bailenson & Yee, 2005; Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Stel et al., 
2011) and supports the idea that mimicry can act as social glue even in tightly controlled 
VR settings. However, there are some caveats to this finding. First, we did not find effects 
of mimicry on any of our other dependent measures (trust, similarity, interaction 
smoothness and self-other overlap). It could be that the outcomes we chose to measure 
are more fragile than we expected; for example, other studies have also failed to find 
statistically significant effects of imitation on trust (Bailenson et al., 2008; Verberne et al., 
2013), similarity (Reddish et al., 2013) and self-other overlap (Hogeveen et al., 2014). 
Second, the effect on rapport which we did find was small (ηp2 = .10) and would not meet 






a Bonferroni correction. Bayesian analyses showed only weak evidence in favour of this 
effect existing in our data (BF10 = 2.94). 
It could be argued that these findings reflect a failure of virtual mimicry to achieve 
the same effect sizes as naturalistic mimicry. We acknowledge that current virtual reality 
methods are not perfect, and participants in this study were aware they were interacting 
with a virtual agent and not another real person. However, our co-presence scores of 
4.45 (Study 1) and 4.75 (Study 2) on a scale from 1-7 are comparable to other VR 
studies. Such studies have successfully replicated psychology effects in the domain of 
body ownership (Maister, Slater, Sanchez-Vives, & Tsakiris, 2015), and interactions with 
virtual characters have been able to successfully generate joint attention (Schilbach et 
al., 2009), proximity effects (McCall & Singer, 2015) and audience effects (Slater et al., 
1999; Slater, Pertaub, Barker, & Clark, 2006) among other phenomena. This would 
suggest that virtual reality can generate socially realistic scenarios which replicate real-
world psychological phenomena.  
3.5.2 What is the Role of Timing in Mimicry? 
The data gives conflicting accounts of the role of timing in mimicry. On the one 
hand, we found a significantly higher rate of mimicry detection at a delay of 1s compared 
to 3s, consistent with Bailenson et al. (2004). This implies that some cognitive process 
is able to detect when someone else mimics me, and this process is tuned to the timing 
of their movements. However, the present study cannot distinguish if this process is 
specific to mimicry, or simply sensitive to any contingent behaviour (Heyes, 2011). On 
the other hand, after people who consciously detected mimicry were excluded from the 
analysis, we found no significant differences in ratings after being mimicked with a 3 
second delay compared to a 1 second delay (although the effect of mimicry on rapport 
only reached significance in the 3s group). This was surprising, and implies that any 
cognitive mechanism which responds positively to being mimicked outside awareness is 
not tuned to a narrow time window. Thus, the process of consciously detecting mimicry 
may be independent of how mimicry is used to evaluate another person. Though 






counterintuitive, this suggestion is consistent with results from a previous study which 
found the spatial correspondence between mimicker and mimickee movements affected 
mimicry detection but not the social evaluation of the mimicker (Bailenson et al., 2008). 
Therefore, it is possible that any mechanism which triggers a positive response to being 
mimicked has a broadly tuned time window for registering any mimicry. This possibility 
would fit with the observation that ‘positive’ mimicry effects could actually be driven by 
negative reactions to an absence of mimicry (van Baaren, Decety, et al., 2009), as well 
as evidence that people expect certain levels of contingency when interacting with 
another person (or robot) and respond positively as long as that threshold is met 
(Bigelow, 1998, 2001, Yamaoka, Kanda, Ishiguro, & Hagita, 2006, 2007). 
3.6 Conclusion 
In this study we developed a new virtual mimicry paradigm which achieved a good 
level of social realism and can be directly compared to traditional studies in which 
confederates covertly mimic participants or not during a social interaction task. In line 
with the social glue theory of mimicry, we found that participants rated significantly more 
rapport towards a virtual character who mirrored their head and torso movements, 
compared to a virtual character which moved in a pre-recorded way. However, there 
were no significant effects of mimicry on any of the other social outcomes we measured. 
These findings suggest that virtual mimicry is able to generate positive social effects, but 
that the effects of mimicry alone may be smaller than expected when we strictly control 
all other social signals such as smiling and eye contact. Varying the precise timing of 
mimicry between one and three seconds did not affect any social outcomes, although 
there was a higher rate of conscious detection at the one second delay. This suggests 
that the detection of mimicry may be tuned to the timing of the mimicker’s actions, but 
this process may be independent of how positively we evaluate people who mimic us.  






Chapter 4. Does mimicry hold as social glue 
across group boundaries? A test using virtual 
reality  
4.1 Abstract 
Virtual reality may provide a highly controlled method for strictly testing the ‘social 
glue’ theory which claims that mimicry leads to positive social outcomes such as rapport 
and trust. In this study, we aimed to replicate our previous finding that virtual mimicry 
leads to rapport, and to extend this by testing whether positive social effects of mimicry 
are modulated by the ingroup or outgroup status of the mimicker. To generate ingroup 
and outgroup mimicry, Forty participants from European or East Asian backgrounds 
interacted with four avatars, two of European appearance and two of East Asian 
appearance. Two avatars mimicked while the other two did not. During the interaction, 
participants rated how much they liked each character, and afterwards they rated 
feelings of rapport and trust. Participants also completed an immersive virtual maze task 
to measure implicit trust behaviour. Across all measures we found no main effects of 
mimicry and no interactions with group membership. These null results were calculated 
in line with a pre-registration. We conclude that being mimicked does not always increase 
rapport or trust when all other social signals are controlled. 
4.2 Introduction 
In Chapter 3, we established that our VR mimicry paradigm could generate 
increases in rapport, similar to naturalistic paradigms with confederate mimickers. The 
present study aimed to replicate this initial finding with a rigorous, pre-registered 
procedure (Hale & Hamilton, 2015) and to further test if the social consequences of 
mimicry may be altered by group membership. We consider this study to be the more 
definitive test of the ‘social glue’ hypothesis that being mimicked leads to liking and 
positive evaluations of the mimicker. In this study we also measure implicit trust 






behaviour towards mimicking and non-mimicking virtual characters using the virtual 
maze task introduced in Chapter 2. 
While it has been suggested that mimicry is an ‘honest signal’ used in all human 
societies (Pentland, 2010), it is not clear whether mimicry leads to increases in rapport 
and trust between people from different cultural groups (Chartrand & Lakin, 2013). This 
is an important question, because many proposed applications of mimicry may involve 
cross-cultural settings or other ingroup-outgroup relationships which could alter the 
expected positive effects of mimicking. For example, in a teaching context (Bernieri, 
1988; LaFrance & Broadbent, 1976), mimicry might not have the anticipated benefits for 
rapport if the teacher has a different cultural background to their students. When the 
mimicker and mimickee come from different backgrounds this could also change how 
mimicry affects rapport, persuasion and disclosure in settings such as business sales 
and negotiations (Maddux et al., 2008; Tanner, 2008; van Swol, 2003) and investigative 
interviews (Abbe & Brandon, 2013a, 2013b; Stel et al., 2009).  
There have been very few previous studies addressing whether mimicry can be 
used to build rapport and trust between members of different social groups. Studies 
focusing on the mimicker show that people typically produce less mimicry towards others 
who they initially dislike (Stel, Blascovich, et al., 2010), competitors (LaFrance, 1985), 
outgroup members (Bourgeois & Hess, 2008; Yabar et al., 2006) and others from a 
different race (Johnston, 2002). Similar effects have also been found for the production 
of facial mimicry towards outgroup members (Bourgeois & Hess, 2008; Mondillon, 
Niedenthal, Gil, & Droit-Volet, 2007; van der Schalk et al., 2011) as well as behavioural 
synchrony (Miles, Lumsden, Richardson, & Macrae, 2011). On the other hand, a small 
number of mimicker studies have found that mimicking an outgroup member can lead to 
more liking and empathy towards the outgroup (Inzlicht, Gutsell, & Legault, 2012; Szuster 
& Wojnarowska, 2016; van der Schalk et al., 2011). However, there is very little research 
about how mimickees evaluate mimicry from outgroup members. Some studies suggest 
being mimicked by an outgroup member depletes cognitive resources, making it harder 






to perform a Stroop task (Dalton et al., 2010) and leads to feeling colder when estimating 
the temperature of a room (Leander et al., 2012). On the other hand, a recent experiment 
found that being mimicked by an outgroup member (a Palestinian virtual character) led 
participants (Jewish Israelis) to increase empathy towards their outgroup in terms of the 
language they used (Hasler et al., 2014). Finally, a study of romantic partners found that 
if one partner was mimicked by a stranger, this could lead to stronger bonding between 
the two partners (Kouzakova, Karremans, et al., 2010). These mixed findings suggest 
that being mimicked by an outgroup member can both challenge people’s expectations 
and also have some positive social outcomes. 
Virtual reality has several advantages for manipulating the ingroup or outgroup 
status of a mimicker, especially on the basis of culture. Firstly, the same computer 
algorithm can be used to generate exactly the same mimicry (and non-mimicry) 
behaviour towards all participants. This avoids the possibility that human confederates, 
who cannot be blind to the participant’s cultural group, might subtly and unconsciously 
change their behaviour towards different groups of participants. For example, people 
tend to align their accent and lexical patterns with people from a different culture (Bock, 
1986; Giles & Powesland, 1975; Niederhoffer & Pennebaker, 2002), but virtual 
characters are not affected by this tendency. Secondly, virtual reality makes it very 
straightforward to carry out repeated-measures research designs where the cultural 
group of the mimicker is counterbalanced simply by switching the computer code, without 
the need to train multiple confederates as mimickers and non-mimickers. Thirdly, virtual 
reality has been useful for studying sensitive ingroup-outgroup scenarios, which might 
otherwise be hard to study with human confederates for ethical reasons. For example, 
Slater et al. (Slater et al., 2013) looked at how participants responded to a violent 
altercation between rival football team supporters, and Hasler et al. (2014) studied how 
mimicry could affect empathy between Israelis and Palestinians in the context of a 
politically-charged debate. 






The present study tested whether mimicry leads to rapport and trust across 
individuals from the same social group (in-group pair) and different groups (out-group 
pair). To create in-group and out-group pairs, we used virtual characters with different 
apparent ethnicities and recruited participants from East Asia and Europe. Each 
participant met with 4 virtual characters who mimicked or did not and who did or did not 
appear to share the participant’s regional background, in a 2x2 factorial within subjects 
design. Mimicry was implemented with a 3 second time delay, and we continued testing 
until we had complete datasets from 40 participants without any detection of mimicry. 
This sample size was chosen following a power analysis based on our previous study, 
in which we found a small effect of mimicry (ηp2 = .10). We calculated that a sample size 
of 40 could detect the same size effect with power of .99, or a smaller effect size (ηp2 = 
.06) with power of .95.  
Participants completed a photo description task with each virtual character, during 
which they were exposed to mimicry or non-mimicry behaviour. They rated likeability, 
trust and rapport towards each virtual character, and we also measured behavioural trust 
using the virtual maze task introduced in Chapter 2 (note the maze task was developed 
after completing our previous mimicry study in Chapter 3). In this study, we did not 
include measures of self-other overlap, interaction smoothness or feelings of similarity, 
because we found null effects of mimicry on these outcomes in our previous study 
(Chapter 3). We predicted that participants should show a main effect of mimicry, with 
greater liking, trust and rapport towards virtual characters which mimicked. Furthermore, 
we predicted that this mimicry effect should be modulated by cultural group, such that all 
effects would be more strongly positive for in-group virtual characters compared to out-
group virtual characters. I report the results as specified in our pre-registration (Hale & 
Hamilton, 2015), and clearly label additional exploratory analyses which were not 
specified in the pre-registration. 








Participants completed a screening questionnaire to ensure they were suitable for 
the study (Table 1). We only selected participants if their answers to the screening 
questionnaire indicated they self-identified strongly with one of the groups chosen for the 
study. We included (1) individuals who identified strongly as European and (2) individuals 
who identified strongly as East Asian, had spent less than 1 year in the UK, and had 
spent most of the last 10 years in an East Asian country. The extra criteria for the East 
Asian group aimed to minimise overlap caused by recruiting and conducting the 
experiment in a European country. 
Fifty-four participants (37 female, Mage = 25.14 years, SD = 3.66 years) out of 236 
total respondents were selected to take part in the study. Ethical approval was obtained 
from the UCL Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience Ethics Chair (Project ID Number ICN-
AH-PWB-3-3-14a) and the Ministry of Defence Research Ethics Committee 
(564/MODREC/14). The methods were carried out in accordance with the approved 
guidelines and the Declaration of Helsinki (2013). All participants gave written informed 
consent to take part.  
4.3.2 Virtual Mimicry  
We used the same equipment and algorithm as in the previous study (Chapter 3) to 
generate virtual mimicry. We prepared five virtual characters for the study (Figure 4-1). 
We used the same practice virtual character (a male named Mike) from the previous 
study (Chapter 3). We also used the same Anna and Becky virtual characters as the 
previous study, because they had European appearances and their voices were 
recorded by volunteers with native British accents. The other two virtual characters, 
named named Su Lin and Tian Tian, had an East Asian appearance and their voices 
were recorded by volunteers speaking English with native Chinese accents. All virtual 
characters were programmed to blink, make eye contact with the participant and speak






Table 4-1. Screening questionnaire and selection criteria.  
Question Response Selection criterion for European 
Group 
Selection criterion for East Asian 
Group 
What is your nationality? Text field European nationality  East Asian nationality 
How much is your nationality 
important to your identity? 
1-7 Likert scale: 
extremely unimportant – 
extremely important 
Score >= 6 Score >= 6 
What is your ethnicity? Text field   
How much is your ethnicity 
important to your identity?  
1-7 Likert scale: 
extremely unimportant – 
extremely important 
  
What is your first language(s)? Text field Must have English as a first language 
OR speak fluent English 
Must have English as a first language 
OR speak fluent English 
How much is your first 
language(s) important to your 
identity?  
1-7 Likert scale: 
extremely unimportant – 
extremely important 
  
What other languages do you 
speak? Please list any 
languages you speak well 
enough to hold a conversation. 
Text field Must have English as a first language 
OR speak fluent English 
Must have English as a first language 
OR speak fluent English 
How many years have you 
lived in the UK? Please include 
time in the past as well as your 
current residence. 
Less than 1 year 
1 - 5 years 
5 - 10 years 
10 years or more 
 Must have lived in the UK for less than 
1 year. 
Over the last 10 years, which 
country have you lived in for 
the most time? 
 
Text field  Must have lived in an East Asian 
country for most of the last 10 years 
Date of Birth DD/MM/YY Aged 18-35 Aged 18-35 
Gender Male / Female   






according to pre-recorded sound files, as in the previous study. 
4.3.3 Experiment Procedure 
Each participant sat at the desk in front of the projector screen, and the 
experimenter fitted the participant with motion tracking sensors. First the participant 
practiced the photo description task with the practice character, who never mimicked 
them.  
Following the practice, the participant completed the four experimental conditions 
in a counterbalanced order. The conditions were: (1) mimicry from an in-group member, 
(2) non-mimicry from an in-group member, (3) mimicry from an out-group member and 
(4) non-mimicry from an outgroup member. Half the participants met virtual characters 
from their in-group first, and the other half met virtual characters from their out-group 
first. For half the participants, the first character in the group mimicked them, and for the 
other half the second character in the group mimicked. The order of characters in each 
group was always Anna then Becky, and Su Lin then Tian Tian. An example order of 
conditions is given in Figure 4-2, which summarises the experiment procedure. 
 
 
Figure 4-1. Virtual character appearances. 
 







Figure 4-2. Experiment procedure, showing an example order of conditions. 
Group and mimicry were counterbalanced across participants. 
 
Photo description task (mimicry manipulation). First, the participant completed 
the mimicry induction (photo description task) with the first virtual character (e.g. Anna), 
as in the previous study (Chapter 3). During the photo description task, the virtual 
character either mimicked the participant’s movements after a 3s delay, or performed 
pre-recorded movements (as described in Chapter 3). Half-way through the photo 
description task, the participant was prompted to rate how much they agree that with the 
statement ‘I think Anna is very likeable’ on a continuous scale from strongly disagree to 






strongly agree. We introduced this additional rating in the present study in case an effect 
of mimicry could be detected during the interaction which could not be detected 
afterwards, in light of the weak effects of mimicry on post-interaction ratings found in 
Chapter 3.  
Virtual character ratings. Next, the participant rated their feelings of rapport and 
trust on a sliding scale from ‘strongly disagree’ (scored 0) to ‘strongly agree’ (scored 1). 
The rapport and trust items were the same as those in the previous study.   
Then the participant repeated the photo description task and ratings with the 
second virtual character (e.g. Becky). The first two characters were always a mimicker 
and non-mimicker from the same group. 
Virtual maze task. After the participant completed the photo task and ratings with 
the first two characters, the experimenter removed the motion sensors and prepared the 
participant for the virtual maze task. Then the participant completed the virtual maze task 
with the two virtual characters they had interacted with so far (e.g. Anna and Becky). In 
the task, the participant navigated through a series of rooms and in each room they could 
ask for advice from Anna and/or Becky about which way to go next. The maze was 
displayed via an Oculus Rift DK2 head-mounted display (HMD). This device allows the 
participant to look around a virtual 3D space as if they are really there. The participant 
was provided with a joystick to move through the virtual space, similar to playing a video 
game. Participants first completed some practice to familiarise them with the 3D 
environment. Then they were instructed to find the way out of the maze through the least 
number of rooms possible. The computer program ensured that each participant 
continued until they had gone through twelve rooms (corresponding to twelve trials). For 
full details of the trial stimuli and procedure, see Chapter 2. On each trial we recorded 
whether the participant approached each character for advice or not, and whether they 
followed the advice of each character or not. This provided two measures of trust: (1) 
how often each character was approached (expressed as a percentage of trials) and (2) 
how often each character’s advice was followed (expressed as a percentage of trials). 






Co-presence and VR questionnaires. At the end of the virtual maze task 
participants completed a questionnaire about their experience of co-presence, as in the 
previous study.  Then they were asked to complete a short questionnaire about their 
experience in the virtual maze and whether they experienced any symptoms of motion 
sickness, headache or eye strain. Data from the VR questionnaire are not included in 
the present study. Participants who reported any of the symptoms were not required to 
continue with the study.  
Following the VR questionnaire, the participant repeated the entire procedure with 
the remaining two virtual characters (e.g. Su Lin and Tian Tian). 
Screening questionnaire and debrief. At the end of the experiment the 
participant completed the same screening questionnaire that we used at the recruitment 
stage (Table 4-1). This was to make sure that participants still reported background 
characteristics that met our group selection criteria. Finally, the participant also provided 
written and verbal answers to a series of questions to determine whether they had 
guessed the purpose of the experiment or noticed the mimicry manipulation.  
4.3.4 Contributions 
Joanna Hale implemented the virtual mimicry algorithm in Vizard (this does not 
include inverse kinematic modelling which was done automatically in MotionBuilder), 
recorded all audio stimuli and programmed the photo description task and virtual maze 
task. Joanna Hale carried out all participant recruitment, data collection and analyses.  
4.4 Results 
Six participants were excluded from analyses due to technical failure of the motion 
tracker. Eight out of the remaining 48 participants (16.6%) detected the virtual mimicry 
manipulation. All of the detectors were excluded from the analyses, so the remaining 
sample was N = 40. Four participants did not complete the virtual maze task with every 
virtual character due to feelings of motion sickness, so their data was not included in 
analyses on that task. 







Participants completed co-presence ratings once after interacting with ingroup 
virtual characters (M = 4.58, SD = 1.21) and once after interacting with outgroup virtual 
characters M = 4.63, SD = 1.29). There was no significant difference in feelings of co-
presence towards ingroup and outgroup members (t(39) = .43, p = .67, d = 0.09). 
Therefore we averaged the two scores together. The median co-presence score was 
4.75 (M = 4.61, SD = 1.19, Range = [1.63, 6.75]), consistent with our initial study, 
reported in Chapter 3, and other VR research (Friedman et al., 2014; Pan et al., 2012).  
4.4.2 Liking, Rapport and Trust Ratings 
We conducted two-way, repeated-measures ANOVAs to test the effects of mimicry 
and group membership on ratings of liking, rapport and trust towards each virtual 
character. We did not find any significant main effects of mimicry or group membership, 
or any significant interaction effects (Table 4-2). There was a marginal effect of mimicry 
on trust in the expected direction: participants rated slightly more trust towards mimickers 
than non-mimickers.  
4.4.3 Virtual Maze Task 
We conducted two-way, repeated-measures ANOVAs to test the effects of mimicry and 
group membership on how often participants approached a virtual character in the virtual 
maze, and how often they followed a virtual character’s advice (each expressed as a 
percentage of trials). We did not find any significant main effects of mimicry or group 
membership, or any significant interaction effects (Table 4-2). There was a marginal 
interaction between mimicry and group membership on how often each virtual character 
was approached in the maze: participants approached the mimicking ingroup member 
on a greater percentage of trials than the non-mimicking ingroup member, whereas this 
trend was reversed for outgroup members. 






Table 4-2. Effects of mimicry and group membership on ratings and virtual maze task. 
 













F(1, 48) p ηp2 F(1, 48) p ηp2 F(1, 48) p ηp2 
Liking rating 
 
.69 (.21) .65 (.21) .69 (.18) .66 (.17) 2.35 .13 .06 .06 .81 .002 .13 .72 .003 
Rapport rating 
 
.72 (.16) .70 (.15) .70 (.15) .69 (.13) 1.06 .31 .03 1.35 .25 .03 .25 .62 .006 
Trust rating 
 
.68 (.15) .66 (.16) .70 (.14) .65 (.13) 3.81 .06 .09 .04 .84 .001 .43 .52 .01 
Approach 
(maze) 
.86 (.22) .80 (.22) .80 (.25) .84 (.22) .19 .67 .005 .05 .82 .001 3.08 .09 .08 
Follow advice 
(maze) 












4.4.4 Exploratory Analyses 
In addition to the pre-registered analyses described above, we conducted further 
exploratory analysis of this dataset.  
Firstly, we carried out Bayesian ANOVAs using JASP software, version 0.7.5.6 
(JASP Team, 2016) to test the main effects of mimicry, group membership and the 
interaction between mimicry and group membership on each of our dependent variables 
(Table 4-3). The results showed that our data favour a null main effect of mimicry on 
ratings of liking, rapport and trust, as well as trust behaviour in the virtual maze (all BF01 
> 1.6). The marginal interaction between mimicry and group membership on how often 
participant’s approached the virtual characters in the maze (reported above) had a Bayes 
factor of 5.37 in favour of the null hypothesis. Bayes factors favoured the null hypothesis 
for all main effects of group membership (all BF01 > 3.5) and all interactions between 
mimicry and group membership (all BF01 > 30). 
Table 4-3. Bayes factors for the effects of mimicry and group membership on 
ratings and virtual maze task. 










effect + group 
main effect 
Mimicry main 
effect + group 
main effect + 




2.11 5.79 11.70 49.67 
Rapport rating 
 
3.74 3.54 13.26 47.61 
Trust rating 
 
1.64 5.61 9.67 30.61 
Approach  
(maze) 
5.37 5.45 29.01 34.93 
Follow advice 
(maze) 
5.60 5.65 32.01 94.82 
Note. All models have a prior model probability of 0.2 and include subject.  
 
Secondly, in order to check whether participants’ experience of co-presence 
modulated any of the effects in the pre-registered analyses, we carried out a series of 
ANCOVAs with co-presence as a covariate. When controlling for co-presence, there 






were no significant main effects of mimicry on any of our dependent variables (Table 
4-4). There were also no significant main effects of group membership or any significant 
interactions between mimicry and group membership. 
Thirdly, it is possible that we did not find a significant effect of mimicry due to fatigue 
effects: participants might have become bored or disengaged by the time they interacted 
with the second group of virtual characters. In order to investigate this possibility, we 
carried out a series of ANOVAs which only included data from the first group of virtual 
characters, i.e. the first half of the experiment. Mimicry was a repeated-measures factor 
and group membership was a between-subjects factor. There were no significant main 
effects of mimicry or group membership and no significant interactions between mimicry 
and group membership in this data (Table 5). This suggests there was not a mimicry 
effect from the first two trials which became masked by boredom or fatigue in later trials. 
Note, however, that this analysis is underpowered for testing between-subjects effects 
of group membership. 
Table 4-4. Effects of mimicry and group on ratings and virtual maze task, 
controlling for levels of co-presence. 
 Main effect of 
mimicry 





p ηp2 F(1, 48) p ηp2 F(1, 48) p ηp2 
Liking rating 
 
0.05 .83 .002 .14 .71 .004 3.03 .09 .09 
Rapport rating 
 
1.14 .29 .03 .12 .73 .004 .35 .55 .01 
Trust rating 
 
1.65 .21 .05 .88 .34 .03 .44 .51 .01 
Approach 
(maze) 
0.17 .68 .005 .12 .73 .004 3.86 .06 .11 
Follow advice 
(maze) 










Table 4-5. Effects of mimicry and group in the first half of the study. 
 Main effect of 
mimicry 
Main effect of 
group 













Liking rating .17 .68 .004 0.13 .98 >.001 2.76 .11 .07 
Rapport rating .47 .50 0.01 .016 .90 >.001 .29 .60 .008 
Trust rating 3.22 .08 0.08 .013 .91 >.001 .32 .57 .008  
Approach  
(maze) 
.01 .93 >.001 2.835 .10 .07 .49 .49 .01  
Follow advice 
(maze) 
.03 .87 .001 2.711 .11 .07 .02 .89 .001  
 
 
Finally, because we found a marginal interaction between mimicry and group 
membership on how often participants approached each virtual character in the virtual 
maze, we further explored participants’ approach behaviour using a less conservative 
measure: how often each virtual character was approached first. This is a less 
conservative measure of participants’ trust towards each virtual character because it 
reflects a binary choice (e.g. Anna or Becky), and thus discriminates between different 
virtual characters more than our original measure of how often each virtual character 
was approached at all, which could be both virtual characters (e.g. Anna and Becky) on 
a given trial. A traditional ANOVA on this less conservative approach measure, with 
mimicry and group membership as factors, revealed a significant interaction between 
mimicry and group membership in the same direction as the marginal interaction for the 
more conservative measure (F (1,35) = 4.64, p = .04, ηp2 = 0.12). The ingroup mimicker 
(M = .53, SD = .22) was approached first more often than the ingroup non-mimicker (M 
=.43, SD = .23), and the opposite was true for outgroup members (mimicker M = .46, SD 
= .27; non-mimicker M = .51, SD = .27). However, Bayesian analysis for this effect 
strongly favoured the null hypothesis (BF01 = 27.2) and also favoured the null hypothesis 
for the main effect of mimicry (BF01 = 5.0) and the main effect of group (BF01 = 5.6). 







In this study participants were mimicked (or not) by a virtual character from their 
ingroup or an outgroup during a photo description task which roughly simulated a 
conversation. We measured the effect of mimicry on ratings of liking, rapport and trust, 
as well as implicit trust behaviour in a virtual maze task, and pre-registered our analyses. 
With this rigorous test of the effects of virtual mimicry, we found null results. In the pre-
registered analyses we did not find any significant main effects of mimicry or group 
membership, or any significant interactions, although there were some trends in the 
predicted directions. In particular, we found a marginal interaction between mimicry and 
group membership on how often each virtual character was approached in the virtual 
maze. An additional exploratory analysis found the interaction was significant for a less 
conservative measure, being approached first (rather than at all). Although this might 
tentatively be taken as evidence that people respond negatively (instead of positively) to 
mimicry from an outgroup member, it is important to note this exploratory finding would 
not meet a Bonferroni correction for six comparisons. Furthermore, Bayesian analysis 
showed that our data provides evidence in favour of the null hypothesis for all main 
effects of mimicry and group membership, and all interactions. Therefore, we are not 
able to draw any strong conclusions about how cultural group membership may modulate 
mimicry effects. Although it would be tempting to speculate that mimicry effects are 
reversed for outgroup mimickers based on some of the trends in our data, we emphasise 
that there is very little evidence for this modulation and that much more conclusive 
research would be needed to make any recommendations about using mimicry to build 
rapport or trust in cross-cultural contexts. 
 These null results contrast with our initial exploratory study (Chapter 3), which 
found that participants rated significantly higher feelings of rapport towards a virtual 
character that mimicked them with either a 1 second or 3 second delay, compared to a 
virtual character with pre-recorded movement. Inspection of the data divided by time 
delay showed that mimicry increased rapport at 3 seconds delay but not at 1 second. 






This is noteworthy because it means that the present study did not use the wrong time 
delay to find positive effects of mimicry. Additional analyses also suggest our null results 
were not due to fatigue effects. Whereas our initial exploratory study had many data 
analysis options available, the present study followed a single analysis pathway which 
was preregistered, and therefore we consider the present study to be more definitive in 
providing a clear test of the hypothesis that mimicry leads to liking, rapport and trust. This 
suggests that the result from our initial study may have been a false positive, and, taking 
both studies together, our data do not provide strong evidence that being mimicked leads 
to positive social evaluations of the mimicker.  
Our data is in line with previous studies of mimicry using VR, which have reported 
mixed results. Bailenson and Yee’s (2005) virtual mimicry system had a positive effect 
on participants’ impression of a virtual character, measured using a scale that taps into 
congeniality, knowledgeability and sincerity. Vrijsen et al (Vrijsen, Lange, Dotsch, et al., 
2010) used the same paradigm in a study comparing socially anxious and non- anxious 
women’s responses. They did not report the main effect of mimicry, but report a near-
significant positive effect of mimicry on how non-anxious women evaluated the virtual 
character in terms of likeability and friendliness. Verberne et al (2013) used the same 
mimicry algorithm and found inconsistent results across a range of measures. With one 
virtual character, mimicry had a significant positive effect on liking and trust, but with 
another virtual character the same mimicry manipulation did lead to significant positive 
effects. In a subsequent study in which the mimicking virtual character also had similar 
goals and appearance, Verberne et al. (2015) also found inconsistent effects across 
different measures of trust. It is worth noting that ratings of liking, trust and self-other 
overlap also show inconsistent effects of mimicry in traditional research settings where 
human confederates were trained to mimic participants (Hale & Hamilton, 2016a). 
Therefore the positive social effects of being mimicked may be more subtle or fragile 
than is generally assumed. Overall, we conclude that the mimicry of participant head and 






torso movements alone by a virtual character does not lead to substantial increases in 
rapport and trust. 
4.5.1 Implications for the Social Glue Theory of Mimicry 
The social glue theory of mimicry (Dijksterhuis, 2005; Lakin et al., 2003) suggests 
that non-conscious mimicry occurs across a wide range of behaviours including speech 
patterns, facial expressions, emotions, postures, gestures and mannerisms, and that 
mimicry of any of these behaviours can lead to positive social consequences such as 
rapport and interpersonal closeness. Virtual reality provides a strong test of this 
hypothesis, because it allows us to specifically control one type of mimicry while keeping 
all other social behaviours (speech, gaze, facial expression) exactly the same. Our 
findings across the present study and the previous study (Chapter 3) thus cast doubt 
over a strong version of the social glue theory, in which all types of mimicry must have 
positive social effects. It seems that in the specific case of mimicking head and torso 
movements in a mirror fashion, mimicry does not lead to increases in liking, rapport or 
trust. 
It is possible that our virtual characters lack other critical behaviours and did not 
achieve a realistic replication of natural mimicry. Adding other social behaviours such as 
nodding and more facial expressions, might lead to stronger effects of virtual mimicry 
(Gratch, Wang, Gerten, Fast, & Duffy, 2007) by making it more similar to real life mimicry. 
This may involve a variety of other social signals such as emotional imitation (Chartrand 
et al., 2005; Wallbott, 1995), turn-taking (Pentland, 2010; Wallbott, 1995) and eye-
contact (Wang, Newport, et al., 2011). Although traditional studies have attempted to 
control for the confounding effects of these signals by videotaping and rating 
confederates’ behaviour (Maddux et al., 2008; Stel, Blascovich, et al., 2010; Stel et al., 
2009), it is likely that some extra social cues still accompany mimicry in naturalistic 
paradigms. Therefore by controlling all other social signals, virtual mimicry may achieve 
smaller effect sizes than naturalistic mimicry (although in the exploratory study we found 
an effect on rapport with eta squared of .1, similar to naturalistic studies). It is also 






possible that mimicry may have different effects in the context of our structured 
conversation task, compared to other contexts involving different levels of interaction 
(e.g. a free conversation; Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; van Baaren et al., 2004) and different 
external cues (e.g. a negotiation agenda; Maddux et al., 2008). However, in order to test 
the claim that mimicry itself leads to positive social effects, virtual mimicry paradigms like 
ours provide the strictest test without other interfering social signals. Despite some 
positive results from VR scenarios which support the social glue theory, our data 
provides evidence in favour of null effects of virtual mimicry on rapport and trust.  
Within the context of the wider reproducibility crisis in psychology and the mixed 
evidence for positive effects of mimicry reviewed in Chapter 1, our studies contribute 
novel evidence to debates around the social glue theory. There have been very few 
previous studies of virtual mimicry and those reported show mixed results (Bailenson & 
Yee, 2005; Hasler et al., 2014; Verberne et al., 2013a). We extended Bailenson and 
Yee’s (2005) paradigm by implementing mimicry of body position as well as head motion, 
and by manipulating mimicry within the context of an interactive social exchange rather 
than a one-sided monologue. Our studies go demonstrate that the significant effects 
reported in previous virtual mimicry studies are difficult to replicate using novel methods 
and pre-specified hypothesis tests. Our Bayesian analyses also go beyond previously 
reported results to provide evidence in favour of null effects of mimicry. In addition, our 
studies have extended our wider understanding of the dowenstream effects of mimicry 
by capitalising on the advantages of virtual mimicry to show that the timing of mimicry 
and the group membership of the mimicker do not significantly modulate people’s 
responses to being mimicked by a virtual character.  
4.6 Conclusions 
 Across two tightly controlled studies in virtual reality (Chapter 3 and Chapter 4), 
we found that mimicry did not reliably lead to increases in rapport and trust when the 
delay was 3 seconds or 1 second, or when the mimicker came from an ingroup or 






outgroup. We cannot overturn a large body of work based on two studies, but our findings 
emphasise the fragile nature of mimicry effects, and suggest that further work with larger 
sample sizes and rigorous methods will be needed to determine if mimicry really is social 
glue. Looking forward, further exploration and quantification of natural mimicry behaviour 
during social interactions would be valuable for developing more realistic virtual 
characters that are able to achieve larger effects of mimicking. 
In the next chapter, we move on to investigate mimicry from a fresh perspective 
using a different methodological approach. While virtual mimickers offer much tighter 
control than human confederates, it is currently difficult to achieve completely naturalistic 
mimicry from virtual characters. Therefore in Chapter 5 we explore a complementary 
approach and investigate the parameters of spontaneous coordination between dyads 
of naïve participants. Representing an initial step in a new direction, we focus on 
quantifying these parameters rather than testing the downstream consequences of 
spontaneous mimicry.   
  






Chapter 5. Get on my wavelength: Interpersonal 
coordination in naturalistic conversations 
5.1 Abstract 
We currently have little data about the precise parameters of mimicry in natural 
conversations, and the role of mimicry in relation to other types of coordination remains 
unclear. Recently, wavelet analysis has been identified as a tool to measure 
interpersonal coordination in motion data recorded from naturalistic social interactions. 
In a pilot study, we used high-resolution motion capture to record head and torso 
movements of 20 dyads over multiple 90 second conversations. Following exploratory 
analyses on the pilot dataset, we replicated the same procedure with a new sample of 
31 dyads and pre-registered our analyses of the new dataset. We used wavelet analysis 
to examine levels of mimicry across a spectrum of different motion frequencies. We 
tested levels of mimicry in real vs. pseudo interactions, created by shuffling the dataset. 
The results suggest that natural conversations are characterised by greater than chance 
coordination at frequencies below 1.5 Hz. Surprisingly, real interactions also showed less 
than chance coordination of head movements at frequencies of 1.5 – 5 Hz, suggesting 
that systematic decoupling of head movements occurs in natural conversations 
alongside spontaneous mimicry. Levels of mimicry did not differ between monologue and 
dialogue interactions or following prosocial vs. antisocial primes. We discuss the 
implications of our data and suggest future directions. 
5.2 Introduction 
In the previous two chapters, we found that precise mimicry of head and torso 
movements by a virtual character did not have any reliable effects on rapport or trust. 
This could be because virtual mimicry is currently unable to replicate spontaneous and 
reciprocal patterns of mimicry that may occur between two people in a natural interaction. 
In virtual mimicry the virtual character always exactly matches the participant like a mirror 






with a fixed delay, but natural mimicry may involve switching between mimicker and 
mimickee roles, as well as variation in the degree to which people match their 
movements in time and space. Natural mimicry also occurs in a rich context of other 
coordinated actions, nonverbal signals and speech. It has traditionally been challenging 
to measure and model mimicry in these contexts, but modern motion capture 
technologies and analysis techniques make it possible to measure natural mimicry in 
precise detail (Chapter 1). Therefore, in the present study we move away from controlled 
manipulations of mimicry and use these methods to explore the natural parameters of 
interpersonal coordination in face-to-face interactions. In the present chapter, we 
focused on quantifying these parameters rather than measuring downstream effects of 
mimicry on rapport, trust or any other social outcomes.  
Interpersonal coordination is an umbrella term that covers many different kinds of 
coordinated action, including mimicry, synchrony, deliberate imitation and 
complementary movements. When the term ‘interpersonal coordination’ was first coined 
by Bernieri & Rosenthal (Bernieri & Rosenthal, 1991), they distinguished between 
behaviour matching (mimicry) and behavioural synchrony. Since then, mimicry and 
synchrony have occupied separate research literatures and discussions have focused 
on similarities and differences in their causes and effects (Chartrand & Lakin, 2013; Hove 
& Risen, 2009; Piercarlo Valdesolo et al., 2010). Other sub-categories of interpersonal 
coordination such as imitation, entrainment and contingent behaviour also tend to be 
studied in separate fields. For experimental purposes, the distinctions between these 
sub-categories are important for generating and testing specific hypotheses. However, 
for modelling realistic social interactions, treating them separately may be less helpful. 
Everyday conversations, meetings, games, sports, music, teaching and other 
interactions all involve a dynamic mixture of mimicry, synchronisation, complementary 
and joint actions which may not be easily disentangled. In addition, it is unclear whether 
sub-categories of interpersonal coordination form a single continuum dependent on the 
same basic cognitive mechanisms, or if there are clear distinctions in the mechanisms 






for different interpersonal behaviours (Hale & Hamilton, 2016a). Therefore, in order to 
understand the natural production of mimicry, we go beyond a strict definition of mimicry 
in this study and explore wavelet analysis as a method for modelling interpersonal 
coordination more broadly. 
Natural social interactions also involve reciprocal patterns of coordinated 
behaviour. This is emphasised in synchrony research, which typically measures 
synchronisation at the level of dyads or groups (Lakens et al., 2016). In contrast, 
research on mimicry has typically involved experiments in which the participant is either 
mimicker or mimickee. This approach, where the individual is the unit of analysis, has 
generated a lot of research into what causes the mimicker to mimic, and (to a lesser 
extent) the downstream consequences of mimicry for the mimickee. Therefore, our 
current understanding of spontaneous mimicry comes from observing how often one 
person matches a target’s movements within a critical time window (Stel et al., 2009; Stel 
et al., 2010). Very few studies have attempted to measure spontaneous mimicry as a 
reciprocal process within a dyad (or larger group) or test causes and consequences of 
mimicry at this level of interaction. However, this could be critical for determining 
naturalistic mimicry parameters such as its timing or rhythmic properties. In particular,  
research focusing on the organisation of nonverbal signals in social interactions suggests 
that natural patterns of social exchange within a participant dyad cannot neccesarily be 
captured when one participant is replaced with an experimenter or confederate (Chapter 
1; Bavelas & Healing, 2013; Brown-Schmidt & Tanenhaus, 2008; Kuhlen & Brennan, 
2013). Therefore, in the present study we recruited participant dyads and aimed to 
explore their patterns of interpersonal coordination at the dyadic level.  
5.2.1 Recording Dyadic Social Interactions 
Researchers have used several approaches to measure interpersonal coordination 
in dyads (Lakens et al., 2016). Early research on interpersonal coordination involved 
videotaping natural conversations, often in clinical contexts between therapists and their 
clients. The videotapes were then extensively coded, frame-by-frame in order to record 






changes in speech and posture (Bernieri, Gillis, Davis, & Grahe, 1996; Condon & 
Ogston, 1966; Kendon, 1970; LaFrance & Broadbent, 1976). Scheflen (1964) noted that 
two (or more) people interacting in therapy sessions often adopted congruent postures, 
either directly matching or mirroring one another’s body positions. Shortly after that, 
detailed video analyses of conversations by Condon & Ogston (1966) and Kendon 
(1970) found that people tended to move different or similar body parts in coordination 
both with each other and with their own speech rhythms at the level of words, syllables 
and phonemes. Central to this microanalysis was the idea that synchrony could occur 
between different behaviours, which required intensive coding of many movements from 
each person interacting at high time resolution (up to 48 frames per second). Although 
this provided very rich data, slow hand annotation was a major limitation (Grammer, 
Kruck, & Magnusson, 1998) and it is likely that chance coordination would occur when 
so many different behaviours are coded (Cappella, 1981; McDowall, 1978). In addition, 
even trained coders with high internal reliability might have introduced bias into the 
scoring of coordinated movements (Lumsden et al., 2012). 
Subsequent research relied on untrained observers to rate the amount of 
coordination in videotaped social interactions. This approach relies on the gestalt 
assumption that people can accurately perceive stimulus properties such as the level of 
coordination between two people without the need for training (Bernieri & Rosenthal, 
1991). In order to test the validity of this approach, Bernieri et al. (Bernieri, 1988; Bernieri 
et al., 1988) gave observers videotapes of real interactions and ‘pseudo interactions’ 
where interaction partners from different videos were randomly paired together to make 
it look as though they were having a real interaction. Observers perceived greater levels 
of synchrony in real interactions compared to the chance levels present in the pseudo 
interactions. This suggested that real interactions are characterised by synchronised 
behaviour and this can be perceived by untrained observers. However, this approach 
only taps into the general level of coordination present, and there is some evidence the 






level of synchrony perceived by the observers is actually correlated with other social 
cues such as smiling (Cappella, 1981) or physical similarity (Lumsden et al., 2012).   
More recent studies have used automatic techniques to record high-resolution time 
series data about people’s motion during naturalistic conversations (Paxton & Dale, 
2013). One technique is to use a frame-differencing algorithm to automatically assess 
differences in each person’s body movements from one video frame to the next in order 
to calculate their overall movement or ‘motion energy’ (Fujiwara & Daibo, 2016; Paxton 
& Dale, 2013; Fabian Ramseyer & Tschacher, 2010; Schmidt, Morr, Fitzpatrick, & 
Richardson, 2012). Although this has the advantage that specialist equipment is not 
needed, there are currently few established frame-differencing methods (Paxton & Dale, 
2013) and this approach lacks resolution to capture specific head or limb movements. In 
order to achieve more specific data from individual body parts, another option is to use 
motion capture technologies. These include 3D depth-sensing cameras such as Kinect 
(e.g. Won, Bailenson, Stathatos, & Dai, 2014), as well as wearable motion sensors that 
can be directly attached to the people interacting (Feese et al., 2011; Poppe et al., 2013). 
Overall, automatic behaviour recording techniques can provide more objective and 
detailed data about an interaction compared to video coding by trained researchers or 
untrained participants. However, a major challenge is then to analyse the level of 
interpersonal coordination in the data. 
5.2.2 Using Wavelet Analysis to Measure Interpersonal Coordination 
Wavelet analysis is a recent approach to measuring interpersonal coordination in 
motion data that has been used to evaluate free conversations (Fujiwara & Daibo, 2016), 
musical improvisation (Walton et al., 2015), and telling knock-knock jokes (Schmidt et 
al., 2014). Wavelet analysis is a type of spectrum analysis that transforms a time series 
into time-frequency space. When applied to one person’s motion trace, this means that 
different frequencies or rhythms within their motion can be examined across the time 
course. Cross-wavelet analysis gives the degree of similarity between two time-
frequency transforms describing movements from each person in a dyad. The similarity 






is calculated as a correlation and is often termed ‘cross-wavelet coherence’. In general, 
high coherence is interpreted as a high degree of synchronisation (Fujiwara & Daibo, 
2016), because it indicates that two people are moving with the same frequency but not 
necessarily in matching forms. However, when high coherence between similar 
behaviours is observed (e.g. both people waving their arms or both nodding), this could 
also be interpreted as mimicry because the movements match in form as well as 
frequency. Perfect mimicry, such as being mirrored exactly by a virtual avatar, would 
lead to maximum coherence at the frequency corresponding to the mimicry time delay 
(e.g. at 0.5 Hz for a mimicry delay of 2s). Note that the cross-wavelet approach gives the 
amount of coherence for the dyad, rather than indicating how much one person mimicked 
or synchronised with the other. As well as the amount of coherence, cross-wavelet 
analysis also calculates the phase relationship between two people, which can indicate 
whether one person led or followed the other at a particular rhythmic frequency, and how 
long this leader-follower pattern was sustained over time. For primers and tutorials on 
using wavelet analysis in the context of social research, see Issartel et al. (2006) and 
Issartel, Bardainne, Gaillot & Marin (2015).  
 Wavelet analysis is still a very new tool for studying naturalistic social 
interactions, and there have only been a handful of studies using this approach. These 
include initial proof-of-concept studies using small sample sizes to demonstrate how 
cross-wavelet analysis can be applied to time series data about the head or limb 
movements of two people interacting together (Issartel et al., 2006; Varlet, Marin, 
Lagarde, & Bardy, 2011; Walton et al., 2015). In one such study, Issartel et al (2006) 
demonstrated that 6 pairs of participants were unable to avoid unintentionally 
coordinating their arm movements, even when instructed to do so, during a free 
movement task where they swung their arms while seated. Subsequent studies using 
larger sample sizes have shown that people with dance training are better at 
synchronising with other people or external rhythms (Sofianidis, Elliott, Wing, & Hatzitaki, 






2014; Washburn et al., 2014) and have demonstrated that bodily synchronisation occurs 
within nested timescales during a scripted task (Schmidt et al., 2014). 
Recently, one study has used wavelet analysis to test whether the levels of cross-
wavelet coherence between two people having a naturalistic conversation are greater 
than chance levels obtained from pseudo interactions. Fujiwara & Daibo (2016) carried 
out cross-wavelet analysis on 31 dyads engaged in 6-minute conversations and 
compared the amount of motion coordination (averaged over all component frequencies) 
to the amount in pseudo interactions where members of different dyads were randomly 
paired together. They found significantly greater coordination in the real interactions, 
replicating earlier findings (Bernieri, 1988; Bernieri et al., 1988; Schmidt et al., 2014) and 
adding further evidence that people spontaneously coordinate their body movements in 
natural conversations. In order to further examine the pattern of how people coordinate, 
Fujiwara & Daibo split the data from the genuine interactions into different frequency 
bands. They found that coherence levels gradually declined across the frequency 
spectrum, from lower (less than 0.025 Hz) to higher (4 Hz) frequencies. These initial 
results suggest that interpersonal coherence may vary at different motion frequencies, 
with less coherence at high frequencies close to 4 Hz. However, the authors did not test 
whether this pattern was also present in pseudo interactions, so it is unclear whether the 
same pattern would emerge in randomly paired data or whether true interactions involve 
more coherence at low frequencies than high frequencies. 
Wavelet analysis versus cross-recurrence analysis. An alternative approach to 
wavelet analysis is to use cross-recurrence analysis to assess the degree of similarity or 
coordination between time series from two people interacting. Cross-recurrence analysis 
is based on recurrence quantification analysis (RQA). RQA was designed in the 1990s 
to identify recurrent patterns of overlap within time-lagged series (Shockley, Butwill, 
Zbilut, & Webber, 2002; Zbilut, Giuliani, & Webber, 1998a, 1998b) and originally had its 
main applications in the biological and physical sciences (D. C. Richardson, Dale, & 
Shockley, 2008). RQA involves two key steps: the first is to identify ‘recurrences’ in the 






time series, when the system being measured revists a similar state that is has been in 
before. The second step is to quantify the number and nature of the recurrences. In 
straightforward RQA, these steps are carried out for one time series representing one 
system. In cross-recurrence analysis, time series from two different systems are 
analysed and the recurrence between them represents the degree of overlap between 
their trajectories (Shockley, Baker, Richardson, & Fowler, 2007; Shockley, Santana, & 
Fowler, 2003).  
The application of cross-recurrence for measuring interpersonal coordination has 
been developed by Kevin Shockley and colleagues over the past two decades. In 
response to traditional research that relied on subjective coding to assess interpersonal 
coordination, they have aimed to use cross-recurrence analysis as a more objective 
approach which allows for objective quantification of the behavioural coupling between 
two or more people engaged in a dynamic social interaction (Shockley et al., 2007, 2002; 
Shockley, Richardson, & Dale, 2009; Shockley et al., 2003). The key variables derived 
from cross-recurrence analysis are the percentage recurrence (%REC), or degree of 
shared movements, and the maximum line of recurrence points (MAXLINE), which 
indicates the length of the longest sustained overlap between interaction partners. 
 In a key study demonstrating this approach, Shockley et al. (2003) investigated 
the coordination of two people’s postural sway during a social interaction task. When 
standing upright, the body naturally sways in continuous movement to maintain balance, 
especially to adjust for the movements made while breathing, speaking and gesturing. 
In order to track postural sway, Shockley et al. attached motion sensors to the heads 
and hips of two participants who engaged in a conversation task. They were each given 
a similar cartoon picture and were asked to discuss the pictures in order to find out subtle 
differences between them. Participants could move and gesture naturally, but would 
either face each other or away from each other while discussing their picture with either 
the other particiapant or a confederate (although the other participant was always 
present). Shockley et al. found that when participants completed the task with each other, 






their postural sway showed significantly greater coordination in terms of both %REC and 
MAXLINE, compared to when they each interacted with a confederate. This effect was 
independent of whether the participants were looking at each other or not. However, 
coordination of head movements did not differ across any conditions. The results from 
this key study suggested that cross-recurrence analysis can measure the dynamics of 
coordination during true social interactions, and this was supported by a follow-up study 
(Shockley et al., 2007). 
Richardson and Dale (2005) have also used cross-recurrence analysis to measure 
the timing of joint gaze between speakers and listeners. The ‘speaker’ participants’ 
voices and eye movements were recorded while they looked at a set of TV sitcom 
characters and spoke spontaneously about the TV show. Segments of their speech were 
played to the ‘listener’ participants, whose eye movements were also tracked while they 
looked at the same display of sitcom characters. The timing of joint gaze between 
speakers and listeners was assessed by comparing the amount of cross-recurrence 
between eye positions at successive time lags. They found that a listener was most likely 
to be looking at the same sitcom character as the speaker after a lag of approximately 
two seconds. In subsequent studies, Richardson, Dale and Kirkham (Daniel C. 
Richardson, Dale, & Kirkham, 2007) used cross-recurrence analysis to investigate gaze 
coordination during live interactions. 
 Wavelet analsysis and cross-recurrence analysis may offer different advantages 
and disadvantages for investigating patterns of spontaneous coordination between two 
people’s movements, although the two techniques have not been directly tested against 
each other. When it comes to quantifying coordinated movements, cross-recurrence 
analysis and wavelet analysis are both suitable for studying natural social interactions, 
because neither of them make assumptions about the stationarity of data (Issartel et al., 
2015; Shockley et al., 2007). Cross-recurrence analysis may also have the additional 
strength that it does not make assumptions about the distribution of data (Shockley et 
al., 2007), whereas wavelet analysis fits the data against a particular wavelet function 






and assumes that it has wavelet-like properties. This could mean that cross-recurrence 
analysis is a more versatile analysis tool than wavelet analysis. When it comes to 
investigating the timing parameters of interpersonal coordination, cross-recurrence 
analysis and wavelet analysis offer different kinds of insight: Cross-recurrence analysis 
has been used to assess coordination at successive time lags (Daniel C. Richardson & 
Dale, 2005), which could be seen as a more sophisticated alternative to the traditional 
cross-correlation of time series. In contrast, wavelet analysis allows the assessment of 
coordination at each component frequency across the whole spectrum that makes up a 
given motion trajectory. In other words, wavelet analysis could be used to reveal the 
rhythmic tempi at which motion is coordinated in a dyad, rather than the typical time delay 
between one person matching the other’s movements. Neither of these analysis options 
is inherently better or worse than the other, but in this chapter we chose to apply wavelet 
analysis in order to investigate the rhythmic characteristics of mimicry in fine detail. 
5.2.3 Interpersonal Coordination at Different Frequencies 
A major advantage of wavelet analysis is that it can be used to measure 
interpersonal coordination at different frequencies, and could therefore provide insight 
into the natural rhythmic characteristics of mimicry. At present this is something we know 
very little about. It has been suggested that mimicry occurs with natural delays of 2-5 
seconds (Leander et al., 2012; van Baaren, Decety, et al., 2009), based on anecdotal 
evidence (although estimates vary from 0 to 10 seconds; Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Stel 
et al., 2009). This would correspond to movement coherence within a frequency band of 
roughly 0.5 – 0.2 Hz, which could be a possible range where we should expect mimicry 
to occur. However, this very rough estimate is based on our beliefs about easily 
observable mimicry behaviours such as body posture shifts and gestures. Coordination 
could also occur between many other subtle behaviours present in a conversation. For 
example, interpersonal coordination has previously been linked to the natural rhythm of 
speech (Condon & Ogston, 1966; Hadar, Steiner, Grant, & Rose, 1983a, 1983b; Kendon, 
1970), which is around 5 Hz (Morrill, Paukner, Ferrari, & Ghazanfar, 2012; Ohala, 1975). 






Further research suggests that facial expressions at frequencies of approximately 2 - 7 
Hz are also important for the interpretation of speech (Chandrasekaran, Trubanova, 
Stillittano, Caplier, & Ghazanfar, 2009). Other studies have demonstrated entrainment in 
covert rhythms such as heart rate (1 – 1.7 Hz; Konvalinka et al., 2011) and breathing 
(0.2 - 0.3 Hz; Pellegrini & Ciceri, 2012; Warner, 1996). Human body movement is also 
thought to be somehow tuned to frequencies around 2 Hz based on musical preference 
and recall of these tempi (Noorden & Moelants, 1999). While it is not possible here to 
review all of the rhythmic behaviours that could be present in a conversation, Table 5-1 
lists some common rhythmic behaviours in order to illustrate a range of motion 
frequencies from around 0 – 5 Hz which might be relevant for interpersonal coordination. 
Without any previous systematic tests of interpersonal coordination for different 
frequencies, it is hard to make firm predictions about the frequencies at which people 
naturally coordinate. However, the behaviours reviewed in Table 1 suggest natural head 
and body coordination is likely to occur at frequencies lower than speech production at 
5 Hz (c.f. Fujiwara & Daibo, 2016). Therefore, in the present study we examine 
interpersonal coordination across a full frequency spectrum from 0 to 5 Hz.  
Table 5-1. Motion frequencies of common rhythmic behaviours.  
Frequency 
(Hz) 
Rhythmic behaviour Reference 
0.2 – 0.3 Breathing while speaking (McFarland, 2001) 
0.43 Blinking (Bentivoglio et al., 1997) 
1 – 1.7 Heart beat (Jose & Collison, 1970) 
1.8 – 3.7 Ordinary head motion in 
conversation 
(Hadar et al., 1983b) 
2 Average beat to music (Noorden & Moelants, 1999) 
2 Walking (MacDougall & Moore, 2005) 
2 – 7  Facial expression accompanying 
speech 
(Chandrasekaran et al., 2009) 
3.7 + Fast head motion in conversation (Hadar et al., 1983b) 
5 Speech (Morrill et al., 2012; Ohala, 1975) 
5 Laughter (Luschei, Ramig, Finnegan, 
Baker, & Smith, 2006) 
 






5.2.4 The Present Study 
In the present study we recorded movements from participant dyads engaged in a 
photo description task. This task was based on previous studies (Chapters 3 and 4), 
although other research has also used a very similar task to study body coordination with 
cross-recurrence analysis (Shockley, Santana, & Fowler, 2003). In our task, participants 
took turns to describe photos to each other for 90 seconds. So that we could explore 
whether there were any differences in interpersonal coordination between monologue 
and dialogue interactions, each turn was split into two parts. For the first 30 seconds the 
speaker described the photo in monologue and for the remaining 60 seconds the listener 
could ask questions and both participants could converse together. We also included a 
scrambled sentences priming task which has been shown to subliminally increase or 
decrease levels of automatic imitation in finger-tapping paradigms. For half of the trials, 
participants were primed prosocially and for the other half they were primed antisocially. 
We recorded the position and rotation of motion sensors on each participant’s head and 
torso, at a rate of 60 Hz. Their conversation was also video and audio recorded, although 
we do not analyse the video or audio data in this chapter. From the motion data we 
primarily examined four head signals: head motion energy, head yaw (turning) head pitch 
(nodding), and head roll (tilting). We used wavelet analysis to calculate levels of 
interpersonal coordination in real trials and in pseudo trials, which were created by 
matching data from different trials within the same pair.   
As wavelet analysis is a relatively new technique in social cognitive research, the 
present study consisted of a pilot phase and a final phase. The pilot phase was highly 
exploratory, whereas the final phase reported here aimed to rigorously replicate our pilot 
results following a strict pre-registered analysis pathway (Hale & Hamilton, 2016a). In 
both phases we used the same method of data collection. In the pilot phase, a student 
supervised by Joanna Hale (Francesco Buccheri) collected a dataset from 20 dyads. We 
then carried out exploratory wavelet analyses on multiple head and torso signals from 
the raw pilot data (Hale & Hamilton, 2016a). Surprisingly, the pilot results suggested that 






real interactions involved less cross-wavelet coherence in head movements than pseudo 
interactions, at movement frequencies of approximately 1-7 Hz. The results also 
suggested that prosocial priming might increase head coordination in monologue 
interactions. However, we carried out many exploratory tests and it is possible these 
results could reflect false positives or spurious trends. Therefore, we aimed to carry out 
more rigorous tests on a new dataset. A different research assistant from our lab 
collected the final dataset, following the same data collection procedure as the pilot 
phase. Based on our pilot analyses, we finalised the analysis pathway for the final 
dataset and pre-registered this pathway along with Matlab scripts for performing the 
analyses. The pre-registered analysis pathway focused only on head movements, where 
we saw the strongest results in the pilot data. In this chapter, we also report additional 




All participants were recruited through email advertisements to a departmental 
database of research volunteers. We recruited 31 dyads in total (Mage = 22.3 years, SDage 
= 2.9 years). Participants were paired up as dyads on the basis of their availability and 
preference for the same time slot. All participants gave written consent and were paid 
£7.50 for 1 hour. The study received ethical approval from the UCL Research Ethics 
Committee (Application 5713/001) and was performed in accordance with the 1964 
Declaration of Helsinki.  
5.3.2 Equipment 
Motion tracking system. We used a Polhemus magnetic motion tracking device 
(Polhemus Inc., Vermont) to detect participants’ movements (Figure 5-1A). This device 
detects the position and rotation of sensors within a low-intensity electromagnetic field, 
with a specified frequency (we used 60 Hz). Participants were fitted with two sensors. 






One sensor was fixed on the participant’s forehead using a Velcro cloth band. Another 
sensor was attached to the participant’s upper back using microporous tape.  
Audio and video recording. Both participants wore a lapel microphone and their 
voices were recorded. A video camera mounted on a tripod recorded the session, 
offering a clear view of the participants’ seated bodies. We do not report any audio or 
video data in this chapter. 
Laboratory set-up. The laboratory set-up is illustrated in Figure 5-1A. In the laboratory 
there were two wooden stools for the participants, facing each other at a distance of 
approximately 1.5m. Between the stools there was a wooden structure to hold the 
Polhemus transmitter device which generated an electromagnetic field of approximately 
2m diameter around the participants. A projector screen to the side of the participants 
showed instructions throughout the session, and audio speakers above the projector 
provided audio cues. A curtain separated participants from the experimenter, who 
remained in the room but did not interact with participants during the experiment and 
could not be seen.  
Data recording software. We used Vizard software to display instructions on the 
projector screen and trigger audio cues at the correct times. Data from the motion tracker 
was read into Vizard at a rate of 60 Hz. We used Vizard to save time-stamped motion 
data, labelled with the current experimental conditions and block and trial numbers. 







Figure 5-1. Equipment and procedure. Panel A shows the equipment and lab arrangement. Red and Blue participants were seated facing each 
other. Each participant wore a motion tracking sensor on their forehead and upper back. Between them a wooden frame held the transmitter device 
for the Polhemus motion tracker. Instructions were displayed on a projector screen and participants were separated from the experimenter by a 
curtain. Panel B shows one block of the experiment. At the start of the block, participants completed a scrambled sentence priming task on 
clipboards. The priming task was followed by four photo description trials. Panel C shows one trial. One participant (e.g. Blue) was the speaker for the 
trial. The speaker described a photo in monologue for 30 seconds, then both participants could speak in dialogue for 90 seconds. The start of the trial, 
the end of the monologue section and the end of the trial were signalled with audible beeps.  







Dominic Oliver carried out the data collection. Two participants were scheduled to 
arrive at the laboratory at the same time, and were met by the experimenter. After giving 
informed consent to take part, the participants were fitted with motion sensors and 
microphones. They were randomly assigned to be the ‘Red’ participant or ‘Blue’ 
participant. These labels were used to distinguish dyad members during the experiment 
and in the recorded data.  
The experiment was split into one practice block and four experimental blocks. 
During the practice block, the experimenter gave the participants verbal instructions 
about each task, in addition to instructions which appeared on the projector screen. 
During the experimental blocks the participants only received instructions on the 
projector screen. Each block began with a scrambled sentences priming task, followed 
by a photo conversation task. The experimental blocks alternated between prosocial and 
antisocial priming conditions. The order was counterbalanced across participants in a 
randomised fashion. 
Scrambled sentences priming task. Although it is not the main focus of the 
present chapter, we included a task to investigate whether social priming would affect 
levels of coordination between dyads. At the start of each experimental block, 
participants individually completed a priming task taken from Wang & Hamilton (2013) 
using paper and pen (Figure 5-1B). The task was to make a correct sentence using six 
words out of a jumbled list of seven words, where two words were already in the correct 
order. When completed, each sentence described an interaction that was either prosocial 
(e.g., “Alex and Zoe enjoy their holiday in Hawaii”) or antisocial (e.g., “Stuart and Eva 
fight over the last biscuit”), and all primes had a third person perspective. In the practice 
block, the sentences presented neutral factual information instead (e.g., “The Nobel prize 
ceremony is held in Sweden”). Individual participants completed different sentences to 
each other but were both primed with the same condition (e.g. both prosocial).  






Picture description task. Following the priming task, participants completed a 
picture description task (Figure 5-1C). Stimuli for the task were colour photos showing 
human figures, taken from the National Geographic website and printed on heavy card. 
In order to generate a conversation between participants, they were asked to take turns 
at describing a photo to each other (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). Each turn describing a 
photo corresponded to one trial. There were two trials in the practice block and four trials 
per experimental block (see Table 5-2 for an example trial sequence). Before the start of 
each trial, participants were instructed who should be the speaker (e.g. Red participant) 
and listener (e.g. Blue participant) for that trial. The trial was split into two parts. In the 
first part (monologue), the speaker was instructed to describe the photo for 30 seconds 
and the listener was instructed not to speak. In the second part (dialogue), the speaker 
and listener were instructed to converse freely for 60 seconds, and the listener was 
instructed they could ask questions about the photo. Audible beeps indicated the start of 
the trial, the start of the dialogue section and the end of the trial. A timer on the projector 
screen also counted down the time left in the monologue and dialogue sections. 
 Interaction quality questionnaire. At the end of the study, participants 
individually completed a questionnaire about the quality of their interaction. The 
questionnaire data is not analysed or reported here. Our virtual mimicry studies 
(Chapters 3 and 4) and piloting of the present study showed weak or null relationships 
between  mimicry and self-reported rapport, trust and other aspects of interaction quality. 
Therefore the present pre-registered study did not aim to investigate any social 
consequences of mimicry. 
Finally, participants were asked to write down what they thought was the purpose 
of the study, and were debriefed and paid by the experimenter. 
5.3.4 Contributions 
Francesco Buccheri carried out pilot data collection, supervised by Joanna Hale. 
Dominic Oliver carried out participant recruitment and data collection for the present 






study, following training by Joanna Hale. Joanna Hale carried out all data pre-processing 
and analyses in MATLAB, which are described below. 
Table 5-2. Example trial sequence. 
Block Priming condition Trial Speaker 
1 Prosocial 1 Red 
  2 Blue 
  3 Red 
  4 Blue 
2 Antisocial 5 Red 
  6 Blue 
  7 Red 
  8 Blue 
3 Prosocial 9 Red 
  10 Blue 
  11 Red 
  12 Blue 
4 Antisocial 13 Red 
  14 Blue 
  15 Red 
  16 Blue 





5.4.1 Data Exclusion Criteria 
We excluded data from dyads who met any of the following criteria: 
1. Participants knew each other before the study 
2. Motion data was not recorded due to technical failure of the equipment or task 
software 
3. Motion sensor(s) moved or fell off during the study 
4. More than 50% of their data was missing or not suitable for wavelet analysis 
 
Before carrying out any analyses, data were excluded from 5 dyads who met one 
of our exclusion criteria. For 1 dyad, participants knew each other before the study. For 
2 dyads, motion sensors moved or fell off during the study. For 2 dyads, more than 50% 
of their data was missing. The final sample consisted of 26 dyads (Mage = 22.3 years, 
SDage = 2.9 years).  There were 16 same-gender dyads and 10 mixed-gender dyads (34 






female and 18 male participants). When carrying out the analyses, we also excluded 
individual trials if wavelet analysis could not be performed (e.g. this could happen if there 
is a very large jerk or jump in the motion data).  
5.4.2 Data Format 
For each participant, motion was recorded from two sensors. One sensor was on 
the head and the other was on the torso (Figure 5-1A). Each sensor gives three data 
channels specifying its position (x, y and z) and three channels specifying its rotation 
(yaw, pitch and roll).  The yaw, pitch and roll signals roughly correspond to head turning, 
nodding and tilting. However, the rotations are calculated relative to a fixed frame of 
reference and the calculations are performed in a fixed order (Figure 5-2). This means 
that the yaw reading affects the pitch reading (Figure 5-2C), and both the yaw and pitch 
readings affect the roll reading (Figure 5-2D). Thus, pitch and roll do not perfectly 
correspond to the head nodding and tilting angles we would calculate if we were working 
with the head as our local frame of reference. However, because people do not usually 
make very large rotations of the head, we interpret the pitch and roll signals as close 
approximations of head nodding and head tilting, respectively. 
 
 
Figure 5-2. Rotation transforms for calculating yaw, pitch and roll signals. The 
rotations are calculated relative to a fixed reference frame, axes XYZ (Panel A). Three 
transforms give the final yaw, pitch and roll rotations. The first transform is a rotation 
about the Z axis, which gives the yaw angle, ψ (Panel B). The second transform is a 
rotation about the y’ axis, which gives the pitch angle, ѳ (Panel C). The third transform 
is a rotation about the x’’ axis, which gives the roll angle, φ (Panel D).  
 






We recorded data from the channels above at a rate of 60 data points per second. 
One trial lasted 90 seconds, split into 30 seconds of monologue and 60 seconds of 
dialogue (Figure 5-1C).  Thus, the complete dataset for a single trial has 24 channels:  3 
head position, 3 head rotation, 3 torso position and 3 torso rotation for each participant, 
over 90 seconds (approximately 5400 data points per channel).  There were 16 trials 
(separate time series) per dyad. Table 5-2 gives the experimental conditions of each trial. 
We read the raw data for each dyad into Matlab as 16 x 5400 matrices.  
5.4.3 Pre-Processing  
We carried out some pre-processing on the raw data. First, we trimmed the data 
by discarding the first 100 time points (1.7s of the trial) and all time points after the 
5,250th point (87.5s into the trial; note that we originally specified 5300 in our pre-
registration but some trials were shorter than 5300 data points). This ensured that all 
time series are of exactly equal length, which was necessary in order to average across 
trials and participants. It also avoided the inclusion of any unusual or jerky movements 
made at the start or end of the trial (signalled by audible beeps), such as turning to look 
at the projector screen. Then we corrected for circularity in the rotation data channels, to 
deal with cases where a change in orientation from -355° to 5° appears to Matlab like a 
large change rather than only a 10° movement past zero.  We used a Matlab script which 
detects changes in angle of more than 270° and then adds / subtracts 360° to the data 
after the jump, in order to end up with continuous data. Next, we de-trended each data 
channel by subtracting the mean value, and applied a 7th order Butterworth low pass 
filter with cut-off frequency of 0.9 to reduce noise in each data channel. Finally, we 
applied a timing correction to deal with any tiny inaccuracies in the data time stamps 
which are incompatible with wavelet analysis. We created a timeline with the same 
number of data points linearly spaced from the first to last data point, and replaced the 
recorded timeline with this precisely equidistant one. Note we did not exclude any data 
for being noisy or poor quality, but rather kept all raw data from all channels at this stage. 






5.4.4 Main Signals 
We analysed 4 main signals. First, we calculated head motion energy as the sum 
of the motion velocities in x, y and z directions. Second, we kept head yaw, head pitch 
and head roll data as separate signals. This allowed us to preserve information about 
how our participants moved in different ways, such as nodding the head versus tilting 
the head from side to side. These different movements might provide different social 
cues in an interaction and show different patterns of coordination. 
5.4.5 Analysis of Signal Power 
As an initial analysis, we examined the power spectral density (PSD) estimate for 
all signals using Welch's method. First, for each participant and each trial we calculated 
the PSD estimate. Then, separately for each experimental condition, we averaged 
together the PSD estimates from participants in the same dyad across all trials. Finally, 
we carried out t-tests to determine whether there were significant differences in power 
between prosocial and antisocial conditions, and between speaker and listener 
conditions. This allowed us to determine if there were overall differences in participants’ 
movement behaviour between the different priming conditions and speaker/listener 
roles. 
5.4.6 Wavelet Analysis 
We carried out wavelet analysis on each of our 4 signals, using the following 
pipeline (summarised in Figure 5-3). All wavelet analyses were carried out using the 
Matlab toolbox from Grinsted et al. (2004) with default parameters. First, we took two 
time series, representing 86s of social interaction from one trial between two participants. 
We calculated the wavelet transform of each time series, the cross-wavelet transform of 
the two time series together, and the cross-wavelet coherence in the interaction (Figure 
5-3). We did this for all 16 trials, giving us 16 cross-wavelet coherence plots per dyad.  
Pilot analyses suggested that in a small minority of trials (mainly those with a single very 






jerky movement), the wavelet toolbox is unable to calculate the wavelet transform. Such 
trials were excluded from all analyses, and reported as missing data.  
 
 
Figure 5-3. Wavelet analysis pipeline for one trial.  
 
 






Next, we collapsed the cross-wavelet coherence over the time course of each trial. 
This is because we are interested in the periodicity of any interpersonal coherence, but 
not the specific time at which it occurred. We averaged the cross-wavelet coherence (R2) 
at each periodicity over the whole trial (86s). We also separately average over 
monologue and dialogue sections of the trial, excluding 100 time points (1.7s) either side 
of the transition from monologue to dialogue, when there was an audible beep that might 
have triggered unusual head movements. Thus, 26.6s of monologue and 55.8s of 
dialogue were analysed from each trial.  
The final output of the wavelet coherence analysis was a 1 x 118 vector of data 
points (one point for each wavelet periodicity from 0.03s to 31.4s) for each trial, 
representing the average wavelet coherence at each periodicity over that trial. We 
calculated these vectors for all 4 signals (head motion energy; head yaw; head pitch; 
head roll) and refer to these as the coherence values for each signal. For the following 
analyses, we converted periods to frequencies (period = 1/frequency). We also truncated 
the wavelet output to frequencies from 0 – 5 Hz, resulting in a 1 x 89 vector of coherence 
values. While our original pre-registration specified we would test all possible frequencies 
in our dataset (0-30 Hz), very high frequencies above 20 Hz could have been 
contaminated by dropped frames (affecting 2.7% of data points). In addition, frequencies 
above 5 Hz are unlikely to show meaningful interpersonal coordination (Fujiwara & 
Daibo, 2016). 
5.4.7 Interpersonal Coherence in Real vs. Pseudo Interactions 
A key test of interpersonal coordination is to compare coherence in real trials, 
where the two datasets entered come from the same interaction, with coherence in 
pseudo trials where two datasets from different interactions are entered into the algorithm 
(Bernieri & Rosenthal, 1991; Fujiwara & Daibo, 2016). Previous studies using this 
approach created pseudo trials by mixing datasets from different participants. We used 
a stricter approach where we mixed datasets from different trials within the same dyad 
and the same priming condition. Thus, our pseudo trials had the same general movement 






characteristics (e.g. overall signal power) as our real trials, and differed only in that the 
real trials represent a genuine live social interaction. To create pseudo trials, we matched 
up the Red participant’s data from one trial with their Blue partner’s data from a different 
trial. We only matched trials that involved the same priming condition and the same 
person speaking (Table 5-3). Note that for each real trial, there are 3 pseudo trial 
combinations, giving 48 pseudo trials per dyad. We carried out wavelet analysis on the 
pseudo dataset using the same pipeline as above. This gave a set of coherence values 
for each real trial of each dyad and each pseudo trial of each dyad.   





















R B  R  B R  B  R  B  
1 Prosocial 1 Red 3, 9, 11 1 1 1 3 1 9 1 11 
  2 Blue 4, 10, 12 2 2 2 4 2 10 2 12 
  3 Red 1, 9, 11 3 3 3 1 3 9 3 11 
  4 Blue 2, 10, 12 4 4 4 2 4 10 4 12 
2 Antisocial 5 Red 7, 13, 15 5 5 5 7 5 13 5 15 
  6 Blue 8, 14, 16 6 6 6 8 6 14 6 16 
  7 Red 5, 13, 15 7 7 7 5 7 13 7 15 
  8 Blue 6, 14, 16 8 8 8 6 8 14 8 16 
3 Prosocial 9 Red 1, 3, 11 9 9 9 1 9 3 9 11 
  10 Blue 2, 4, 12 10 10 10 2 10 4 10 12 
  11 Red 1, 3, 9 11 11 11 1 11 3 11 9 
  12 Blue 2, 4, 10 12 12 12 2 12 4 12 10 
4 Antisocial 13 Red 5, 7, 15 13 13 13 5 13 7 13 15 
  14 Blue 6, 8, 16 14 14 14 6 14 8 14 16 
  15 Red 5, 7, 13 15 15 15 5 15 7 15 13 
  16 Blue 6, 8, 14 16 16 16 6 16 8 16 14 
Note. The order of prosocial and antisocial priming conditions was counterbalanced across 
dyads. 
 
We carried out the following analysis three times, looking separately at monologue 
data, dialogue data and full trial data (monologue plus dialogue). Separately for the real 
dataset and the pseudo dataset, we averaged the coherence values across all trials for 
all dyads. This gave us group levels of coherence in real interactions and pseudo 
interactions. We then calculated a coherence difference for each dyad, representing the 
average coherence in real interactions minus the average coherence in pseudo 
interactions. Then we carried out t-tests on the coherence differences at each frequency 






(89 tests).  To correct for multiple comparisons, we used a false detection rate (Benjamini 
& Hochberg, 1995) in Matlab. 
5.4.8 Effect of Prosocial and Antisocial Primes 
We also carried out the following analysis separately for monologue data, dialogue 
data and full trial data: To test whether prosocial and antisocial primes lead to different 
levels of coordination, we calculated a coherence difference for each dyad, representing 
the average coherence in prosocial trials minus the average coherence in antisocial 
trials. We carried out t-tests on the coherence differences at each frequency, with p 
values corrected for multiple comparisons. 
5.5 Results 
5.5.1 Signal Power 
We carried out t-tests to determine whether there were significant differences in 
the power spectral density (PSD) estimate of each signal between prosocial and 
antisocial conditions, and between speaker and listener conditions. Speakers showed 
significantly greater power than listeners for head yaw, head roll signals and head motion 
energy signals (Figure 5-4). They showed fewer differences in the head pitch signal, 
although speakers had significantly greater power at some frequencies. There were no 
significant differences in signal power between the prosocial and antisocial conditions in 
any signal (Figure 5-5).  







Figure 5-4. Difference in PSD estimates for speaker and listener head motion. 
Red dots indicate significant differences. 
 
Figure 5-5. Difference in PSD of dyadic head motion in prosocial and antisocial 
conditions.  
 






5.5.2 Cross-wavelet Coherence of Head Movements in Real vs. Pseudo 
interactions 
Results are shown separately for each head signal in Figure 5-6 to 5-9. In each 
figure, panel A shows the coherence values for real and pseudo interactions. To assess 
the difference in cross-wavelet coherence between real and pseudo interactions, we 
performed t-tests at each frequency (89 tests). Panel B shows the results for full trials 
(including both monologue and dialogue sections). There were virtually no differences in 
results between the whole trial, the monologue section and the dialogue section, and 
therefore we only report the results for full trials. The plot in panel B shows the effect size 
(Cohen’s d) for the difference between real and pseudo interactions. Red dots indicate 
frequencies where there was a significant difference between real and pseudo levels of 
coherence, with correction for multiple comparisons. Blue dots indicate uncorrected 
significant differences. Panel C shows the average signal power for the speaker and 
listener. Panel D shows the average phase relationship between speaker and listener as 
a rose plot from -180 to 180 degrees offset, where 0 degrees offset is perfect in-phase 
coordination. 
For all four signals, there was a similar pattern of coherence across frequencies. 
Visually, this pattern could be split into two frequency ranges, above and below 1.5 Hz. 
Above 1.5 Hz, all rotation signals surprisingly showed significantly less coherence in real 
interactions compared to pseudo interactions (Figures 5-7 to 5-9). The motion energy 
signal also showed less coherence, but this was not significant after FDR correction 
(Figure 5-6). However, below 1.5 Hz all signals showed coherence close to or greater 
than chance levels during real interactions. Below 1.5 Hz, there were also some 
differences between the levels of coherence in each signal. Head pitch was significantly 
more coherent in real interactions than pseudo interactions at all frequencies from 0.07-
1.1Hz (Figure 5-8), showing the strongest coordination above chance level of all the 
signals. Head yaw showed less coherence and was only significantly more coherent than 
chance at 0.09-0.11 Hz (Figure 5-7). Head roll (Figure 5-9) and motion energy (Figure 






5-6) did not show any significant differences that met FDR correction at frequencies 
below 1.5 Hz. A visual inspection of the average phase relationship between speaker 
and listener suggests that coordination in the range below 1.5 Hz did not show any strong 
patterns of phase locking at a specific phase offset. 
 
 
Figure 5-6. Head motion energy in real vs. pseudo interactions. Panel A shows the 
cross-wavelet coherence values for real and pseudo interactions. Panel B shows the 
effect size of the difference between real and pseudo interactions. Red dots indicate 
significant t-test results with FDR correction. Blue dots indicate uncorrected significant t-
test results. Panel C shows the average signal power for the speaker and listener in real 
interactions. Panel D shows the average phase relationship between speaker and 



















Figure 5-8. Head pitch in real vs. pseudo interactions.  







Figure 5-9. Head roll in real vs. pseudo interactions.  
 
 
5.5.3 Effect of Prosocial and Antisocial Primes on Head Movements 
The coherence values for prosocial and antisocial priming conditions are shown in 
Figure 5-9. To assess the coherence difference between trials following prosocial versus 
antisocial primes, we performed t-tests at each frequency. Figure 5-10 shows results for 
full trials (including both monologue and dialogue sections). There were no significant 
differences in coherence between prosocial and antisocial conditions that would meet a 
correction for multiple comparisons. The same results were found when we separately 
analysed the monologue and dialogue sections of the interaction. 







Figure 5-10. Coherence values in prosocial and antisocial conditions with effect sizes for the difference between conditions. Blue dots 
indicate uncorrected significant differences. 






5.5.4 Additional Analysis of Torso Movements in Real vs. Pseudo 
interactions.  
In the pre-registered analyses above we focused only on head movements. A 
natural extension was to apply the same analysis pathway to torso signals from the same 
dataset. In particular, we wanted to explore whether torso movements also show 
significantly less coordination in real interactions compared to pseudo interactions. 
Therefore, we calculated the cross-wavelet coherence for four torso signals using the 
same procedure as above. The torso coherence values for real and pseudo interactions 
are shown in Figure 5-11. To assess the difference in cross-wavelet coherence between 
real and pseudo interactions, we performed t-tests at each periodicity (as we did for head 
motion). Figure 5-11 shows the results for full trials. We did not separately examine 
monologue and dialogue sections of the trial, as these showed no differences in the head 
signals. As we found for head movements, at the frequency range below 1.5 Hz 
coherence in the torso signals was close to or greater than chance. There was 
significantly greater than chance coherence in torso motion energy at 0.13 - 0.22 Hz and 
0.47 – 0.79 Hz, and in torso pitch at 0.13 – 0.16 Hz. However, at frequencies above 1.5 
Hz no signals showed significantly less coherence in real interactions compared to 
pseudo interactions. In fact, at 3.6 - 5 Hz there was greater than chance coherence in 
motion energy of the torso during real interactions, and there was also significantly 
greater than chance coherence in torso pitch and roll at 4.8 – 5 Hz.  
 







Figure 5-11. Coherence values for torso signals with effect sizes for the difference between real and pseudo interactions. Red dots indicate 
corrected significant differences. Blue dots indicate uncorrected significant differences. 







We used high-resolution motion capture to record the movements of participant 
dyads during a naturalistic conversation task with monologue and dialogue sections. In 
order to assess levels of interpersonal coordination we measured the cross-wavelet 
coherence of each dyad’s head movements in terms of four signals: overall head motion 
energy, head yaw (turning the face), head pitch (nodding) and head roll (tilting side-to-
side). We found that real interactions showed greater coherence than pseudo 
interactions, but this was only true for frequencies below 1.5 Hz and was strongest in the 
head pitch signal. Surprisingly, at higher frequencies between 1.5 and 5 Hz head 
movements showed significantly less coherence in real interactions compared to pseudo 
interactions (chance levels). No such pattern of divergence was seen for torso 
movements. In the coherence levels from the real interactions, we did not find any 
significant effects of priming using prosocial and antisocial scrambled sentences. In 
addition, all of our analyses showed practically identical patterns of coherence for both 
the monologue and dialogue parts of the conversation task. First we offer possible 
interpretations for the different patterns of coherence above and below 1.5 Hz, before 
discussing methodological implications of our data and future directions for research. 
5.6.1 Decoupling of Head Movements at High Frequencies 
It was a surprising result that all head rotation signals were significantly less 
coherent than chance levels during real social interactions. Dominant theories of 
interpersonal coordination would expect people to spontaneously coordinate (Bernieri & 
Rosenthal, 1991; Lakens et al., 2016; Marsh, Richardson, & Schmidt, 2009), but not to 
actively un-coordinate their movements. Our findings challenge these predictions by 
demonstrating that natural conversations are characterised by active decoupling of head 
movements at frequencies of around 1.5 to 5 Hz. These results do not simply suggest 
that dyads failed to coordinate their head movements in this range, but actually 
coordinated significantly less than we would expect from chance levels when data from 






within the same dyad was shuffled. Note that we observed the same pattern in our pilot 
dataset (Hale & Hamilton, 2016a). It is also worth noting that head movements in the 
frequency range of 1.5 – 5 Hz are fairly typical in conversations. Hadar et al. (1983b) 
recorded head rotations while dyads engaged in free conversations and found that 
‘ordinary’ head motion occured within a range of 1.8 – 3.7 Hz, while ‘fast’ movements 
were characterised as above 3.7 Hz. Although their study was based on a very small 
sample size (N = 4), Hadar et al.’s (1983b) account suggests that the decoupling we 
observed was within a normal to fast range for head movements in conversation. 
Therefore, given the wealth of evidence that people spontaneously coordinate other 
movements (e.g. Bernieri, Davis, Rosenthal, & Knee, 1994; Grammer et al., 1998; 
Ramseyer & Tschacher, 2010; Schmidt et al., 2012), it is surprising we should see active 
decoupling of head movements at typical frequencies for conversation. 
Although we found that the pattern of decoupling was present in all head signals, 
there was no evidence for the same effect in signals from the torso, which suggests that 
it is specific to head movements. Our findings are consistent with previous research 
showing that head and body movements play different roles in interpersonal coordination 
and show different patterns. For example, Ramseyer & Tschacher (2014) separately 
examined head and body motion energy from videotapes of psychotherapy sessions. 
They calculated synchrony in terms of the cross-correlation between patient and 
psychotherapist, and found that synchronised body motion predicted different outcomes 
of the therapy session compared to synchronised head motion. Another study by 
Shockley et al. (2003) used Polhemus motion sensors to capture the head and hip 
movements of participants engaged in a picture description task. Although they found 
that participants entrained to one another’s bodily sway during the task (assessed 
through cross-recurrence analysis), they did not find any evidence of entrainment in head 
displacement data. The authors attributed this null result to disruption in head 
movements associated with speaking and vocal gesturing. However, we think that the 






active divergence of head movements in our data could be interpreted as more than just 
disruption. 
We speculate that the active decoupling of head movements we observed in real 
conversations could be associated with signalling behaviour that accompanies speech. 
We do not think that the lack of coordination could be due to speech itself, because 
speech and laughter rhythms occur at around 5 Hz, which is at the very top end of the 
range where we observed decoupling. Also, if decoupling were due specifically to speech 
then we would not expect to see the same decoupling during monologue (when only one 
person was speaking), compared to dialogue (when both people spoke). Instead, we 
think that the decoupling could be a result of social signalling. Natural head movements 
at a similar frequency range (2-7 Hz) have been shown to play a direct role in the 
interpretation of speech (Chandrasekaran et al., 2009; Morrill et al., 2012). Munhall et al. 
(2004) gave participants a speech-in-noise task and found that they were better at 
identifying speech when the speech was accompanied by natural head motion from an 
animated character. Consistent with this data, Hadar et al. (1985) suggested that one 
person’s head movements in a conversation may be signalling their communicative 
intentions as well as synchronising with the other person. Head signals may include 
nodding for ‘yes’ and shaking for ‘no’, as well as more subtle gestures to indicate 
impatience, scepticism or interest (Duncan, 1972; Hadar et al., 1983b; Heylen, 2006; 
McClave, 2000). Hadar et al. (1985) propose that such signalling leads to patterns of 
dissimilarity in people’s head movements. This could be one way to interpret the 
divergence of head movements in our data at the 1.5 – 5 Hz range, as well as Shockley 
et al.’s (2003) similar finding that head movements did not coordinate during a picture 
description task. Therefore, we tentatively suggest that the head decoupling in our data 
could be associated with dissimilarities arising from the head signals that accompany 
conversations. However, further research would be needed to test this hypothesis 
directly.  






The decoupling of head movements in our data resonates with other research 
showing patterns of divergence in social interactions. Firstly, research by Healey et al. 
(2014) revealed that patterns of syntactic divergence also occur in conversations. Using 
data from annotated conversations of over 2100 participants, they tested for the 
repetition of words and syntactic structures between the turns taken in conversation. 
Real conversations were compared to pseudo conversations, which were created by 
randomly re-pairing turns from the same conversation. Interestingly, the results showed 
that people repeated each other’s syntactic structures significantly less in real 
conversation than chance levels would predict, although they may use the same words 
in a different syntactic structure. The authors suggested that this pattern of divergence 
could be associated with creating contrasts, evaluations and elaborations that sustain 
the momentum of the conversation. Thus, people may not always mirror one another in 
their use of language, but may actively diverge in order to signal particular speech 
meanings. Another recent study also suggests that partners may show neural decoupling 
during imitative interactions (Konvalinka et al., 2014). Participants completed a finger-
tapping task where they had to synchronise either with another real person, or a 
computer. Neural activation was measured using EEG, and a computer classifier aimed 
to distinguish real interactions from computer interactions. For eight out of nine dyads 
tested, the classifier was able to distinguish real interactions by frontal alpha 
suppression, which only occurred in one member of each pair. Alpha suppression is 
associated with planning and control, and so the authors interpret the results as evidence 
that participants spontaneously adopted distinct leader and follower roles. This is a 
noteworthy result, because previous research using dual-EEG, dual-fMRI and dual-
fNIRS techniques (known as ‘hyperscanning’) has suggested that when two people 
engage in a cooperative task together, their brains show similar patterns of activation 
(Cui, Bryant, & Reiss, 2012; Dumas, Lachat, Martinerie, Nadel, & George, 2011; 
Konvalinka & Roepstorff, 2012). In contrast, Konvalinka et al’s (2014) study suggests 
that when people aim to coordinate their actions, this may involve different patterns of 






neural activation in each person in order to achieve synchrony at the behavioural level. 
Overall, multiple areas of research are beginning to highlight ways in which behaviour 
systematically diverges during conversations. Such divergence could therefore be 
important to incorporate into theoretical models of interpersonal coordination. In 
particular, our results suggest that mimicry of head movements in conversations may be 
accompanied by active dissimilarity at movement frequencies between 1.5 and 5 Hz. 
5.6.2 Coordination of Head and Body Movements at Lower Frequencies 
As well as active decoupling of head movements, our results also showed 
significant coupling of head and body movements at frequencies below 1.5 Hz. These 
results are consistent with Fujiwara and Daibo’s (2016) earlier findings using the pseudo 
interaction paradigm. The frequency range below 1.5 Hz is roughly consistent with 
timescales traditionally associated with behavioural mimicry (e.g. Chartrand & Bargh, 
1999; Stel et al., 2009). Therefore, we interpret cross-wavelet coherence in this range 
as evidence for mimicry when looking at the head or torso rotation signals (yaw, pitch 
and roll). When looking at overall motion energy, we do not know participants’ 
movements were spatially matching, and so cross-wavelet coherence in motion energy 
is usually interpreted as synchrony (e.g. Fujiwara & Daibo, 2016; Schmidt et al., 2014). 
By looking at both motion energy and individual rotation signals, we found interesting 
differences in the way that dyads coordinated their head and body movements at the low 
frequencies below 1.5 Hz. 
Head coordination in this range was mainly characterised by cross-wavelet 
coherence in head pitch (nodding). Across the different head signals, head pitch showed 
the greatest coherence relative to chance, and this was significant for all frequencies 
between 0.07 and 1.1 Hz. In addition, head pitch was the only head signal where the 
signal power between speakers and listeners was the same. In the other signals, the 
speaker had greater signal power than the listener, and this difference in the overall 
amount of movement could have reduced the likelihood of coordination occurring. The 
fact that speakers and listeners had similar signal power in head pitch suggests that the 






coordination in this signal was not simply due to movements such as looking downwards 
at the photograph, since this would occur much more often in the speaker than the 
listener (who could not see the image). Therefore we suggest that the coordination in the 
head pitch signal reflected coordinated nodding. Head nodding is known to be an 
important communicative back-channel for listeners in conversations (Dittmann & 
Llewellyn, 1969; Hadar et al., 1985; Heylen et al., 2011). Previous research has also 
suggested that listeners are more likely to nod than make other types of head tilt (Hadar 
et al., 1983b). Our findings add to this literature by suggesting that participants are more 
likely than chance to mimic each other’s nods during a conversation. Importantly, this 
pattern did not differ between monologue and dialogue parts of the interaction, which 
suggests that nodding is not merely a back-channel used by listeners (during 
monologue) but can also be a mode of coordination between two people engaged in 
dialogue. In addition to the strong coordination in head pitch, we found that head yaw 
was significantly more coherent than chance at around 0.1 Hz (a period of 10 seconds). 
This suggests that coordination of head movements is not restricted to nodding, and that 
turns of the head may coordinate at a slow timescale. Coordination at 0.1 Hz is at the 
edge of the expected range for mimicry, and is twice as slow as the rhythm of breathing 
during conversation (McFarland, 2001). Therefore this peak in coordination is unlikely to 
be linked to speech, and may possibly reflect a different process to coordination in head 
pitch. 
In contrast to head coordination, torso coordination at frequencies below 1.5 Hz 
seemed to be characterised by synchronisation in overall motion energy more than one 
specific rotation channel. This pattern is consistent with the view that behavioural 
synchrony does not have to involve matching actions (Bernieri & Rosenthal, 1991), and 
it suggests that natural conversations may involve quite loose matching of body 
movements unlike the precise mirroring that is generated by virtual mimicry (Chapters 3 
& 4). In addition, real interactions showed greater coherence in torso pitch (forward/back 
lean) compared to pseudo interactions. From the present analyses, it is unclear whether 






this indicates that both people tended to lean forward (or back) together, or whether they 
followed a compensatory pattern where one person leans forward when the other leans 
back (Burgoon, Dillman, & Stem, 1993; Condon & Ogston, 1966). Future analyses could 
examine the interpersonal distance between participants as a possible indicator of 
coordination and feelings of interpersonal closeness (Aron et al., 1992; Ashton-James et 
al., 2007) .  
5.6.3 Methodological Implications and Future Directions 
Our data also has several methodological implications. Firstly, we found that 
priming did not have an effect on the levels of coordination in real interactions. In Chapter 
1, we suggested that subliminal priming could possibly provide a way to manipulate the 
levels of mimicry in an interaction without having to explicitly instruct anyone to mimic. 
This suggestion was based on previous results which show that prosocial and antisocial 
primes can reliably alter levels of automatic imitation in finger-tapping laboratory tasks. 
It remained to be tested whether this robust effect would translate into naturalistic 
situations where the head and body are tracked instead of finger movements. Although 
our pilot dataset suggested that there might be an effect of priming, we found null results 
in the final pre-registered analyses which are reported here. This suggests that priming 
does not have a strong effect on levels of cross-wavelet coherence between two people’s 
head or torso movements, which could mean that priming will not be an effective way to 
manipulate natural mimicry levels between two naïve participants. However, it is possible 
that we would have found effects of priming if we had looked at other types of mimicry 
(e.g. facial mimicry) or used a different measure of interpersonal coordination (e.g. 
observer ratings of mimicry in video clips). 
Secondly, our results provide insight into the natural parameters of interpersonal 
coordination which could be used to generate more socially realistic virtual characters. 
This was one of the main motivations for the present study. Our mimicry studies in 
Chapters 3 and 4 suggested that being precisely mirrored by a virtual character at a fixed 
time delay cannot generate strong effects on rapport or trust. The findings from the 






present study could be applied to generate a mimicry algorithm that is closer to the way 
people naturally mimic each other in conversations. Specifically, our results suggested 
that mimicry of head movements is naturally restricted to motion frequencies below 1.5 
Hz. Whereas our virtual characters previously mimicked the participant’s head 
movements exactly at all motion frequencies, virtual mimicry might be improved in future 
studies by creating an algorithm that only mimics head movements with frequencies 
below 1.5 Hz. This could be achieved by blending the relevant frequencies from the 
participant’s motion into a pre-recorded animation that is standard across all participants. 
By using a pre-recorded animation, this would also create a lack of contingency between 
their head movements at frequencies above 1.5 Hz, where we observed decoupling in 
real interactions. Importantly for virtual mimicry paradigms, we found that there were 
virtually no differences in the pattern of interpersonal coordination between monologue 
and dialogue interactions. This suggests that we can study mimicry in artificial 
conversations where a participant and a virtual character take turns to speak in 
monologue without the need to generate realistic dialogue from the virtual character, 
which is currently very difficult.  
Finally, there are many ways that the current dataset or similar data could be 
explored further. Here, it was not possible to explore all possible analyses and we 
decided to focus on cross-wavelet coherence of head movements. It would be valuable 
to examine the phase relationship between participants in more detail (Fujiwara & Daibo, 
2016; Issartel et al., 2006; Schmidt et al., 2014). In this study, we did not carry out any 
tests on the phase relationship, although we visually inspected the phase data for head 
motion above and below 1.5 Hz (Figures 5-6 to 5-9). Visual inspection did not suggest 
any consistent leader-follower dynamics existed between speaker and listener. 
However, more in-depth testing could reveal whether phase-locking is greater than 
chance at certain phase offsets or certain time-points in the interaction. It would also be 
possible to test whether levels of coherence change over the time course of a trial or the 






whole experiment, consistent with earlier microanalysis studies (Condon & Ogston, 
1966; Kendon, 1970).  
Another avenue would be to examine the relationship between cross-wavelet 
coherence and ratings of rapport or trust made by the people interacting (Ramseyer & 
Tschacher, 2011; Ramseyer & Tschacher, 2014). In the study reported here we did not 
analyse the relationship between cross-wavelet coherence and rapport, trust or other 
social outcomes traditionally linked to mimicry (which were tested in Chapters 3 and 4). 
We would predict that cross-wavelet coherence might be positively associated with 
feelings of rapport and trust, and that coordinated behaviour might lead to increased 
rapport and trust in a pre-post experiment comparison, although this is a tentative 
prediction given the mixed evidence that being mimicked by a confederate or virtual 
character can generate rapport and trust (Chapters 1, 3 and 4). At present, it is also 
unclear to what extent cross-wavelet coherence can be linked to more traditional 
measures of social coordination, and so this could help to build up a better understanding 
of how to interpret cross-wavelet coherence values. 
Lastly, we also collected audio data that were not analysed in the present study, 
which could potentially provide insight into the links between movement coordination and 
speech content. For example, it could be possible to test whether decoupling in head 
movements is related to particular prosodic, syntactic or lexical features of speech. 
Overall, current motion technologies and automatic analysis techniques mean that there 
could be great value in collecting rich datasets such as those reported here, because 
they provide many opportunities for investigating interpersonal coordination at a variety 
of levels. With many new analysis options being explored in current literature, it will be 
valuable for researchers to share their datasets and use pre-registration platforms to 
clearly document analyses which are exploratory versus confirmatory.  







Our results from wavelet analysis of head movements provide new insights into 
the frequency characteristics of interpersonal coordination. We showed that people’s 
head movements in natural conversations involve reliable patterns of dissociation at 
frequencies between 1.5 and 5 Hz as well as coordination at frequencies below that 
range. This pattern of decoupling was specific to head movements, and we speculate 
that it could reflect head signals that accompany speech. We also found that coordination 
in head movements in conversations are largely characterised by mimicry of nods, 
whereas coordination in body movement might reflect synchronised posture shifts. The 
present study builds on a growing literature exploring interpersonal coordination through 
automatic motion capture and spectrum analysis. Future research could use the insights 
generated from this approach in order to improve the social realism of virtual characters 
for future tests of interpersonal coordination. 
  






Chapter 6. Discussion 
6.1 Summary of Experimental Chapters 
The studies reported in this thesis used novel methods to examine the role of 
mimicry in rapport and trust. As well as developing new methods, this thesis aimed to 
rigorously test the claim that being mimicked leads to rapport and trust towards the 
mimicker. The results from our studies do not support a strong version of this claim, and 
suggest that mimicry of head and body movements alone has small effects on positive 
social outcomes including trust and rapport. 
In Chapter 2, we developed a new behavioural task for measuring implicit trust 
towards a specific person. Existing questionnaire measures and economic games have 
limitations for measuring trust towards a specific stranger in an experimental setting. The 
virtual maze task measures implicit trust behaviour towards a target person in terms of 
approaching them for advice and choosing to follow their advice. Across two experiments 
in VR we showed that the virtual maze task was sensitive to differences between 
trustworthy and untrustworthy characters, and yielded larger effects than an economic 
investment game. The task was also sensitive to specific trust towards each character, 
whereas the investment game partly reflected individual differences in trusting people 
more generally. In a third experiment, we demonstrated how the task could be adapted 
for traditional desktop displays, although this format yielded smaller effects.  
Chapters 3 and 4 investigated the social effects of being mimicked using a novel 
virtual mimicry paradigm. Participants took turns to describe photographs with a virtual 
character that either mirrored their head and body motion with a set delay, or did not 
mimic. This paradigm provides a very strict test of the effects of being mimicked, while 
keeping all other social behaviours constant. In Chapter 3, we reported a relatively 
exploratory study which tested the effect of being mimicked on a range of social 
outcomes including rapport, trust, similarity, smoothness of the interaction, and self-other 
overlap. We also manipulated the time delay in mimicry. Participants rated significantly 






greater rapport towards a virtual character who mimicked them, compared to a virtual 
character who made pre-recorded movements. However, this effect was not modulated 
by the timing of mimicry and we found no other significant effects of being mimicked. 
In Chapter 4, we aimed to see if the significant effect of virtual mimicry on rapport 
could be replicated using a more rigorous pre-registered design. In this study, we also 
compared the effects of virtual mimicry across in-group and out-group interactions. We 
did not find any significant effects of being mimicked on ratings of rapport or trust, or 
implicit behaviour in the virtual maze task. There were also no significant interactions 
between mimicry and group membership. Overall, our results across the two virtual 
mimicry studies suggest that strict mimicry of head and body movements alone does not 
have strong effects on rapport and trust. This could be because virtual mimicry is 
currently unable to replicate the spontaneous patterns of mimicry that may occur in 
natural social interactions.  
Chapter 5 moved away from a strict emphasis on mimicry in order to investigate 
the natural parameters of interpersonal coordination more broadly. We used high-
resolution motion capture to record the head and body movements of dyads while they 
took turns to describe photos to each other. Following a pre-registered analysis pathway, 
we used wavelet analysis to examine levels of interpersonal coordination in different 
head and body signals across a spectrum of motion frequencies. Participants showed 
coordination in head nodding and body motion energy at frequencies traditionally 
associated with mimicry. However, at motion frequencies above 1.5 Hz, participants 
coordinated their head movements significantly less than expected from chance levels. 
This suggests that natural conversations may involve systematic decoupling of head 
movements alongside spontaneous mimicry.   
In this chapter, I will first discuss the implications of our results for current theories 
of mimicry. In the following sections, I will go on to suggest possible neurocognitive 
models of being mimicked and discuss methodological directions for neuroimaging and 
virtual reality which could advance future mimicry research.  






6.2 Theoretical Implications and Emerging Questions 
In Chapter 1, I introduced three main groups of theories about of the social purpose 
of mimicry. The first set of theories suggested that mimicry is an innate behaviour that 
has evolved because it is socially adaptive (Meltzoff, 2007a; Meltzoff & Moore, 1997; 
Pentland, 2010). These theories have received limited empirical support, and are directly 
challenged by evidence that mimicry behaviour is malleable across different social 
contexts (Lakin et al., 2003; Wang & Hamilton, 2012) and in response to sensorimotor 
training. Therefore, we did not aim to test the view that mimicry is innately adaptive. The 
second set of theories proposes that mimicry is a strategic communication tool. The 
social glue theory (Dijksterhuis, 2005; Lakin et al., 2003), which dominates the mimicry 
literature, assumes that mimicry originally evolved to facilitate communication but now 
serves the adaptive function of creating affiliation and rapport through harmonious 
interactions. According to the social glue theory, people can use mimicry strategically. A 
neurocognitive account of the strategic control of mimicry is provided by the STORM 
model (Wang & Hamilton, 2012). However, a third theoretical view opposes the claim 
that mimicry has a strategic social function. Proponents of this view suggest that mimicry 
is an evolutionary by-product of domain-general visuomotor associations between 
perceived and performed actions (Heyes, 2001, 2010; Ray & Heyes, 2011). Therefore, 
according to the associative sequence learning (ASL) theory, mimicry itself has no 
special social purpose.  
 In this thesis, we aimed to test the social glue theory of mimicry by examining 
whether being mimicked leads to feelings of rapport and trust towards the mimicker. If 
being mimicked has positive social consequences, this would suggest that mimicry is an 
effective social strategy and provide evidence for the social glue theory. However, if 
mimicry itself cannot generate any positive social effects, this would undermine its utility 
as a social strategy, consistent with the view that mimicry has no special social purpose. 
 Across two tightly controlled studies, our results favour the null hypothesis that 
being mimicked does not lead to positive feelings towards the mimicker. In our first virtual 






mimicry experiment (Chapter 3), we explored a range of positive responses to mimicry 
that have been reported in the literature, and only found one significant effect of being 
mimicked on ratings of rapport towards the mimicker. This effect was small, and we were 
unable to replicate it in our second virtual mimicry study (Chapter 4). Across both studies, 
Bayesian analyses showed that our data favoured the null hypothesis for almost all 
effects. Together, the null results from these strictly controlled VR studies suggest that 
mimicry of head and torso movements alone cannot generate positive feelings of trust 
and rapport towards the mimicker. This leads us to doubt a strong version of the social 
glue theory, in which all kinds of mimicry (including mimicry of postures, mannerisms, 
facial expressions and other behaviours) are all assumed to create positive social 
consequences. Instead, our results appear to be consistent with predictions from the 
ASL theory, insofar as our Bayesian results provide some modest evidence that mimicry 
may not generate social benefits. However, it is important to note we did not directly 
compare the social glue and ASL theories, and our data in Chapters 3 and 4 do not 
provide direct evidence about the ASL theory.  
 It is also important to acknowledge potential limitations of our virtual mimicry 
studies for drawing wider conclusions about the effects of being mimicked. Firstly, we 
used the motion from one pilot participant to animate our non-mimicking characters, 
rather than ‘yoking’ to the previous participant’s motion (Bailenson & Yee, 2005). This 
ensured that our non-mimicry condition was exactly the same for all participants and 
avoided any unusual movements or problems with motion capture being carried across 
participants. However, this has the limitation that our results might reflect specific aspects 
of the recorded motion, although we subjectively judged the selected motion capture to 
be typical of our pilot participants. Secondly, our studies and previous virtual mimicry 
experiments (Bailenson & Yee, 2005; Hasler et al., 2014; Verberne et al., 2013) involved 
the minimum possible number of virtual characters (one character per within-participants 
condition). This has advantages for maximising the exposure time that participants spend 
interacting with each character and matching different characters on appearance and 






voice characteristics, whilst minimising the possibility participants might conflate different 
characters. However, this approach limits the generalisability of the results, and thus 
future virtual mimicry studies could be improved by increasing the number of character 
stimuli. Thirdly, our virtual mimicry studies and traditional experiments in the field have 
tested mimicry versus non-mimicry, with various operationalisations of non-mimicry as a 
control condition (Chapter 1). This allows us to infer whether mimicry significantly differs 
from non-mimicry, but not how these two conditions differ from not interacting at all. For 
example, it has been suggested that non-mimicry might have detrimental social effects 
(van Baaren, Decety, et al., 2009) rather than representing a baseline. Instead, a non-
interaction condition might provide a neutral baseline against which we could test the 
relative effects of mimicry and non-mimicry.  
Despite our null results in Chapters 3 and 4, the dyadic data reported in Chapter 5 
show that people spontaneously coordinate their head and body movements significantly 
more than we would expect by chance. This suggests that mimicry does matter in some 
way to social interactions, which seems to contradict our earlier findings. Whereas our 
virtual mimicry studies suggest that mimicry of head and body motion doesn’t always 
work as a social strategy, our dyadic datasets suggest that coordination does 
spontaneously occur between dyads as a function of true social interaction. This tension 
between our findings makes it difficult to give a definitive answer as to whether mimicry 
has strategic social benefits. If being mimicked does not reliably lead to feelings of 
rapport and trust, then this raises the question: why do people mimic others and 
modulate how much they mimic depending on the social context?  
There could be several possible answers to this emerging question. Firstly, it could 
be that mimicry does increase rapport, trust and other positive evaluations of the 
mimicker under the right conditions. As we have highlighted earlier, it is possible that our 
virtual mimicry was too artificial to replicate the effects of human mimicry. Our virtual 
mimicry involved mirror-matching of head and body motion, with head motion being most 
salient because the body of the virtual mimickers was mostly obscured from view. This 






type of mimicry might deviate too far from how people mimic one another in real life. Our 
results from Chapter 5 indicate that head mimicry may be restricted to certain 
frequencies and that real interactions also involve active decoupling of head movements 
at high frequencies. The positive effects of mimicry may depend on conforming to these 
movement parameters and avoiding mimicry when dissimilarity is more appropriate. In 
other words, our virtual mimickers may have mimicked the wrong head parameters for 
achieving positive effects. 
The positive effects of mimicry might also depend on copying other actions besides 
head position or overall posture. In most traditional studies of mimicry, a confederate 
mimicker copies the actions, gestures and mannerisms of the participant. In particular, 
face-touching and foot-tapping are highlighted as commonly mimicked actions 
(Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Stel, van Baaren, et al., 2010; van Baaren et al., 2003). 
Therefore, it is possible we would have found positive effects of virtual mimicry if our 
virtual characters also matched the type of arm or leg movements made by participants. 
In one existing virtual reality study, this approach had a significant effect on empathy 
towards the mimicker (Hasler et al., 2014). Therefore, it is possible that we needed to 
implement different mimicry conditions in order to generate positive social effects of 
being mimicked. Under this explanation, the social glue theory would need to be 
elaborated to specify the conditions under which mimicry can lead to positive effects.  
Secondly, it could be that mimicry is still a worthwhile social strategy even if it leads 
to small effects. In our virtual mimicry studies, we strictly tested mimicry of head and 
torso movements in isolation. Previous research using confederates has also aimed to 
manipulate behavioural mimicry while keeping other social signals constant (e.g. 
Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Redeker, Stel, & Mastop, 2011; van Baaren, Holland, 
Kawakami, & van Knippenberg, 2004). However, we know that mimicry in real life may 
be accompanied by many other forms of coordinated behaviour and social cues such as 
smiling and making eye contact (Bernieri & Rosenthal, 1991; Pentland, 2010; Wallbott, 
1995; Wang, Newport, et al., 2011). It is possible that all of these social cues have an 






additive effect and increase the likelihood of affiliation and rapport. Therefore, even if 
mimicry itself has small and inconsistent effects, it could still be strategically beneficial to 
mimic others. This could be especially true considering evidence that mimicry is an 
unconscious and automatic tendency, rather than a wilful exertion (Brass et al., 2009; 
Chartrand & Lakin, 2013).  
Both of the accounts given so far are consistent with the social glue claim that 
mimicry can be used as a social strategy, albeit with some caveats. However, a third 
explanation could be that mimicry is a strategy for understanding and learning from other 
people’s minds, rather than a strategy for increasing rapport. Instead of interpreting the 
top-down control of mimicry in terms of enhancing mimicry towards people with whom 
we want to affiliate, we could see it in terms of reducing mimicry inhibition. Some theorists 
have suggested that mimicry is ‘default’ social behaviour (van Baaren, Decety, et al., 
2009), and this is consistent with evidence from automatic imitation paradigms showing 
that we automatically imitate others and have to inhibit this tendency when it conflicts 
with our goals (e.g. responding to a cue on a computer screen) (Brass, Derrfuss, & von 
Cramon, 2005; Brass et al., 2009; Spengler et al., 2010). In line with this evidence, some 
theorists suggest that mimicry may be useful as a ‘fast and dirty’ default strategy for 
social learning from others (Whiten, Horner, & Marshall-Pescini, 2005; Whiten et al., 
2009). Others have suggested that imitation and other forms of bodily alignment may be 
useful for understanding other people. Garrod and Pickering (Garrod & Pickering, 2004; 
Pickering & Garrod, 2013) suggest that bodily alignment contributes to mutual 
understanding when communicating, while simulation theorists (e.g. Gallese & Goldman, 
1998; Oberman & Ramachandran, 2007; Ravenscroft, 1998) have argued that imitating 
someone makes it possible to simulate their mental state and have a theory of mind 
(although this is highly contentious; Davies & Stone, 2001; Saxe, 2009; Spaulding, 2012; 
Stich & Nichols, 1992).  
According to these views, mimicry is strategic for social understanding: it benefits 
the mimicker to imitate others in order to communicate and understand their mental state, 






but it is not important whether this makes them like the mimicker or not. We could 
speculate that it may particularly benefit the mimicker learn from and understand the 
mental states of other ingroup members or socially desirable people. Therefore, in these 
contexts there may be little need to inhibit mimicry, whereas people might be more 
inclined to inhibit mimicry and focus on our own goals when interacting with outgroup 
members or people of lower status. Thus, one explanation for the top-down control of 
mimicry could be that it is a strategy for social understanding rather than social bonding.  
To summarise, the chapters in this thesis give a somewhat contradictory view of 
mimicry. If being mimicked does not increase rapport or trust (Chapters 3 and 4) then 
why do people spontaneously coordinate their movements (Chapter 5) and appear to 
modulate mimicry levels strategically (Lakin & Chartrand, 2003; Wang & Hamilton, 
2012)? We cannot give a definitive answer to this emerging question based on the data 
in this thesis. Our results are most resonant with the view that mimicry may only have 
positive social effects under certain social conditions. In particular, it may be important 
to mimic head movements within an appropriate frequency range (below 1.5 Hz, Chapter 
5) or to mimic other actions as well. If this account is true, then the social glue theory of 
mimicry could be elaborated to specify the conditions needed for being mimicked to have 
positive effects. However, we cannot rule out other possible explanations. It could be 
mimicking other people has very small positive effects which may add to other social 
cues that increase rapport and trust. This would imply that social glue effects exist but 
may be weak. Alternatively, mimicry may be a strategy for social understanding rather 
than social bonding, and could benefit the mimicker by increasing their ability to 
understand communicative signals and mental states.  
To distinguish between these and other possible answers, we would benefit from 
a better understanding of the cognitive processes going on in the mimickee. For 
example, is the unconscious perception of mimicry tuned to particular frequencies or 
types of behaviour? Is being mimicked a rewarding signal to the mimickee? It may be 
difficult to answer these kind of questions on the basis of behavioural data alone. 






Therefore, in the next section I turn to neural evidence about cognitive processes 
associated with being mimicked.  
6.3 Neurocognitive Models of Being Mimicked  
A major direction for future theories of mimicry will be to build more detailed models 
of cognitive systems involved in being mimicked. At present, we have little insight into 
the unconscious perception of being mimicked and how this affects the mimickee at a 
cognitive level. These processes may be subtle and hard to probe with behavioural 
methods, especially when the mimickee is unaware that they are being mimicked. In this 
context, neuroimaging data could be invaluable for building cognitive models of being 
mimicked. For example, we already have detailed neural evidence about the production 
of mimicry, which engages inferior parietal cortex and premotor cortex (Grèzes & Decety, 
2001; Iacoboni et al., 1999; Molenberghs, Cunnington, & Mattingley, 2009), commonly 
referred to as the mirror neuron system (MNS). There are also several detailed 
neurocognitive models describing how the implementation of mimicry by mirror regions 
may be subject to top-down social control by medial prefrontal and tempero-parietal 
regions linked to mentalising (Brass et al., 2009; Cross et al., 2013; Spengler et al., 2010; 
Stel et al., 2016; Wang & Hamilton, 2012).  
Therefore, to address the emerging questions from the previous section, a next 
step will be to examine current neuroimaging data about being mimicked. As we did not 
carry out any neuroimaging studies in this thesis, I will draw from the small body of 
existing research in this area. Firstly I will review neuroimaging studies in which 
participants were mimicked, imitated or acted in synchrony in order to identify potential 
neural correlates of being mimicked. I will then draw from existing theoretical ideas to 
develop three possible neurocognitive models of being mimicked. Each model outlines 
a possible pathway from mimicry perception to reward activation, and I will discuss their 
implications for the speculative accounts of mimicry which were outlined in the previous 
section. 






6.3.1 Neural Correlates of Being Mimicked 
Owing to the difficulty of studying spontaneous behavioural mimicry under 
controlled conditions, there is little data on the neural correlates of being mimicked 
(Guionnet et al., 2012). Only one study has measured a mimickee’s neural response to 
mimicry of their postures and body movements (Hogeveen et al., 2014). However, 
several other research groups have measured neural activation in response to closely 
related experiences, including being overtly imitated by a live experimenter or a video 
stimulus (Brass et al., 2009; Decety, Chaminade, Grèzes, & Meltzoff, 2002; Guionnet et 
al., 2012), passively observing a mimicry interaction from the perspective of the 
mimickee (Kühn et al., 2010), and interactional synchrony driven by another person 
(Cacioppo et al., 2014; Kokal et al., 2011). Here I review available data from these 
different paradigms in order to identify possible neural systems which may be involved 
in responding to mimicry. The data (summarised in Table 3) highlights three systems 
involved in responding to mimicry: (1) a perception-action matching system which 
recognises when we are being mimicked, (2) a self-other system which relates actions 
made by self and other, and (3) a reward system associated with positive affect and 
prosocial behaviour (Figure 6-1). Based on these candidate systems, I will go on to 
outline three possible neurocognitive models of being mimicked. 
 







Figure 6-1. Brain regions associated with being mimicked. Unconscious 
recognition of a perception-action match during mimicry may be associated with MNS 
activity. Being mimicked increases self-other processing, which may be linked to 
activity in TPJ and right inferior parietal cortex. Being mimicked is also associated with 
increased functional connectivity between vmPFC and striatum/insula. Increased 
activity in striatum and insula may reflect reward and positive responses to being 
mimicked. The Self-Other Overlap, Contingency and Similarity models predict different 
cognitive pathways connecting these brain regions. 
 
Perception-action matching. There is extensive evidence that the production of 
mimicry relies on the mirror system regions of inferior parietal and inferior frontal cortex 
(Iacoboni et al., 1999; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). These are robustly activated when 
people produce actions, observe actions and imitate actions (Caspers, Zilles, Laird, & 
Eickhoff, 2010; Molenberghs et al., 2009). These same regions are also likely to have a 
role in detecting when someone else is mimicking, because they have the capacity to 
match observed to performed actions. One study tested this using EEG recordings of 
the mu-rhythm, a possible marker of MNS function. Hogeveen et al. (2014) took EEG 
recordings before and after participants completed a rating task. The task involved one 
of three conditions: social interaction with a mimicking confederate, social interaction 






with an anti-mimicking confederate (where the confederate changed their behaviour if 
the participant initiated any mimicry), or interaction with a computer. During EEG 
recording, participants observed video actions. Their mu-rhythm suppression, which is 
thought to reflect activation of the sensorimotor cortex, was measured as an indirect 
index of MNS activity. The results showed enhanced mu-suppression from pre- to post-
test in the mimicry condition. The same increase was not found in the anti-mimicry 
condition, and the increase was significant relative to the computer condition. These 
findings suggest that being mimicked during naturalistic social interaction leads to an 
increase in MNS activity which can be detected during subsequent action observation. 
Two neuroimaging studies provide evidence that being imitated leads to activation 
in the left inferior parietal cortex, a classic region of the MNS (Molenberghs et al., 2009; 
Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). Decety et al. (2002) used PET to measure participants’ 
brain activity in response to deliberately imitating or being imitated by an experimenter. 
The experimenter and participant each had a set of three small objects to manipulate 
with their right hand and they could see each other’s hands via live video links. In this 
paradigm, participants knew in advance whether they were about to be imitated or not in 
each block of the experiment. There was an increase in activity in the left inferior parietal 
cortex when participants were imitated by the experimenter as well as when they did the 
imitating. Similar activity was found in recent fMRI study of participants who experienced 
another person not in their view (actually a computer algorithm) synchronising with them 
on a computer screen while the participant simply tapped a button (Cacioppo et al., 
2014). Compared to experiencing asynchrony, while participants experienced synchrony 
they showed greater activity in the left inferior parietal cortex. Therefore, converging 
evidence from mimicry, imitation and synchrony paradigms suggests the MNS is involved 
in the unconscious recognition of mimicry through perception-action matching.  
Relation between self and other actions. Being mimicked also appears to 
activate several regions associated with self-other processing. Decety et al. (2002) found 
that being imitated was associated with stronger activation in the right inferior parietal 






cortex, compared to imitating someone. This region is thought to have a role in self-other 
discrimination and sensing agency (Decety & Sommerville, 2003; Farrer & Frith, 2002; 
Ruby & Decety, 2001; Uddin, Molnar-Szakacs, Zaidel, & Iacoboni, 2006). Consistent with 
this finding, Brass et al. (2009) found significant activation in the TPJ in response to being 
imitated. In their fMRI study, participants made index or middle finger movements that 
were congruent or incongruent with a stimulus movement, and either saw the stimulus 
movement before or after they responded. Similar levels of TPJ activity were observed 
when the participant was imitated and when they experienced an incongruent stimulus. 
This pattern of results is consistent with the interpretation that TPJ responds when 
observed movements are delayed or dissimilar performed movements, suggesting this 
region is involved in distinguishing between self and other actions or perspectives (Brass 
et al., 2009; Decety & Sommerville, 2003; Ruby & Decety, 2001; Spengler et al., 2010). 
However, other results suggest that being mimicked is associated with increased 
self-other overlap in frontal regions. Kuhn et al. (2010) set out to investigate the neural 
correlates of positive responses to mimicry. Specifically, participants in an fMRI scanner 
passively observed videos of social interactions where they took the first-person 
perspective of an actor being mimicked or anti-mimicked. Compared to anti-mimicry, 
mimicry led to increased activity in the mOFC/vmPFC, which correlated with ratings of 
interpersonal closeness. Therefore, being mimicked may be associated with processes 
of self-other overlap in mOFC/vmPFC in addition to processes of self-other distinction in 
TPJ and inferior parietal cortex. 
Positive responses to mimicry. Neuroimaging data also highlight a system of 
reward activation in response to being mimicked. In the study described above, Kuhn et 
al. (2010) also demonstrated activation in brain areas associated with emotion and 
reward processing. The mimicry condition was associated with increased functional 
connectivity between vmPFC and the striatum and mid-posterior insula, regions which 
are related to positive affective states and emotional salience (Craig, 2005; Kühn et al., 
2010; Uddin, 2015). In a different paradigm, Guionnet et al. (2012) used live video links 






to study neural activity while being imitated in an fMRI scanner. Participants either moved 
their hands and were imitated by an experimenter, or imitated the experimenter’s hand 
movements. Consistent with the functional connectivity reported by Kuhn et al. (2010), 
there was greater activation in the left anterior insula when participants were imitated. 
These findings indicate that a reward network involving the striatum and insula may be 
activated in connection to vmPFC in response to being mimicked. 
Further evidence for the same reward system comes from an fMRI study of 
synchronous behaviour. Kokal et al. (2011) examined activity in the caudate during a 
drumming task in which participants experienced a partner drumming in synchrony or 
asynchrony with them. They found that that ease of drumming was associated with 
activation in the caudate, a region also active in processing monetary reward. 
Importantly, caudate activation while drumming in synchrony predicted prosocial 
behaviour towards the drumming partner at the end of the experiment. These findings 
provide evidence for a neural link from synchrony-related reward processing to 
downstream prosocial behaviour, which has previously been found to follow 
synchronised behaviour and mimicry (Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2011; van Baaren et al., 
2004; Wiltermuth & Heath, 2009). 
6.3.2 Neurocognitive Models 
From initial neuroimaging results, it seems that being mimicked may activate three 
neural systems, one which detects mimicry (MNS), one which relates self and other 
actions (TPJ and vmPFC), and one which reflects the positive consequences of mimicry 
(striatum and insula). However, the small number of data points here makes it hard to 
develop a cognitive model of how these systems might operate together when someone 
is being mimicked. To advance the field, we can also draw on our extensive knowledge 
of brain systems engaged in relevant cognitive processes, in particular perception-action 
matching, social reward processing and perspective-taking. Numerous studies have 
shown that imitating other people’s actions and observing action engages the MNS 
(Caspers et al., 2010; Molenberghs et al., 2009, 2009). There is also a large body of 






literature showing that socially rewarding activities engage the insula, ventral striatum 
and OFC (e.g. Aharon et al., 2001; Bhanji & Delgado, 2014; Fliessbach et al., 2007; 
Izuma, Saito, & Sadato, 2008; O’Doherty et al., 2003; Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, 
& Cohen, 2003). In addition, several lines of evidence suggest that perspective-taking 
and other forms of self-other processing engage mPFC and TPJ (Brass et al., 2005; 
David et al., 2006; Denny, Kober, Wager, & Ochsner, 2012; Heatherton et al., 2006; 
Ruby & Decety, 2001). Drawing on this knowledge in conjunction with the specific studies 
of being mimicked and synchronising (reviewed above), we can then begin to develop 
cognitive models which link together these systems and behavioural evidence from 
mimickees. Next I outline three possible models which build on existing theoretical ideas 
in the literature and develop them in relation to the available neural evidence. I will 
evaluate each model in terms of how well it can account for existing behavioural evidence 
about how people respond to being mimicked, including new insights from the 
experimental chapters of this thesis.  
Self-Other Overlap model. One possible model linking neural and behavioural 
responses to being mimicked could depend upon self-other processing. During mimicry, 
the boundary between self and other is thought to become blurred (Georgieff & 
Jeannerod, 1998). Ashton-James et al. (2007) have proposed that an increase in self-
other overlap mediates the prosocial consequences of being mimicked. The Self-Other 
Overlap model builds on this cognitive pathway by speculating that when perception-
action matching occurs in the MNS, regions involved in self-other processing are 
activated. In turn, frontal regions associated with interpersonal closeness may activate a 
reward system involving the insula and caudate, which may lead to an increase in 
prosocial behaviour (Kokal et al., 2011). Other positive responses to mimicry may also 
result from this cognitive pathway, although only prosocial behaviour has been previously 
tested (Ashton-James et al., 2007) 
Importantly, the Self-Other Overlap model assumes that being mimicked leads to 
a general tendency to see oneself as closer to others (Ashton-James et al., 2007), 






despite neural activation in TPJ and inferior parietal cortex associated with self-other 
distinction (Brass et al., 2009; J. Decety et al., 2002). Several lines of research suggest 
that the ability to distinguish self- and other-perspectives is essential for taking another’s 
perspective (Galinsky, Ku, & Wang, 2005; Lamm, Batson, & Decety, 2007), which may 
be an important process in empathy (Bird & Viding, 2014; Jean Decety & Jackson, 2006) 
and prosocial cooperation (Galinsky et al., 2005; Maddux et al., 2008). Therefore, this 
model assumes that mimicry ultimately leads people to see others as more ‘like me’ 
(Meltzoff, 2007a, 2007b) and behave more prosocially as a result of this self-other 
overlap. 
The Self-Other Overlap model can account for many of the positive responses to 
mimicry reviewed in the Chapter 1. In particular, several research groups demonstrated 
that being mimicked makes people behave prosocially towards others in general, and 
not just the person mimicking (Ashton-James et al., 2007; Carpenter et al., 2013; 
Fischer-Lokou et al., 2011; Stel & Harinck, 2011; van Baaren et al., 2004). In fact, no 
studies have reported social effects of being mimicked which failed to extend to other 
people beyond the mimicker. Furthermore, being mimicked induces cognitive changes 
in feelings of interdependence (Redeker et al., 2011; Stel & Harinck, 2011;  Stel et al., 
2011), social distance (Ashton-James et al., 2007) and convergent thinking (Ashton-
James & Chartrand, 2009). These findings are consistent with the suggestion that being 
mimicked primarily increases self-other overlap, and other consequences are secondary. 
If people tend to rate mimickers as more likeable, trustworthy or persuasive due to a 
general prosocial effect rather than a change in their perceptions of the mimicker, this 
could also explain why mimicry appears to have less robust effects on these ratings 
compared to prosocial behaviour.  
However, Hogeveen et al. (2014) found mimicry did not lead to increased self-other 
overlap using the IOS scale, which is inconsistent with the model’s predictions. We also 
failed to find any significant effects of virtual mimicry on a similar scale (Chapter 3), 
suggesting that self-other overlap may be a less robust outcome of mimicry than 






previously assumed. The Sefl-Other Overlap model also does not explain why the 
positive effects of mimicry are modulated by mimicker characteristics. If being mimicked 
primarily increases self-other overlap, it is unclear why participants do not respond 
positively to mimicry from an outgroup member (Chapter 4; Dalton, Chartrand, & Finkel, 
2010; Leander, Chartrand, & Bargh, 2012), higher status person (Dalton et al., 2010) or 
task-focused individual (Leander et al., 2012). Arguably, increased self-other overlap 
should have especially notable effects in these interactions, because the initial level of 
overlap may be lowered.  
Contingency model. Whereas the first model proposed that perception-action 
matching is linked to reward via self-other processing, the Contingency model assumes 
that detecting contingency between our own actions and the world is intrinsically 
rewarding and motivating. Under this model, complementary and imitative actions would 
all be processed in the same way and be equally rewarding. From infancy, the ability to 
detect contingent caregiver behaviour is found to increase positive affect, self-efficacy 
and social motivation towards the caregiver (Dunham et al., 1989; Millar, 1988; Watson 
& Ramey, 1972). The Contingency model therefore proposes that being mimicked leads 
to positive responses due to the contingency of the mimicker’s actions on the mimickee’s. 
This view is supported by a recent study showing that people responded positively to 
contingent movements regardless of how similar the movements were to their own 
(Catmur & Heyes, 2013), suggesting that positive responses to mimicry may be 
attributed to contingency and not behaviour-matching. The MNS may be responsible for 
detecting this contingency. Several studies provide evidence that mirror associations in 
the MNS are learned through contingent experience, by demonstrating the MNS can 
form similar associations between dissimilar actions through repeated contingent 
experiences (Catmur et al., 2008, 2007; Heyes, 2001). Therefore, when the MNS is 
active in responding to mimicry it may actually reflect the detection of contingency.  
The contingency model would predict that positive affective and social 
consequences of detecting contingency can be attributed to activation of the neural 






reward system. However, this system may be tuned to an expected level of contingency. 
Infant studies show that contingent behaviour from a stranger only elicits positive 
responses when the degree of contingency is similar to their caregiver’s behaviour 
(Bigelow, 1998, 2001). Research in robotics also highlights the importance of 
‘appropriate’ contingency levels in creating realistic social entities (Yamaoka et al., 2006, 
2007). Therefore, the Contingency model would also predict that reward is not a fixed 
response to being mimicked.  
In support of the Contingency model, being in synchrony has similar positive effects 
to being mimicked. In particular, synchronised movement leads to increased liking (Hove 
& Risen, 2009; Miles et al., 2009) and prosocial behaviour (Reddish et al., 2013; 
Piercarlo Valdesolo et al., 2010; Wiltermuth & Heath, 2009). Synchrony and mimicry also 
appear to activate similar reward regions in the brain (Cacioppo et al., 2014; Kokal et al., 
2011). Since synchronised movements are characterised by contingency rather than 
similarity (Catmur & Heyes, 2013), this suggests that contingency may explain these 
effects of mimicry. The Contingency model is also consistent with the breakdown of 
positive responses to mimicry in contexts and individuals where a lower level of mimicry 
is typical (Dalton et al., 2010; Leander et al., 2012).  
However, the Contingency model would predict that decreasing the time lag in 
mimicking should elicit stronger responses by making the contingent nature of the 
mimicker’s actions more salient. Although we and others have shown that shorter time 
delays make it easier to consciously detect that the mimicker is acting contingently 
(Chapter 3; Bailenson, Beall, Loomis, Blascovich, & Turk, 2004), we did not find any 
evidence that shorter time delays are associated with more positive social responses in 
line with the Contingency model. In addition, it is a matter of debate whether mere 
contingency is ‘enough’ or whether the similarity of actions has additional importance. 
The Contingency model is directly challenged by studies comparing merely contingent 
behaviour to mimicry: in both infants (Agnetta & Rochat 2004) and adults (Hogeveen et 
al., 2014; Kulesza et al., 2014), mimicry elicits more positive responses than contingent 






behaviour or anti-mimicry. People also show a preference for movements that involve 
the same effector even when there is no temporal contingency (Sparenberg, Topolinski, 
Springer, & Prinz, 2012), which suggests that similarity of movement may still account 
for some of the positive effects of being mimicked.  
Similarity model. Like the Contingency model, the Similarity model proposes a 
direct pathway from perception-action matching to reward activation, and makes the 
claim that the most predictable response from the other person is the one with the highest 
reward value. In this context, the similarity model assumes that an imitative action is 
more rewarding than a non-imitative one because the kinematic similarity of imitation 
makes it easier to predict the imitative pattern of action. This means that imitative actions 
would be more rewarding than complementary actions. Note that overlearned 
complementary actions (e.g. the grasp patterns involved in handing a mug to another 
person) might also be highly predictable and thus rewarding. 
 There is increasing evidence that the brain is good at prediction in both perception 
and action (Brown & Brüne, 2012; Bubic, von Cramon, & Schubotz, 2010; Clark, 2013). 
In line with this evidence, the Similarity model assumes the brain is a predictive system 
which aims to anticipate future sensory inputs (Friston et al., 2011; Kilner et al., 2007), 
and which finds predictable inputs rewarding. Within this framework, the MNS is part of 
a generative model that tries to predict incoming sensory input (Kilner, 2011). Using 
knowledge of a participant’s own action and of the social context, the MNS can generate 
predictions about what the other person will do and can compare those to the other’s 
actual action. If the other person mimics the participant, the visual input is predictable 
because it is similar to the participant’s own action, leading to a low prediction error 
signal. However, if the other person does not mimic but instead performs some other 
action, the visual input is less predictable and the error signal is higher. This means that 
interacting with someone who mimics leads to less prediction error and more activation 
of reward-related brain networks, which could induce a positive or prosocial mood.  






Like the Contingency model, the Similarity model could also generalise to take into 
account contextual expectations of mimicry. It has previously been suggested that not 
being imitated is generally unexpected, and therefore experienced negatively (van 
Baaren, Decety, et al., 2009). If a participant is in a context where mimicry is likely (e.g. 
interacting with an in-group member), then their MNS will generate a mimicry prediction 
and when this matches their visual input, prediction error is low and reward is high. 
However, if a participant is in a context where mimicry is not likely (e.g. interacting with 
an outgroup member), then their MNS will predict other actions which are not similar to 
their own. If the interaction partner does mimic, the visual input concerning their actions 
will not match the predicted visual input, leading to a high prediction error and low reward. 
Note that this generalisation would require additional contextual information to modulate 
what the MNS predicts.  
By taking mimicry context into account, the Similarity model is able to explain both 
positive consequences of being mimicked and the breakdown of these positive 
consequences in certain contexts. Many of the positive effects of mimicry, such as 
affiliation (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Stel & Vonk, 2010), persuasion (Drury & van Swol, 
2005; van Swol, 2003) and perceived smoothness (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999) could be 
direct consequences of reward activation during social interaction. The suggestion that 
these positive responses depend on the expectation of being mimicked is also consistent 
with studies showing that mimicry from an outgroup member, high status person or 
disaffiliative person challenges our expectations, leading to cognitive resource depletion 
(Dalton et al., 2010) and negative responses (Leander et al., 2012). The Similarity model 
is also consistent with data suggesting that individual differences in self-construal 
mediate whether people respond positively to being mimicked. Considering that self-
construal is closely tied to cultural norms (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Sanchez-Burks et 
al., 2009), people with strongly independent self-construals may expect to be mimicked 
less often than people who feel strongly interdependent (Sanchez-Burks et al., 2009; 






Stel et al., 2011). Thus, people with independent self-construals may not respond 
positively to mimicry because they do not predict mimicry will occur. 
However, this model is less clear in explaining the link between mimicry and 
prosocial behaviour. It is unclear why a low prediction error and subsequent reward 
activation should lead to prosocial responses such as helping other people, and why 
prosocial behaviour should extend beyond the person mimicking (Van Baaren & 
Chartrand, 2005; van Baaren et al., 2004). Others have suggested that positive affect 
may be associated with creative and prosocial cognitive styles (Ashton-James & 
Chartrand, 2009), but there is no clear evidence for a pathway from reward activation to 
positive affect to generalised prosocial behaviour. Given that increased prosocial 
behaviour appears to be one of the more consistent effects of being mimicked, this is a 
significant limitation of the Similarity model. 
6.3.3 Summary 
The available neuroimaging and EEG data from mimicry, imitation and synchrony 
tasks suggested that being mimicked may activate mirror neuron systems, brain regions 
for self-other processing and reward-related systems. I have outlined three speculative 
models which link these neural systems to possible cognitive processes that follow being 
mimicked. The Self-Other Overlap model suggests that recognising a perception-action 
match in the MNS may lead to neural reward via self-other processing; in contrast, the 
Contingency model and Similarity models propose a direct link between perception-
action matching and reward activation (Figure 6-1). The Contingency model argues that 
this link depends purely on the temporal contingency of the mimicker’s actions on the 
mimickee’s and that the kinematic form of their actions is not relevant. In contrast, the 
Similarity model suggests that kinematic similarity between mimicker and mimickee 
movements increases the predictability of the mimicker’s behaviour, which reduces 
prediction error and increases reward. Each model is able to predict some of the reported 
outcomes of being mimicked. However, none of them fully explains the range of mimicry 
effects reported in previous literature (Chapter 1). This suggests the effects of being 






mimicked could be explained by a combination of the models above or other models not 
outlined here.  
However, the models outlined in this section have implications for the different 
theoretical views presented earlier. In the previous section, the question emerged: if 
being mimicked does not increase rapport or trust, why do people spontaneously mimic 
others and modulate mimicry levels strategically? I suggested three possible answers. 
Firstly, mimicry may have positive social effects under certain conditions. This account 
would be consistent with the Contingency and Similarity models, which both suggest that 
the perception of being mimicked by the MNS may be sensitive to particular 
characteristics of the mimicked action. However, it remains unclear whether contingency 
or similarity or both are important for the detection of mimicry and downstream positive 
responses. Secondly, I suggested that mimicking other people may be strategic even if 
it only has very small positive effects. All of the models in this section propose that being 
mimicked leads (directly or indirectly) to reward activation, which supports the view that 
mimicking others has positive effects on them. Thirdly, I suggested that mimicry may be 
a strategy for social understanding instead of social bonding. This view could fit with the 
Self-Other Overlap model, which suggests that any social benefits of mimicry are 
mediated by merging of self and other, similar to the idea that the purpose of mimicry 
may be to help us to align with and better understand others (Garrod & Pickering, 2004; 
Pickering & Garrod, 2013). Overall, all three suggestions could be supported by the 
different neurocognitive models outlined here. Therefore, an important challenge for 
future research will be to find ways of distinguishing between competing neurocognitive 
models and theoretical accounts of being mimicked. In the next section I will discuss 
methodological innovations which could help to drive forward the field. 
6.4 Future Methodological Directions 
A theme throughout this thesis has been to develop new methods for creating 
ecologically valid mimicry interactions and measuring the downstream effects of mimicry. 






In order to advance the field and overcome the limitations associated with traditional 
studies of mimicry using confederates, we will need to continue developing and refining 
new methodologies. In this section I outline two methodological directions that could 
benefit future research of mimicry and other forms of nonverbal behaviour in social 
interactions. The first direction would be to investigate neural responses to being 
mimicked during naturalistic social interactions using complementary fMRI and near-
infrared spectroscopy techniques. The second direction would be use a data-driven 
machine learning approach to generate realistic mimicry behaviour from virtual 
characters based on automatic extraction of mimicry parameters from real world social 
interactions. While each of these directions could offer new research opportunities, a 
major challenge will be to create effective collaborations across disciplines. Finally, I 
briefly suggest a broader scope for investigating mimicry beyond the dyadic level. 
6.4.1 Neuroimaging of Social Interactions 
To gain a more accurate understanding of brain regions and cognitive processes 
involved in being mimicked, it will be necessary to measure neural responses in 
participants during true mimicry interactions. Currently, a major challenge for any 
neuroimaging study of mimicry is generating appropriate behaviour under controlled 
conditions. The participant must generate behaviour which can be mimicked, but they 
must also not be aware that the mimicry is occurring. However, most neuroimaging 
modalities require the participant to keep still, which restricts the range of possible 
movements they can perform. To overcome this challenge, future neuroimaging studies 
could take two different approaches. 
First, virtual mimicry could be combined with fMRI. Crucially, virtual mimicry 
paradigms involve very precise control of mimicry timing and may therefore provide 
suitable manipulations for fMRI. In order to translate virtual mimicry into the scanner 
setting, it would be necessary to use a non-magnetic motion tracking system to record 
the participant’s movements and drive the virtual character’s behaviour. Due to the 
sensitivity of fMRI to motion artifacts, it would also be necessary to restrict the range of 






head and body movement made by the participant within the scanner. Freedom of 
movement could be increased by using an optical tracking system to control for motion 
artifacts (Zaitsev, Dold, Sakas, Hennig, & Speck, 2006), or alternatively hand movements 
could be the target mimicry (cf. Guionnet et al., 2012). However, the constriction of the 
fMRI environment might also make it difficult to achieve an ecologically valid social 
interaction when using virtual characters. Another challenge would be to forge 
collaborations between researchers with expertise in VR and neuroimaging. Although 
some studies have already used virtual agents and environments for neuroimaging (e.g. 
Gould et al., 2007; King, Burgess, Hartley, Vargha-Khadem, & O’Keefe, 2002; Ninaus et 
al., 2014; Schilbach et al., 2010, 2011; Wilms et al., 2010), these are much rarer than 
behavioural social psychology studies using VR, where there is greater overlap between 
disciplines. Therefore, research combining VR and neuroimaging might benefit from 
more meetings and workshops for collaboration between computer scientists and 
neuroscientists. 
A second option would be to study mimicry in live face-to-face interactions using 
functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS). Whereas most neuroimaging modalities 
require the participant to keep still, which restricts the range of movements that can be 
mimicked, fNIRS avoids this challenge by measuring haemodynamic responses in the 
brain using infrared light optodes fitted against the scalp. Since fNIRS is portable and 
much less sensitive to motion artifacts than fMRI or EEG, participants are able to move 
freely in a face-to-face interaction. A recent experiment demonstrated this possibility by 
using fNIRS while participants played the popular dance video game, Dance Dance 
Revolution (Noah et al., 2015). Participants also completed a version of the game 
adapted for fMRI, and the researchers confirmed there were equivalent activation 
patterns between the two methods, consistent with other cross-validations (Irani, Platek, 
Bunce, Ruocco, & Chute, 2007). However, participants were asked not to touch their 
face or head while wearing the fNIRS optodes in order to avoid face-touching artifacts; 
this is a disadvantage for studies of mimicry, as face-touching is a commonly mimicked 






action (Cheng & Chartrand, 2003; Lakin & Chartrand, 2003; van Baaren et al., 2003). 
Limited depth of penetration in fNIRS also presents a major challenge for testing the 
possible role of the neural reward system in neurocognitive models of mimicry, because 
activity in regions such as the caudate and insula would not be detectable using fNIRS.  
Moving forward, an optimal strategy for neuroimaging studies of being mimicked 
could be to carry out complementary experiments using fMRI and fNIRS (Noah et al., 
2015). Whereas fMRI could provide high spatial resolution about brain regions activated 
by being mimicked, fNIRS provides greater ecological validity to examine mimicry in real-
world contexts. Despite this advantage, many studies using fNIRS are still currently 
restricted to artificial laboratory settings (Piper et al., 2014). However, to use fNIRS in 
more naturalistic settings would provide valuable neural data that could help to 
distinguish between possible neurocognitive models for responding to mimicry, such as 
those outlined in the previous section. Due to the scarcity of neural data from participants 
being mimicked, these models had to draw from neuroimaging studies which tapped into 
related processes such as deliberate imitation and behavioural synchrony. In order to 
generate more detailed and accurate models of the neural and cognitive processes 
involved in being mimicked, it will therefore be important to exploit neuroimaging 
methods such as fNIRS to measure responses to being mimicked in naturalistic social 
settings. 
6.4.2 Improving Virtual Mimicry through Machine Learning 
Another major opportunity for future research will be to take a data-driven approach 
to building more socially realistic virtual characters. In our virtual mimicry experiments 
(Chapters 3 and 4) we have demonstrated the experimental benefits of ‘reverse 
engineering’ virtual characters in order to generate highly controlled social interactions. 
However, these studies also highlighted major limitation of the reverse-engineered 
approach: we currently lack detailed knowledge of many behavioural parameters that 
might need to be programmed into virtual characters, such as when and how much they 
should mimic, when it is appropriate to blink or smile, or what combinations of nonverbal 






behaviours should go together. Until we have a more systematic knowledge of people’s 
natural behaviour it will be very difficult to manually design fully realistic virtual characters 
that can generate social responses equal (or very close) to human confederates. Virtual 
agents that do successfully generate feelings such as trust and rapport have been 
achieved through many iterations of trial-and-error in programming (e.g. Gratch et al., 
2006, 2007; Huang, Morency, & Gratch, 2011; Verberne et al., 2013, 2015). 
However, there is a current trend in computer science of moving away from trial-
and-error to developing more data-driven ways of animating virtual characters. In 
Chapter 5, we outlined how our data about the frequency parameters of mimicry in 
naturalistic conversations could be used to inform more naturalistic algorithms for 
animating virtual characters. We suggested that virtual mimickers might achieve stronger 
social effects if they only mimicked head movements at frequencies below 1.5 Hz, as 
this was the boundary we found for mimicry of head movements in natural conversations. 
Although we think this kind of tweak to our current avatars would be a step in the right 
direction, to generate a fully realistic avatar this way would rely on further studies of other 
mimicry parameters and very time-consuming programming to translate observed 
behaviour into animation. However, these limitations might be overcome by using 
machine learning to uncover the natural patterns of behaviour in social interactions. 
Machine learning is a computing method associated with cognitive simulation, or 
artificial intelligence (Michalski, Carbonell, & Mitchell, 2013). It involves programming 
computers with algorithms that can learn from and make predictions about datasets 
without being explicitly programmed. For example, given a dataset about diseases and 
their symptoms, a machine learning algorithm could learn to predict the disease a patient 
has based on their symptoms (Koller & Friedman, 2009). In the context of modelling 
social interactions, machine learning can extract correlated features from a dataset 
describing the social interaction and then generate a probabilistic model predicting the 
behaviour of one person based on the other.  






If we wanted to get a model that predicts when and how to mimic a participant, 
then the first step would be to motion track real people engaging in mimicry during a 
social interaction and record their data as a time series (as we did in Chapter 5). The 
next step would be to apply a machine learning algorithm to reduce the dimensionality 
of the dataset, by ‘clustering’ the motion data into different possible ‘actions’ (Gillies, 
2009). The final step would be to computationally model the probabilistic relationship 
between different actions, such as nodding and leaning forwards, or mimicked actions 
such as one person nodding and the other person nodding at the next time point. Hidden 
Markov models are suitable for this step, because they are able to model sequential 
outcomes (such as actions) driven by ‘hidden’ states within the system (analagous to 
mental states) (e.g. Mead, Atrash, & Matarić, 2013; Mihoub, Bailly, & Wolf, 2013). The 
model derived from real world data can then be used to drive the behaviour of a virtual 
character: if input behaviour from a participant is fed into the model, then the virtual 
character will be able to respond appropriately to the participant’s behaviour in real time. 
In this way, machine learning may be able to generate virtual character animations that 
closely approximate real-world behaviour without the need to manually test different 
behavioural parameters and code them individually (Gillies, 2009).  
This kind of data-driven approach to generating social behaviours from virtual 
characters will require strong interdisciplinary collaboration. Implementing machine 
learning models and animating virtual characters from scratch is outside of the scope of 
most social psychology laboratories. On the computing side, theoretical knowledge of 
social interactions is also needed for the ‘human component’ of designing and fine-tuning 
of computer models (Gillies et al., 2016). Both sides may also need to work with 
technologists and engineers to select and use motion capture equipment suitable for 
capturing social behaviours. Therefore, for data-driven approaches to drive forward the 
social realism of avatars as research tools, strong collaborations will be needed across 
disciplines.  






6.4.3 Beyond Dyadic Interactions 
Throughout this thesis, we specifically focused on mimicry between adult dyads, 
reflecting much of the empirical work on mimicry, synchrony and other forms of 
interpersonal coordination. Here, I would like to briefly draw attention to the broader 
possibility of studying mimicry at a group level. 
As a general rule, experiments and theories in the field of mimicry have focused 
on dyadic interactions where one person mimics another. Some exceptions include early 
microanalysis studies of interpersonal coordination in videotapes of many people 
interacting (e.g. Condon & Ogston, 1966; Kendon, 1970) and more recent motion capture 
research measuring how much people mimic one another in small groups of three (Feese 
et al., 2011, 2012). One study by van Swol (2003) also tested the effect of mimicry in a 
group discussion between one participant and two confederates, where only one 
confederate mimicked. In addition, van Baaren and Chatrand (2005) demonstrated that 
prosocial consequences of being mimicked may extend to helping people outside of the 
dyad. However, very few other studies have examined mimicry production in group 
settings or the group consequences of being mimicked. A related phenomenon which 
has received more attention is the contagion of emotions and moods within groups 
(Chartrand & Lakin, 2013; Neumann & Strack, 2000). Recently, two studies have focused 
on the production of mimicry towards multiple targets. Cracco et al. (2015) found 
evidence for the automatic imitation of finger movements two people presented at the 
same time in a spatial response compatibility (SRC) task. Another study by Tsai, Sebanz 
and Knoblich (2011) showed that pairs of participants mimic hand actions made by other 
pairs more than actions made by an individual, leading them to suggest that groups 
mimic group actions. Together, these finding suggests people may mimic multiple others 
within a group. This opens up the future possibility of exploring the social consequences 
of mimicking and being mimicked by multiple people.  







This thesis has used novel methods to rigorously test the claim that being mimicked 
leads to rapport and trust towards the mimicker, in line with the social glue theory of 
mimicry. This work has extended the field of mimicry research by introducing new virtual 
reality paradigms, testing novel factors that could modulate responses to being 
mimicked, and developing a new wavelet analysis pipeline for examining the rhythmic 
properties of spontaneous mimicry. In addition we have contributed to improving 
scientific practice in this field by replicating exploratory studies with strict, pre-registered 
methods and reporting Bayesian analyses as an alternative to null-hypothesis 
significance tests. Under strictly controlled conditions in virtual reality, we did not find 
reliable effects of mimicry on rapport or trust, suggesting that mimicry of head and torso 
movements alone cannot generate positive social effects as the social glue theory 
predicts. We found that spontaneous interpersonal coordination in naturalistic 
conversations involves reliable decoupling in head movements alongside mimicry and 
synchronisation. Overall, our data suggests that mimicry does not have a straightforward 
role in creating rapport and trust, and that these outcomes may depend on the specific 
parameters of mimicry or the presence of other social cues. 
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